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PART 1: DECLARATION 
SITE NAME AND LOCATION 
Waste Area Group 3, Operable Unit 3-14, Tank Farm Soil and INTEC Groundwater 
Idaho National Laboratory Site, Scoville, Idaho 
CERCLIS ID No. 4890008952; CERCLA Site ID No. 1000305 
STATEMENT OF BASIS AND PURPOSE 
This decision document presents the selected remedy for Operable Unit (OU) 3-14 tank farm soil 
and groundwater at the Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center (INTEC), which is located on 
the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Site. The tank farm was initially evaluated in the OU 3-13 Record of 
Decision (ROD), and it was determined that additional information was needed to make a final decision. 
Additional information has been obtained on the nature and extent of contamination in the tank farm and 
on the impact to groundwater. The selected remedy was chosen in accordance with the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Liability and Compensation Act of 1980 (CERCLA) (42 USC 9601 et seq.), as 
amended by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (Public Law 99-499) and the 
National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (40 CFR 300). The selected remedy 
is intended to be the final action for tank farm soil and groundwater at INTEC.  
The U.S. Department of Energy Idaho Operations Office (DOE-ID) is the lead agency for this 
decision. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Region 10 approves this decision and the 
Idaho Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) concurs. EPA and DEQ have participated in the 
evaluation and selection of remedies for OU 3-14 sites and groundwater, including the no action and 
institutional control decisions. The basis for decisions is established in this ROD and documented in the 
Administrative Record file for OU 3-14.  
ASSESSMENT OF SITE 
The response action selected in this ROD is necessary to protect the public health, welfare, or the 
environment from actual or threatened releases of hazardous substances into the environment. Such a 
release or threat of release may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to public health, 
welfare, or the environment. The remedial actions selected in this ROD are designed to reduce the 
potential threats to human health and the environment to acceptable levels. In addition, DOE-ID, EPA, 
and DEQ (the Agencies) have determined that no action is necessary under CERCLA to protect public 
health, welfare, or the environment at 16 sites located outside the tank farm boundary.  
DESCRIPTION OF THE SELECTED REMEDY 
The tank farm remedial action is part of the Idaho Cleanup Project at the INL Site. A 
comprehensive ROD was completed for INTEC (OU 3-13) in 1999 (DOE-ID 1999a). As part of the 
OU 3-13 ROD, the Agencies determined that they needed more information and created OU 3-14 to 
conduct further investigations and select a final remedy for tank farm soil and INTEC groundwater. The 
OU 3-14 remedy supersedes the OU 3-13 interim actions and is integrated with the OU 3-13 final actions. 
The OU 3-14 remedy is independent of, but coordinated with, the ongoing INTEC operations and the 
Tank Farm Facility closure being performed under the State of Idaho Hazardous Waste Management 
Act/Resource Conservation and Recovery Act.  
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The major threats posed by contaminated soil inside the tank farm boundary are direct radiation 
exposure to workers and internal exposure to biota (such as insects and birds) from radionuclides in the 
soil. The major threat posed by groundwater is potential ingestion of radionuclide-contaminated water 
from a portion of the Snake River Plain Aquifer under the INTEC facility in the year 2095 (assumed start 
of hypothetical residential scenario) and beyond. Although the OU 3-13 ROD considered tank farm soil 
principal threat waste due to direct radiation exposure and potential leaching and transport of 
contaminants to the perched water or the Snake River Plain Aquifer, the ROD required further study of 
tank farm soil under OU 3-14 in order to make a final remedial decision. Further investigation under 
OU 3-14 has determined, using EPA guidance (EPA 1991), that the soil is not principal threat waste. This 
determination was made because the residual contamination in the soil is not highly mobile (cesium-137) 
or no longer mobile (residual strontium-90 in the soil) and not a threat to the Snake River Plain Aquifer. 
Treatment of the soil was considered in the OU 3-14 Feasibility Study but not selected based on (1) the 
effectiveness of soil containment, (2) the protectiveness provided by containment for human health and 
the environment, (3) the other CERCLA evaluation criteria, and (4) the difficulty of treatment due to the 
complexity of the site and the limitations of treatment technologies for radionuclides in soil. OU 3-14 
determined that the threat to the Snake River Plain Aquifer is from the strontium-90 that migrated over 
30 years ago to the perched water system, which is not principal threat waste by definition (EPA 1991). 
The remedy is designed to reduce downward transport of strontium-90 out of the perched water system to 
protect the Snake River Plain Aquifer.  
The purposes of the selected remedy are to (1) contain contaminated soil as the radionuclides decay 
in place, (2) isolate current and future workers and biological receptors from contact with contaminated 
soil, and (3) restore the portion of Snake River Plain Aquifer contaminated by INTEC releases to Idaho 
Ground Water Quality standards (same as maximum contaminant levels) by reducing water infiltration 
through strontium-90 contaminated perched water and interbeds. In addition, the remedy will prevent 
future drinking water wells from being drilled into the contaminated portion of the aquifer that is in and 
near the INTEC facility until such time as the water is restored to maximum contaminant levels or below.  
The selected remedy for OU 3-14 consists of remedial actions for tank farm soil and groundwater 
and no action for a group of sites outside the tank farm. Major components of the selected remedy are 
summarized below, beginning with items that are common to all time periods (Items 1 through 4), and 
ending with items that are specific to a time period (Items 5 through 7):  
1. Institutional controls will be implemented to prevent exposure to the contaminated soil and 
groundwater and prevent land uses that would be inconsistent with the selected remedy. The 
institutional controls include restrictions to (a) eliminate or minimize exposure to contaminated soil 
or groundwater; (b) limit disturbances of contaminated tank farm soil by non-CERCLA activities; 
(c) prohibit the use of the portion of the Snake River Plain Aquifer in proximity to INTEC that 
exceeds maximum contaminant levels; and (d) control drilling activities that could cause potential 
cross contamination between contaminated perched water and the Snake River Plain Aquifer. 
These controls will be included in the INL’s Sitewide institutional controls plan. 
2. Contaminant concentrations and water levels in perched water and Snake River Plain Aquifer 
indicator wells will be monitored in accordance with a long-term monitoring plan to assist in 
determining the effectiveness of the groundwater remedy and to ensure that the portions of the 
Snake River Plain Aquifer contaminated by INTEC releases will meet maximum contaminant 
levels by 2095.  
3. The selected remedy for 16 sites outside the tank farm boundary is no action under CERCLA. 
Three of these sites (CPP-125, CPP-126, and CPP-128) involved leaks or releases of 
nonradioactive, nonhazardous steam condensate or service wastewater and, therefore, require no 
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action. The remaining 13 no action sites (CPP-102, CPP-103, CPP-104, CPP-105, CPP-106, 
CPP-107, CPP-108, CPP-109, CPP-110, CPP-113, CPP-114, CPP-115, CPP-116) are shallow 
injection wells associated with the steam system. Releases associated with these sites do not pose 
an unacceptable risk to human health or the environment based on unlimited use and unrestricted 
exposures and, therefore, do not require CERCLA remediation or implementation of institutional 
controls. Therefore, upon finalization of the no action decision in this ROD, the sites will exit the 
CERCLA process.  
4. If historic releases to the environment are discovered after the ROD is implemented, this 
contamination will be addressed using the process the Agencies have established for evaluation and 
inclusion of new sites under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order. Using this process, 
a newly identified release is evaluated and, if the contaminants are addressed in an existing ROD, 
the Agencies may determine that the site may be remediated under the existing ROD. These sites 
will undergo evaluation during the 5-year review process to assess whether the actions taken are 
sufficient to protect human health and the environment. To protect workers, the public, and the 
environment, the institutional controls for newly identified sites will be implemented using the 
controls in place for similar sites in the operable unit. 
5. Prior to Tank Farm Facility closure, these major components will be implemented: 
• Install and maintain a low-permeability pavement (or equivalent barrier to reduce infiltration) over 
the recharge control zone outside the tank farm with expanded drainage system to reduce 
infiltration of precipitation without interfering with ongoing INTEC operations and remediation 
activities. Direct water run-off toward lined ditches, which will divert it to an evaporation pond. As 
buildings and structures are removed through deactivation, decontamination, and 
decommissioning, extend the low-permeability pavement to maintain an infiltration-reducing 
barrier over the recharge control zone outside the tank farm.  
• Maintain the Tank Farm Interim Action system per the Operations and Maintenance Plan until the 
selected remedy’s drainage and water management system is expanded. Approval of the OU 3-14 
Remedial Design/Remedial Action Work Plan, and expansion, completes the Tank Farm Interim 
Action.  
• Implement and maintain additional recharge controls in northern INTEC to reduce anthropogenic 
and storm water recharge to the northern perched water zones.  
6. Following Tank Farm Facility closure, these major components will be implemented: 
• Install a low-permeability pavement (or equivalent barrier to reduce infiltration) over the north, 
central, and south tank farm to reduce infiltration of precipitation. Direct captured surface water 
run-off toward lined ditches, culverts, and lift station(s) for transport to the lined evaporation pond. 
• Maintain the drainage system and low-permeability pavement over the recharge control zone to 
reduce infiltration of precipitation without interfering with ongoing INTEC cleanup operations. 
• Maintain the recharge controls in northern INTEC to reduce anthropogenic and storm water 
recharge sources to the northern perched water zones. 
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7. As part of and coordinated with INTEC facility closure, these major components will be 
implemented: 
• Install a protective cover over the north tank farm. Use characterization results to design the 
protective cover (i.e., maintain the low-permeability pavement, excavate soil and replace with clean 
backfill and new low-permeability pavement or equivalent barrier to reduce infiltration, or extend 
the evapotranspiration cap with capillary biobarrier [ET/CB] that is to be placed over the central 
area). 
• Install an ET/CB over the central and south tank farm to protect workers from exposure.  
• Monitor and maintain the ET/CB, low-permeability pavement, and drainage system to reduce 
infiltration of precipitation. 
Waste Management 
Soil and other media that have become contaminated by contact with sodium-bearing waste or 
high-level waste are contaminated media. The characteristics and concentrations of the contaminated soil 
and media have been altered over time due to transport through the subsurface, chemical and/or physical 
reaction with surrounding materials, and radioactive decay. Tank farm activities, such as construction, 
maintenance, and removal of these soils and media, have further modified contaminant concentrations. 
Contaminated soil and media that are disturbed and removed during remediation activities will be 
managed based on the actual radioactive and chemical characteristics and concentrations of the media. 
Contaminated media from OU 3-14 activities, debris, sample equipment and residue, personal 
protective equipment, and other investigation- or remediation-derived waste can be disposed of in the 
Idaho CERCLA Disposal Facility, subject to meeting the facility’s Waste Acceptance Criteria. This 
includes waste generated as a result of previous sampling activities under the OU 3-14 remedial 
investigation/feasibility study (known as investigation-derived waste). Waste from OU 3-14 remedial 
design/remedial action activities and investigation-derived waste will be temporarily consolidated within 
the Waste Area Group 3 area of contamination (described in the OU 3-13 ROD, DOE-ID 1999a).  
This ROD also recognizes that OU 3-14 contaminated soil may be disturbed through maintenance 
or upgrade activities associated with INTEC operations before the final CERCLA remedy is fully 
implemented. The contaminated soil and media that are generated will be CERCLA remediation waste, 
because the removal and subsequent storage and disposal of contaminated soil represent progress toward 
cleanup and can, therefore, be disposed of in the Idaho CERCLA Disposal Facility and otherwise 
consolidated in accordance with CERCLA within the INL Site. 
STATUTORY DETERMINATIONS 
Statutory Requirements—The selected remedy attains the mandates of CERCLA § 121 
(42 USC 9621) and is protective of human health and the environment, complies with federal and state 
requirements that are applicable or relevant and appropriate to the remedial action, is cost-effective, and 
uses permanent solutions. 
Statutory Preference for Treatment—The National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution 
Contingency Plan expresses a preference for remedies that use permanent solutions and alternative 
treatment technologies to the maximum extent possible to reduce toxicity, mobility, and volume. The 
remedy in this OU does not employ treatment, which is statutorily preferred to the extent practical, as a 
principal element of the remedy for the following reasons: (1) most of the contaminants of concern are 
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radionuclides that cannot be destroyed through treatment, (2) a cost-effective method to separate 
cesium-137 from the soil is not available, and (3) the selected remedy, containment, meets EPA’s 
preference for sites where treatment is impractical.  
Five-Year Review Requirement—Land use and groundwater restrictions are necessary because 
the selected remedy will result in contaminants remaining onsite in soil and groundwater at levels above 
those that allow for unlimited use and unrestricted exposure. A statutory review will be conducted within 
5 years after startup of the remedial action to ensure that the remedy continues to provide adequate 
protection for human health and the environment. The 5-year review will evaluate such factors as 
contaminant migration from sites where contamination has been left in place, effectiveness of institutional 
controls, and overall effectiveness of the remedial actions. Five-year reviews will be conducted for 
remediated sites with institutional controls until it has been determined during a 5-year review that 
controls and reviews are no longer necessary. It is anticipated that the 5-year review for this operable unit 
(OU 3-14) will be combined with the comprehensive 5-year review for CERCLA response actions at the 
INL Site, as practical. 
RECORD OF DECISION DATA CERTIFICATION CHECKLIST 
The information listed below is included in the Decision Summary (Part 2) of this ROD: 
• Contaminants of concern and their respective concentrations (see Sections 5.2.2, OU 3-14 2004 
Soil Sampling Results; 5.6, Current Perched Water and Aquifer Contamination; and 7, Site Risks). 
• Baseline risks represented by the contaminants of concern (see Section 7, Site Risks). 
• Cleanup levels established for the contaminants of concern and the basis for the levels (see 
Section 9, Remediation Goals). 
• No source materials constituting principal threats were encountered.  
• Current and reasonably anticipated future land use assumptions and current and potential future 
beneficial uses of groundwater used in the baseline risk assessment and ROD (see Sections 4, 
Scope and Role of Response Action; 6, Current and Potential Future Site and Resource Uses; and 
12.4, Expected Outcomes of the Selected Remedy). 
• Potential land use and groundwater use that will be available at the site as a result of the selected 
remedy (see Section 12.4, Expected Outcomes of the Selected Remedy). 
• Estimated capital, annual operations and maintenance, and total net present value costs; the 
discount rate; and the number of years over which the remedy cost estimates are projected 
(see Section 12.3, Estimated Cost for the Selected Remedy). 
• Key factors that led to selecting the remedies (see Sections 7.5, Basis for Action, and 12.1, 
Summary of the Rationale for the Selected Remedy). 
Additional information can be found in the Administrative Record for OU 3-14. 
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 1-1 
PART 2: DECISION SUMMARY 
1. SITE NAME, LOCATION, AND BRIEF DESCRIPTION 
Operable Unit (OU) 3-14 in Waste Area Group (WAG) 3 is located at the Idaho Nuclear 
Technology and Engineering Center (INTEC) on the Idaho National Laboratory (INL)a Site in 
southeastern Idaho. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act 
(CERCLA) (42 USC 9601 et seq.) identification number for the INL Site is 1000305. 
The U.S. Department of Energy Idaho Operations Office (DOE-ID) is the lead agency responsible 
for the Idaho Cleanup Project’s (ICP’s) cleanup actions. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) Region 10 and the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) are support agencies and 
are responsible for regulatory oversight. DOE-ID, EPA, and DEQ are referred to collectively as the 
Agencies. EPA approves of the decision presented in this Record of Decision (ROD) and DEQ concurs. 
Both EPA and DEQ participated in the evaluation and selection of remedies for OU 3-14. 
OU 3-14 consists of a group of soil sites located in and around the INTEC tank farm (see 
Figure 1-1), contaminated backfill within the tank farm boundary, and the underlying Snake River Plain 
Aquifer (SRPA) affected by INTEC releases. The OU 3-14 soil sites are located in an industrial land use 
area.  
                                                     
a. INL’s name has changed over time. It began as the National Reactor Testing Station, was the Idaho National Engineering 
Laboratory from 1974 through 1996, and was the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory from 1997 through 
January 2005, when it became Idaho National Laboratory. 
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Figure 1-1. Location of INL Site, INTEC, and tank farm. 
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2. SITE HISTORY AND ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES 
This ROD selects a remedy for OU 3-14 CERCLA sites that are collocated within an operating 
Hazardous Waste Management Act (HWMA)/Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) facility. 
The regulatory background under CERCLA is summarized below and includes a discussion of CERCLA, 
OU 3-13 (some OU 3-14 sites were originally in OU 3-13), and HWMA/RCRA as they pertain to the 
OU 3-14 remedy for the tank farm soil and INTEC groundwater. The OU 3-14 remedy for the 
contaminated soil surrounding the tanks is integrated with, and limited by, ongoing HWMA/RCRA 
closure activities and ongoing INTEC cleanup operations. 
2.1 Site History 
The tank farm was built beginning in the early 1950s and continuing into the mid-1960s. The tank 
farm is an integral part of the former Chemical Processing Plant (CPP, also called the Idaho Chemical 
Processing Plant [ICPP]), which is now INTEC. The Chemical Processing Plant was built to reprocess 
spent nuclear fuel (SNF) from reactors and recover and recycle uranium-235 (U-235) and other nuclear 
materials. Fuel reprocessing generated highly radioactive wastes. These wastes were stored underground 
in the tank farm in stainless-steel tanks. Most of these wastes have been removed from the tanks for 
treatment and have been concentrated in evaporators and/or converted into solids through a process called 
calcining. 
From a CERCLA perspective, the term “tank farm” refers to the underground tanks used to store 
radioactive liquid wastes; the infrastructure used to transfer, monitor, and control the liquid wastes; and 
the surrounding soil within the tank farm boundary. Some of the piping and valves outside both the tanks 
and vaults leaked, contaminating soil, perched water, and groundwater. Some of the leaks were a result of 
flaws in piping or valve designs that were corrected during several major upgrades at the tank farm. The 
leaks and spills occurred mainly between 1954 and 1986. No leaks occurred from the tanks themselves.  
Another source of contamination was the former INTEC injection well. It was used from the early 
1950s to the mid-1980s for the routine discharge of service wastewater to the SRPA. The well was sealed 
and abandoned in 1989. 
2.2 Regulatory Status of the Tank Farm Facility 
The CERCLA tank farm soil and INTEC groundwater remedial action is independent of, and 
coordinated with, the operations and closure of the Tank Farm Facility (TFF). The TFF consists of eleven 
300,000-gal and four 30,000-gal belowgrade stainless-steel tanks and the associated piping, valve boxes, 
encasements, and vaults. The hazardous components of wastes stored at the TFF are regulated through 
DEQ. The TFF is currently operating under HWMA/RCRA interim status as a hazardous waste 
management unit and is undergoing closure. As such, the requirements of 40 CFR 265, “Interim Status 
Standards for Owners and Operators of Hazardous Waste Treatment, Storage, and Disposal Facilities,” 
apply to tank closure. These requirements apply to the 15 underground tanks, the tanks’ contents, and 
ancillary equipment and piping. 
The HWMA/RCRA closure of the tank system (emptying, cleaning, and grouting in place) is being 
performed in phases in accordance with a closure plan that is prepared for each phase. The final closure of 
the tank system will be complete when all of the tanks and ancillary equipment have been closed, 
including any post-closure requirements. A decision to close the tank system as a landfill or as a 
HWMA/RCRA clean closure will be determined during final closure (DOE-ID 2003), currently 
scheduled to be completed by December 31, 2012. The TFF is also being closed in accordance with 
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Department of Energy (DOE) Order 435.1 requirements for managing a radioactive waste storage facility 
and the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act (Public Law 108-375). 
2.3 Background of CERCLA Investigations, Remedial Actions, 
and Enforcement Activities 
This section of the ROD summarizes the CERCLA activities that are pertinent for OU 3-14. 
2.3.1 OU 3-13 and OU 3-14 
The INL Site was placed on the National Priorities List (NPL) of CERCLA hazardous substance 
release sites in 1989 (40 CFR 300) and became subject to the provisions of CERCLA § 120 
(42 USC 9620) governing remedial action at federal facilities. The former INTEC injection well was one 
of the sites that caused the INL Site to be listed on the NPL. In 1991, the Agencies signed a Federal 
Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFA/CO) and Action Plan (DOE-ID 1991) governing CERCLA 
cleanups and HWMA/RCRA corrective actions on the INL Site. Under the terms of the CERCLA § 120 
as implemented through the FFA/CO, DOE will carry out the cleanup and fund all associated costs. 
The FFA/CO placed all known CERCLA release sites at INTEC in OU 3-13 and required a 
comprehensive remedial investigation/feasibility study (RI/FS) for this OU. All known release sites 
within INTEC in 1997 were evaluated in the OU 3-13 Comprehensive RI/FS (DOE-ID 1997a, b). 
Ninety-five release sites were evaluated in the RI, 40 of which exceeded the soil remedial action 
objectives (RAOs) and were, therefore, further evaluated for remedial alternatives in the FS. In 1999, the 
Agencies signed the ROD for OU 3-13 (DOE-ID 1999a). The ROD divided the WAG 3 release sites 
requiring remedial action into groups according to shared characteristics or common contaminant sources. 
The groups that are relevant for this OU 3-14 ROD are 
• Group 1: Tank Farm Soils 
• Group 2: Soils Under Buildings and Structures 
• Group 3: Other Surface Soils 
• Group 4: Perched Water 
• Group 5: Snake River Plain Aquifer. 
As part of the OU 3-13 ROD, the Agencies determined that they needed more information before 
they could make a final remedial action decision. Information needed included 
• The nature and extent of contamination in tank farm soil, including contaminated backfill, and in 
three soil sites outside the tank farm, as well as the impact of this contamination on groundwater 
• Whether the former injection well, which was used from the early 1950s to 1986, was a continuing 
source of contamination to groundwater 
• How a planned environmental impact statement (DOE 2002, 2005) for disposition of the waste in 
the TFF tanks would affect the decision for contaminated soil surrounding the tanks. 
To address the need for the additional information, the Agencies created OU 3-14 to conduct 
further investigations and select a final remedy for tank farm soil and groundwater, while interim actions 
were being implemented under the OU 3-13 ROD. The final remedy for tank farm soil and groundwater 
in the OU 3-14 ROD supersedes the OU 3-13 Group 1 and Group 5 interim actions. 
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2.3.2 OU 3-13 Group 1, Tank Farm Soil 
2.3.2.1 Tank Farm Interim Action. The Tank Farm Interim Action (TFIA) addressed sites with 
soil contamination located in the area of the tank farm. The interim action was selected to provide 
protection until a final remedy could be developed and implemented. The major components of the 
remedy for the TFIA (Tank Farm Soils, Group 1) (DOE-ID 1999a) were to  
• Restrict access to soil to control exposure to workers and prevent exposure to the public 
• Reduce precipitation infiltration by 80% of the average annual precipitation at the tank farm by 
grading and surface-sealing the tank farm soil 
• Use surface water run-on diversion channels to accommodate a one-in-25-year, 24-hour storm 
event 
• Improve exterior building drainage to direct water away from the contaminated areas. 
The interim action specified for tank farm soil consisted of institutional controls (ICs) with surface 
water control to reduce surface water infiltration into tank farm soil until OU 3-14 remedial action begins. 
2.3.2.2 Agreement to Resolve Dispute. During implementation of the TFIA Remedial 
Design/Remedial Action (RD/RA) Work Plan (DOE-ID 2000a), EPA issued a Notice of Violation (NOV) 
for a dispute raised under the FFA/CO (Kreizenbeck 2002). The NOV alleged that violations were caused 
by the failure of DOE-ID to complete work as required under the RD/RA Work Plan (DOE-ID 2000a). 
On February 21, 2003, the Agencies agreed to resolve the dispute. 
In the Agreement to Resolve Dispute (ARD) (DOE 2003), DOE-ID agreed to meet the intent of the 
TFIA by completing two phases. Phase 1, completed before September 30, 2003, included improving 
storm water drainage and collection to reduce infiltration. Phase 2, completed by September 30, 2004, 
required DOE-ID to place infiltration barriers over the affected areas of three principal soil contamination 
sites (CPP-28, CPP-31, and CPP-79). The purpose of Phase 2 was to meet the intent of the interim action, 
which was to reduce precipitation infiltration. 
In the ARD, DOE-ID also agreed to revise the data quality objectives as a modification to the 
existing Operable Unit 3-14 Tank Farm Soil and Groundwater Phase I Remedial 
Investigation/Feasibility Study Work Plan (DOE-ID 2000b). The revised RI/FS Work Plan 
(DOE-ID 2004a) superseded the December 2000 Work Plan and the 1999 RD/RA Scope of Work 
(DOE-ID 1999b). In the ARD, the Agencies agreed to a planned date of December 31, 2006, for 
completion of an early draft OU 3-14 ROD. 
2.3.2.3 Explanation of Significant Differences for OU 3-13 ROD. DOE-ID also agreed in the 
ARD to separate the non-tank-farm soil components from the OU 3-14 RI/FS (the former INTEC 
injection well [CPP-23] and three no action sites [CPP-61, CPP-81, and CPP-82]) and prepare an 
Explanation of Significant Differences (ESD) to the OU 3-13 ROD to address these components. 
Additional investigations were completed on the former INTEC injection well and three no action sites 
(CPP-61, CPP-81, and CPP-82). The investigations determined that the three soil sites required either no 
action or no further action. The ESD, which was signed by the Agencies in 2004 (DOE-ID 2004b), 
transferred the three soil sites back to OU 3-13 and finalized the no (further) action decisions for these 
sites. The investigations also determined that the former injection well was not a continuing source of 
contamination to groundwater. The ESD transferred the injection well to OU 3-13 Group 5, established 
additional SRPA monitoring requirements, and modified the Group 5 interim remedy.  
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2.3.3 OU 3-13 Group 2, Soils under Buildings and Structures 
Group 2 release sites are contaminated soils that are located under buildings and structures. Until 
the buildings and structures are closed and removed, the structures help to minimize infiltration of water 
through the contaminated soil and prevent direct exposure of personnel. Once the structures are removed, 
the sites will be remediated in accordance with the remedy that applies to the particular area.  
2.3.4 OU 3-13 Group 3, Other Surface Soils  
Group 3 is other surface soil sites that have been contaminated by radiological and chemical spills 
and releases. The remediation of Group 3 sites consists of excavation to remove the contaminated soil or 
capping the contaminated areas. Some Group 3 sites occur in the OU 3-14 industrial use area. 
2.3.5 OU 3-13 Group 4, Perched Water Final Action  
Perched water (limited zone of subsurface water that is separated from the SRPA by layers of 
unsaturated basalt and other geologic materials) exists beneath the tank farm and is a potential pathway 
for contaminants to migrate to the aquifer (DOE-ID 1999a). The OU 3-13 perched water (Group 4) 
remediation goals are to (1) reduce recharge to the perched zones and (2) minimize the migration of 
contaminants to the aquifer so that SRPA groundwater outside of the INTEC security fence meets, by 
2095, applicable State of Idaho groundwater standards (same as maximum contaminant levels [MCLs]). 
The selected OU 3-13 perched water remedy consists of ICs combined with recharge controls and 
includes the following items: 
• Implementing ICs that include limiting access to prevent perched water use and future 
unauthorized drilling into or through the perched zone. 
• Controlling surface water recharge to perched water by upgrading the surface water drainage 
system on and near the tank farm and implementing infiltration controls. Actions taken to reduce 
infiltration include removing the former INTEC percolation ponds from service and replacing them 
with new percolation ponds located 2 miles west of INTEC, minimizing lawn irrigation at INTEC, 
minimizing steam condensate discharges to ground, and eliminating the Sewage Treatment Plant’s 
infiltration trenches by redirecting the treated wastewater effluent to the new percolation ponds. 
The TFIA implemented upgrades to surface water drainage systems within the tank farm and 
immediate area, including construction of a lined storm water retention pond to manage this 
drainage. The OU 3-13 ROD also stated that additional infiltration controls, if necessary, might 
include lining the adjacent reach of the Big Lost River (BLR). 
• Measuring moisture content and contaminant of concern (COC) concentrations in the perched 
water to determine if water contents and contaminant fluxes are decreasing as predicted and to 
verify the vadose zone model. 
2.3.6 OU 3-13 Group 5, Snake River Plain Aquifer Interim Action 
The human health threat posed by the contaminated SRPA is exposure to radionuclides, via 
ingestion, of a future worker or hypothetical future resident. The Agencies selected an interim action for 
the SRPA. While the OU 3-13 remedy selection for the contaminated portion of the SRPA groundwater 
outside the INTEC security fence was final, the final remedy for the contaminated portion of the SRPA 
inside the INTEC fence was deferred to OU 3-14. As a result of dividing the SRPA groundwater 
contaminant plume associated with INTEC operations into two zones, the remedial action was classified 
as an interim action (DOE-ID 1999a).  
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The OU 3-13 remediation goals for the SRPA outside of the current INTEC security fence are 
• Prevent current on-Site workers and the public from ingesting groundwater that is contaminated 
above the applicable State of Idaho groundwater standards or risk-based groundwater concentration 
during the IC period (i.e., until the year 2095)  
• Achieve the applicable State of Idaho groundwater standards or risk-based groundwater 
concentrations in the SRPA contaminant plume south of the INTEC security fence by the year 
2095.  
The selected OU 3-13 SRPA interim action for contaminated portions of the SRPA, both inside and 
outside the INTEC security fence, was ICs with monitoring and contingent remediation to meet MCLs 
outside the INTEC fence by 2095. The WAG 3, Group 5 Monitoring Report/Decision Summary (MRDS) 
(DOE-ID 2004c) served as the remedial action report for OU 3-13, Group 5 (Snake River Plain Aquifer). 
Based on the results of the tasks performed, the conclusions of the MRDS report were that the remedy for 
Group 5 specified in the 1999 ROD is operational and functional. Additionally, the Group 5 MRDS 
concluded that 
• Contrary to previous modeling predictions, the field and laboratory results demonstrated that 
elevated radionuclide concentrations do not exist within the HI interbed downgradient of INTEC. 
• The former INTEC injection well does not appear to constitute a significant continuing source of 
contaminants to the aquifer. 
• As of 2003, tritium (H-3) and iodine-129 (I-129) activities were already below their respective 
MCLs in all SRPA monitoring wells downgradient of INTEC; therefore, the RAOs for these two 
constituents have already been met. 
• Strontium-90 (Sr-90) levels in the aquifer in 2003 exceed the MCL downgradient of INTEC, but 
Sr-90 concentrations are slowly declining in nearly all wells as a result of radioactive decay and 
dilution/dispersion. Trends indicate that Sr-90 activities in groundwater outside the INTEC security 
fence will decline below the MCL by 2095.  
• The Group 5 remedy is anticipated to be successful in achieving the RAOs established for the 
aquifer by the year 2095, and there was no need to invoke the contingent remedy (groundwater 
pump and treat). 
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3. COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION 
The Agencies have been actively engaged in dialogue with the community and have strived for 
early and meaningful community participation during all remedial activities at the ICP. These community 
participation activities meet the public participation requirements in CERCLA and the National Oil and 
Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP). 
In accordance with CERCLA § 113(k)(2)(b)(i–v) (42 USC 9613(k)(2)(b)(i-v)) and § 117 
(42 USC 9617), and the NCP (40 CFR 300.430(f)(3)), opportunities for public information and 
participation in the OU 3-14 RI/FS project were provided between October 1998 and October 2006. The 
opportunities to obtain information and/or provide input included the OU 3-13 Proposed Plan 
(DOE-ID 1998) and ROD (DOE-ID 1999a), two open houses, EM Progress newsletters, two fact sheets, 
the OU 3-14 Proposed Plan (ICP 2006a), briefings and presentations to interested groups, tours, and 
public meetings.  
In October 1998, the Agencies released to the public the OU 3-13 Proposed Plan, which also 
briefly outlined the approach for the OU 3-14 RI/FS. The OU 3-13 ROD, released in October 1999, gave 
further details on the planned scope for the OU 3-14 RI/FS. The Agencies released the ESD for OU 3-13, 
which addressed additional SRPA monitoring requirements, to the public in January 2004 
(DOE-ID 2004b).  
In August 2000, the Agencies released an OU 3-14 “kickoff” fact sheet to approximately 
1,200 citizens on the Environmental Management (EM) mailing list. DOE-ID also released to the public 
EM Progress newsletters, which discussed the OU 3-14 project. 
DOE-ID provided updates on this project to the Citizens Advisory Board from 1998 through 2006. 
The advisory board is a group of 15 Idaho citizens who make recommendations to DOE-ID regarding 
environmental management activities at the INL Site. The Citizens Advisory Board holds meetings every 
2 months that are open to the public and include opportunities for public comment.  
In March 2006, DOE-ID, EPA, DEQ, INL Oversight Program, and ICP program managers 
sponsored two open houses to discuss all significant ICP projects, including OU 3-14. The Agencies held 
one of these evening open houses in Twin Falls during the Citizens Advisory Board’s 2-day meeting 
there. At the conclusion of the RI/FS in late spring 2006, DOE-ID provided specific presentations to the 
Citizens Advisory Board on (1) the results of the RI and baseline risk assessment (BRA) (May meeting) 
and (2) the results of the FS and evaluation of remedial alternatives (July meeting). 
In July 2006, DOE-ID released a fact sheet to approximately 1,200 citizens on the EM mailing list. 
The fact sheet discussed the results of the RI/FS and outlined upcoming public involvement opportunities, 
including briefings, the release of the Proposed Plan, and public meetings. 
The OU 3-14 Proposed Plan was mailed to approximately 1,200 citizens on the EM mailing list 
during the week of August 14, 2006. An electronic copy of the Proposed Plan was made available via the 
Internet on the ICP home page (http://www.idahocleanupproject.com/). The public comment period for 
the Proposed Plan began August 22, 2006, and was planned to end on September 21, 2006. However, at 
the request of the public, DOE-ID extended the comment period 30 days, to October 21, 2006. 
Also during the week of August 14, 2006, large display advertisements announcing the availability 
of the Proposed Plan and the locations of public meetings appeared in regional newspapers in Idaho and 
one in Wyoming. These ads appeared in the following newspapers: (1) the Post Register (Idaho Falls), 
(2) the Arco Advertiser (Arco), (3) The Sho-Ban News (Fort Hall), (4) The Idaho State Journal 
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(Pocatello), (5) The Times-News (Twin Falls), (6) the Idaho Statesman (Boise), (7) the Moscow-Pullman 
Daily News (Moscow), and (8) the Jackson Hole News and Guide (Jackson, Wyoming).  
Postcards were mailed to approximately 1,200 citizens on the EM mailing list during this time, 
informing them of the availability of the OU 3-14 Proposed Plan, the duration of the comment period, and 
the times and locations of upcoming public meetings. An electronic note was sent to all ICP/INL 
employees providing this information. 
On August 17, 2006, a press release was sent to the media, interested Idaho and Wyoming 
stakeholders, and elected officials concerning the beginning of a 30-day public comment period 
pertaining to the OU 3-14 Proposed Plan and upcoming public meetings. The news release resulted in 
articles running in various newspapers and in one publication based in Washington, D.C. The news 
release gave notice to the public that supportive OU 3-14 investigation documentation was available in 
the Administrative Record section of the INL Information Repositories located in the INL Technical 
Library in Idaho Falls and Albertsons Library on the campus of Boise State University as well as on the 
Internet.  
ICP issued another press release on August 25, 2006, to inform the public of the comment period 
extension for the Proposed Plan, based on a request from the public. A follow-up advertisement ran in 
newspapers. Additionally, a postcard was mailed to approximately 1,200 citizens on the EM mailing list. 
Several telephone calls were made to environmental interest groups in Idaho and Wyoming to 
remind them of public meetings and the comment period and to assess if a technical briefing was desired. 
Emails were also sent to these groups and to some elected officials in and near communities where the 
public meetings were held. DOE-ID, EPA, DEQ, and ICP contractor staff hosted a public meeting in 
Idaho Falls on August 29, 2006. Approximately 17 people not associated with the OU 3-14 project 
attended the public meeting. Written comment forms (including a postage-paid, business-reply form) 
were made available to those attending the public meeting. The forms were used to submit written 
comments either at the meeting or by mail. A survey form was made available for public use in evaluating 
the effectiveness of the meeting. A court reporter was also present to record public comments. One person 
made oral comments and another submitted written comments, which were transcribed by the court 
reporter. Another public meeting was held in Twin Falls on August 30, 2006. Seven members of the 
public attended; one provided oral comments. The format was identical to the Idaho Falls public meeting.  
The ICP arranged and participated in 12 briefings with environmental interest groups, elected 
officials, members of the Citizens Advisory Board, and the Shoshone-Bannock Tribes. The OU 3-14 
project was also discussed in three separate public tours. 
On September 19, 2006, the Citizens Advisory Board met to finalize their formal recommendations 
on the Proposed Plan. DOE-ID and ICP contractor staff were on hand to answer questions. 
The Agencies received both oral and written comments during the comment period. All comments 
received on the OU 3-14 Proposed Plan were considered during the development of this ROD. 
Part 3 of this ROD, the Responsiveness Summary, includes responses to all formal comments 
presented at the public meetings in Idaho Falls and Twin Falls and all written comments received on the 
OU 3-14 Proposed Plan during the public comment period. The oral and written comments are also 
included in the Administrative Record for OU 3-14. 
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4. SCOPE AND ROLE OF RESPONSE ACTION 
This section of the ROD describes the scope and role of the remedial actions to be performed under 
OU 3-14 and how these actions relate to other cleanup projects being performed on the tank farm. The 
selected remedy presented in this ROD addresses the contaminated soil and groundwater from historical 
releases. It is supported by other cleanup projects, including actions performed under the OU 3-13 ROD, 
disposition of the sodium-bearing waste (SBW) and closure of the TFF, and deactivation, 
decontamination, and decommissioning (DD&D) of the surrounding infrastructure. Combined, these 
actions will permanently close and remediate the tank farm in accordance with applicable environmental 
regulations and DOE orders. 
It is anticipated that the TFF will be closed in 2012 (see Section 2.2). Following closure, INTEC 
cleanup and waste management activities will continue to support the 1995 Settlement Agreement 
(DOE 1995), whose key objectives are to remove all SNF from Idaho by 2035 and to prepare waste stored 
at the INL Site for removal from Idaho by the same date. Many of the waste management facilities and 
infrastructure around the tank farm will remain active until that mission is completed. Some of the key 
waste management facilities include the buried tanks north of CPP-604 (WM-100, WM-101, WM-102, 
WL-101, WL-102 and WL-133); several buildings/structures (CPP-604, CPP-605, CPP-659, CPP-756, 
and the main stack); and transfer piping and valve boxes located in the tank farm. The active 
infrastructure to remain past 2012 is shown in purple in Figure 4-1. The OU 3-14 remedy will allow the 
continued use of this infrastructure while protecting human health and the environment.  
The TFF is in an area of established industrial infrastructure. Following closure, this infrastructure 
will include grouted underground tanks, piping, and ancillary equipment. In addition, the Waste Calcining 
Facility (WCF) (CPP-633) has been closed with waste left in place to the standards applicable to a 
HWMA/RCRA landfill. The end state of other nearby facilities, such as the New Waste Calcining Facility 
(CPP-659), bin sets where calcined waste is stored, and the Fuel Reprocessing Complex (CPP-601, 
CPP-602, and CPP-630) is unknown at this time, but may include some permanent barriers such as grout. 
As a result, the Agencies agreed that residential use over these facilities, the associated underground 
utilities, and the grouted tanks is not a reasonably anticipated future use and that an industrial future land 
use is appropriate. The outline of the industrial land use area is shown in Figure 4-2.  
4.1 Operable Unit 3-14 
The selected remedy presented in this ROD addresses both the OU 3-14 soil and groundwater 
contamination from INTEC activities. Action is necessary because workers could be externally exposed 
to unacceptable levels of cesium-137 (Cs-137) from contamination in the soil. The contaminated soil will 
be capped to protect workers from exposure to Cs-137. Action is also necessary to restore to MCLs that 
portion of the SRPA contaminated by INTEC releases and to prevent ingestion of contaminated 
groundwater at INTEC. If no action is taken, the Sr-90 contamination in the perched water system could 
migrate to the SRPA and present an unacceptable risk to hypothetical future residents outside of the 
industrial land use area and to future workers who might drink the groundwater. Infiltration controls will 
also be implemented at INTEC to reduce the migration of Sr-90 from the perched water system to the 
SRPA so that MCLs are met beneath INTEC by 2095.  
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Figure 4-1. Tank farm—north, central, and south sections—shown with recharge control zone and planned active infrastructure in 2012. 
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Figure 4-2. Industrial use area (soil institutional control area) and CERCLA sites. 
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The principal infiltration control will consist of an infiltration-reducing, low-permeability 
pavement (or equivalent barrier) that will be installed over the recharge control zone (RCZ), which is 
centered over the tank farm (see Figure 4-1). This pavement will greatly reduce the amount of water 
infiltrating from the surface down through the perched water and interbeds. Without this water, the Sr-90 
in perched water and interbeds will be less mobilized. Because the pavement is about 6 in. thick, it can be 
installed around the existing infrastructure without disrupting operations in northern INTEC. It will 
require ongoing maintenance (such as patching) to ensure its effectiveness and the use of lift stations to 
remove surface water accumulating in the low areas and to transport that water to a lined evaporation 
pond.  
Other infiltration controls will also be implemented in northern INTEC to reduce the amount of 
anthropogenic and storm water infiltrating through the northern perched water. Some of these controls 
include (1) eliminating intentional water discharges (lawn watering, steam condensate, etc.) in northern 
INTEC; (2) improving the surface water diversion system around the low-permeability pavement; 
(3) improving the metering of INTEC water usage; and (4) real-time water level monitoring in selected 
northern perched water wells. These additional controls will continue during the timeframe of active 
operations in northern INTEC.  
Once the active infrastructure in northern INTEC is no longer needed and is demolished, an 
evapotranspiration cap with a capillary biobarrier (ET/CB) will be installed over approximately two-thirds 
of the tank farm that correspond to areas having higher soil contamination (e.g., over the soil release 
sites). This cap varies in thickness and is a minimum of 6 ft thick at the edges of the south and central 
tank farm and sloped to drain from the crown. It will protect workers from external exposure to 
contaminated soil, reduce water infiltration, and prevent biota from intruding through the cap and 
bringing contamination to the surface. This type of cap requires less maintenance than the 
low-permeability pavement and does not require lift stations or evaporation ponds for managing surface 
water. Instead, it minimizes recharge by storing moisture and returning it to the air using plants and 
evaporation. 
4.2 Coordination between Operable Units 3-13 and 3-14 
As described in Section 2.3, the OU 3-13 ROD selected interim actions for the tank farm soil and 
the SRPA and final actions for the other contaminated soil sites that reside within the industrial land use 
area and for the perched water. The OU 3-13 ESD (DOE-ID 2004b) transferred the injection well 
(CPP-23) back to Group 5 and modified the Group 5 remedy. Coordination of the actions under OU 3-13 
and OU 3-14 is given below: 
• The OU 3-13, Group 1, Tank Farm Interim Action, is currently in operation to reduce the amount 
of precipitation infiltrating through the contaminated tank farm soil. The primary components of 
this system (diversion ditches, lift station, evaporation pond, etc.) will be enhanced under the 
OU 3-14 remedy to help meet the performance requirements for infiltration reduction. 
• The OU 3-13, Group 5 interim action (ICs with monitoring and contingent pump and treat, see 
Section 2.3.6) was selected for the portion of the SRPA contaminated from INTEC activities. This 
OU 3-13 interim action was modified by the ESD (DOE-ID 2004b), which transferred the injection 
well to Group 5 and modified the steps that would trigger the OU 3-13 interim action of contingent 
pump and treat. The ESD required vertical profiling of three SRPA monitoring wells (USGS-44, 
USGS-46, and USGS-47) to determine if I-129 concentrations exceeded the modified trigger level 
of 5 pCi/L. An assessment of results of the vertical profiling has shown that I-129 concentrations in 
the SRPA are below 5 pCi/L and further vertical profiling was discontinued. The remedy selected 
in the OU 3-14 ROD supersedes the OU 3-13 interim remedy. However, until the OU 3-14 RD/RA 
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work plan and groundwater monitoring plan are developed and implemented, the OU 3-13 Group 5 
interim activities of ICs and groundwater monitoring will be continued. 
• The OU 3-13, Group 4 final action (ICs with aquifer recharge controls) was selected for the 
contaminated perched water beneath INTEC (see Section 2.3.5). The OU 3-13 Group 4 
remediation goals are to (1) reduce recharge to the perched zones and (2) minimize the migration 
of contaminants to the SRPA so that SRPA groundwater outside of the current INTEC security 
fence meets applicable State of Idaho groundwater standards by 2095. Based upon the results of the 
OU 3-14 groundwater modeling, it is anticipated that no additional actions will be required to meet 
the OU 3-13 RAOs for perched water. However, OU 3-14 will implement actions to reduce 
infiltration through contaminated perched water that could contribute to SRPA contamination at 
INTEC. In addition, monitoring of perched water will continue under Group 4 until it is 
incorporated into the WAG 3 groundwater monitoring plan included in the OU 3-14 RD/RA work 
plan. 
• The OU 3-13, Group 3 sites within the industrial land use area include three sites east of the WCF 
cap (CPP-13, CPP-35, and the northern portion of CPP-93); one site between the stack and the 
WCF cap (CPP-36); one site under the WCF cap (CPP-91); and one site between the tank farm and 
Building CPP-601 (CPP-124). These sites are shown on Figure 4-2. These sites will be cleaned up 
under the OU 3-13, Group 3 Phase II Remedial Design/Remedial Action Work Plan 
(DOE-ID 2006a) using the OU 3-14 remediation goals for soil in the industrial use area. 
• The OU 3-13, Group 2 sites within the industrial land use area include sites under 
Buildings CPP-601 and CPP-602 (CPP-80, CPP-86, CPP-117, CPP-118, CPP-119, CPP-120, 
CPP-121, CPP-122, and CPP-123) and under Buildings CPP-649 and CPP-604 (CPP-87 and 
CPP-89). These are shown on Figure 4-2 as hatched areas in yellow. These sites will be cleaned 
up under OU 3-13 in accordance with the process identified in the Operable Unit 3-13 Group 2 
Closure Evaluation Criteria and Checklist (DOE-ID 2000c) using the OU 3-14 remediation goals 
for soil in the industrial use area. 
4.3 Deactivation, Decontamination, and Decommissioning 
Many buildings and structures located in and around the OU 3-14 sites require closure prior to 
completing the OU 3-13 and OU 3-14 remedies. For example, the low-permeability pavement cannot be 
installed over the tank farm until several structures have been removed. The ET/CB cap cannot be 
installed in the southern portion of the tank farm until the affected facilities (CPP-604, CPP-605, etc.) and 
structures (Tanks WM-100, WM-101, WM-102, WL-101, WL-102, and WL-133) are no longer in use. 
Finally, the OU 3-13 Group 2 sites cannot be remediated until the overlying facilities have been closed. 
Once these infrastructure are no longer needed for ongoing cleanup activities, they may need DD&D 
before they can be demolished. Some of these actions are being conducted under DOE’s CERCLA 
removal authority as non-time-critical removal actions. Contaminated waste and debris from these 
removal actions are being disposed of in the Idaho CERCLA Disposal Facility (ICDF) located outside the 
southwestern corner of INTEC. For example, Building CPP-627 (Remote Analytical Facility), located 
just west of the TFF, has undergone DD&D as a non-time-critical removal action (ICP 2006b) and the 
building has been demolished. The sequencing of the OU 3-14 remedy has been integrated with the 
OU 3-13 remedy, INTEC operations, TFF closure, and facility DD&D. 
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5. SITE CHARACTERISTICS 
This section discusses the types of waste at the tank farm and describes the known releases and soil 
contamination. It then discusses site characteristics—geology, surface water sources, hydrogeology—and 
current aquifer and perched water contamination as well as the source term used in modeling to describe 
the releases to the environment. The conceptual model is then presented, followed by a summary of the 
groundwater modeling, which predicts transport of contamination in the subsurface in the future. 
5.1 Types of OU 3-14 Waste 
Two types of waste contributed to OU 3-14 contamination—tank farm waste and waste sent to the 
former injection well. The waste managed at the INTEC tank farm came from reprocessing SNF and 
related activities such as equipment decontamination, uranium purification, laboratory work, off-gas 
treatment, fuel receipt and storage, and waste calcination. There were five major sources of tank farm 
waste: first-cycle, second-cycle, and third-cycle raffinates from SNF reprocessing; process equipment 
waste (PEW) evaporator concentrate; and miscellaneous sources. 
Reprocessing SNF generated the greatest volume of waste. Typically, SNF reprocessing had three 
steps. Each reprocessing step generated liquid waste, called raffinate. The first step (called first-cycle 
extraction) separated the uranium from the dissolved fuel cladding and radioactive material in the SNF 
and generated first-cycle raffinate. First-cycle raffinate is classified as high-level waste (HLW). The 
second and third SNF reprocessing steps (called second- and third-cycle extraction) purified the uranium 
in preparation for off-Site shipment and generated second- and third-cycle raffinates. First-cycle raffinate 
comprised the bulk of the SNF reprocessing waste in terms of both radiological activity and waste 
volume. 
The PEW evaporator system collected dilute radioactive wastes from a variety of sources, 
including equipment decontamination, cell floors drainage, fuel storage basin water treatment systems, 
laboratories, off-gas condensers, and other SNF support activities. The evaporator concentrated the dilute 
waste and sent the concentrate (bottoms) to the tank farm, where it was often combined with the SNF 
second- and third-cycle raffinates for storage. This waste became known as SBW due to its high 
concentrations of sodium and potassium nitrates (1-2 molar). SBW is an acidic waste that contains much 
less radioactivity than first-cycle raffinate (typically 10 to 100 times less). 
The tank farm wastes also included “miscellaneous” wastes such as steam-jet condensate, dilute 
wastes that exceeded the Waste Acceptance Criteria for the PEW evaporator, and nonradioactive waste 
from equipment testing and operator training.  
The vapors from the PEW evaporator, which contained traces of radioactivity, were condensed, 
sampled, and discharged to the former INTEC injection well (until the mid-1980s) via the service waste 
system.  
5.2 OU 3-14 Soil Sites 
Operable Unit 3-14 consists of sites that required additional information when the OU 3-13 ROD 
was signed or are newly identified sites. For the sites that were known when the OU 3-13 ROD was 
signed, the OU 3-13 ROD selected an interim action and deferred the final remedy to OU 3-14. Table 5-1 
lists all CERCLA soil sites at INTEC that are part of OU 3-14. Some of these sites were transferred to 
OU 3-14 by the OU 3-13 ROD, and some were newly identified sites that the Agencies agreed should be 
part of OU 3-14. 
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Table 5-1. OU 3-14 soil sites. 
Site 
Name Site Description 
Pathway  
to OU 3-14 
Final Disposition 
in OU 3-14 
CPP-15 Spill from storage tank associated with solvent burner east of 
CPP-605 
OU 3-13 ROD RD/RA 
CPP-16 Contaminated soil from leak in line from Tank WM-181 to 
PEW evaporator 
OU 3-13 ROD RD/RA 
CPP-20 CPP-604 radioactive waste unloading area OU 3-13 ROD RD/RA 
CPP-24 Tank farm area bucket spill OU 3-13 ROD RD/RA 
CPP-25 Contaminated soil in the tank farm area north of CPP-604 OU 3-13 ROD RD/RA 
CPP-26 Contaminated soil in the tank farm area from steam flushing OU 3-13 ROD RD/RA 
CPP-27 Contaminated soil in the tank farm area east of CPP-604 OU 3-13 ROD RD/RA 
CPP-28 Contaminated soil in the tank farm area south of Tank WM-181 
by Valve Box A-6 
OU 3-13 ROD RD/RA 
CPP-30 Contaminated soil in the tank farm area near Valve Box B-9 OU 3-13 ROD RD/RA 
CPP-31 Contaminated soil in the tank farm area south of Tank WM-183 OU 3-13 ROD RD/RA 
CPP-32 Contaminated soil in the tank farm area southwest and 
northwest of Valve Box B-4 
OU 3-13 ROD RD/RA 
CPP-33 Contaminated soil in the tank farm area near Tank WL-102, 
northeast of CPP-604 
OU 3-13 ROD RD/RA 
CPP-58 Pipeline spills of PEW evaporator overheads outside the tank 
farm boundary near the southwest corner 
OU 3-13 ROD RD/RA 
CPP-58W 1954 service waste line leak inside tank farm boundary between 
CPP-601 and CPP-604 
OU 3-13 ROD RD/RA 
CPP-79  Tank farm releases near Valve Box A-2 (shallow/deep) OU 3-13 ROD RD/RA 
CPP-96 All soil sites transferred to OU 3-14 in the OU 3-13 ROD and 
interstitial soil inside the tank farm boundary, including 
contaminated backfill 
OU 3-13 ROD RD/RA 
CPP-102 Shallow injection well from steam system New site No action 
CPP-103 Shallow injection well from steam system New site No action 
CPP-104 Shallow injection well associated with fuel oil storage tanks New site No action 
CPP-105 Shallow injection well associated with fuel oil storage tanks New site No action 
CPP-106 Shallow injection well associated with fuel oil storage tanks New site No action 
CPP-107 Shallow injection well associated with fuel oil storage tanks New site No action 
CPP-108 Shallow injection well associated with fuel oil storage tanks New site No action 
CPP-109 Shallow injection well from steam system New site No action 
CPP-110 Shallow injection well from steam system New site No action 
CPP-112 Potential release from tank vault around Tank WM-184 during 
rinsing with deionized water 
New site RD/RA 
CPP-113 Shallow injection well from steam system New site No action 
Table 5-1. (continued). 
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Site 
Name Site Description 
Pathway  
to OU 3-14 
Final Disposition 
in OU 3-14 
CPP-114 Shallow injection well from steam system New site No action 
CPP-115 Shallow injection well from steam system New site No action 
CPP-116 Shallow injection well from steam system New site No action 
CPP-125 1 1/2” SWA-106450 leak north of CPP-1618 New site No action 
CPP-126 20” SW-NS-110477 flange leak east of CPP-601 New site No action 
CPP-128 4” SWA-100532 leak near the intersection with 8” SWN-3001 New site No action 
 
Sites CPP-15, CPP-16, CPP-20, CPP-24, CPP-25, CPP-26, CPP-27, CPP-28, CPP-30, CPP-31, 
CPP-32, CPP-33, CPP-58, CPP-58W, and CPP-79 were transferred by the OU 3-13 ROD to OU 3-14. 
They were combined with contaminated backfill in the tank farm and became CPP-96. All of these 
OU 3-14 sites are inside the tank farm boundary except for CPP-15 and CPP-58. Three of these sites 
(CPP-16, CPP-20, and CPP-30) were no action sites in OU 3-13 but were reinvestigated under OU 3-14 
and are part of the soil inside the tank farm boundary selected for remediation in this OU 3-14 ROD. 
Sites CPP-102 through CPP-110 and CPP-113 through CPP-116 are shallow injection wells that 
were identified as new sites for OU 3-14 after the OU 3-13 ROD was signed and are no action sites under 
CERCLA. Sites CPP-125, CPP-126, and CPP-128 are new sites in OU 3-14 that are outside the tank farm 
boundary and are no action sites (ICP 2005a, b, c). CPP-112 is a new site under OU 3-14 that is inside the 
tank farm and will be discussed as part of the remedy for soil inside the tank farm boundary (ICP 2005d). 
5.2.1 Soil Sampling Strategy 
The contaminated soil sites at the tank farm were investigated through various sampling and 
probing activities between the initial discovery of each site and the OU 3-13 investigation in 1995 
(DOE-ID 1997a, b). As part of the OU 3-13 ROD, the Agencies determined that they needed more 
information on these sites before they could make a final remedial action decision. The sampling strategy 
for OU 3-14, discussed in detail in the OU 3-14 RI/FS Work Plan (DOE-ID 2004a), addressed these key 
data needs: 
• Determine the extent, distribution, and composition of contamination at known release sites 
• Characterize soil from known release sites between the ground surface and basalt as necessary to 
support RI/FS tasks 
• Estimate the level of contamination in the tank farm soil used for backfill. 
The Agencies determined that additional information was needed to address these data gaps for 
Sites CPP-15, CPP-27, CPP-28, CPP-31, and CPP-79. New probeholes were installed and downhole 
gamma radiation surveys conducted on all new and existing probeholes. Samples were collected in 
selected probeholes every 4 ft through the alluvium for laboratory analysis. The locations of all 
probeholes and sampling locations are shown on Figure 5-1, and the analyses run by the laboratory are 
listed in Table 5-2. Section 5 of the OU 3-14 RI/BRA (DOE-NE-ID 2006a) contains details on the 2004 
field investigation, including analytical methods, quality assurance/quality control requirements, and 
sampling results. 
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Figure 5-1. OU 3-14 probeholes and sampling locations. 
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Table 5-2. Laboratory analyses of samples during the 2004 OU 3-14 field investigation. 
Analytical Group Analytes 
Radionuclides H-3, C-14, Sr-90, Tc-99, I-129, Cs-137, Eu-154, U-235, U-238, 
Np-237, Pu-238, Pu-239/240, Am-241 
Metals Arsenic, chromium, mercury 
Wet chemistry Nitrate-N, nitrite-N, pH 
Organic compounds Appendix IX to 40 CFR 264 target analyte list semivolatile organic 
compounds and volatile organic compounds  
Toxicity characteristic leaching procedure Metals and organic compounds 
 
5.2.2 OU 3-14 2004 Soil Sampling Results 
The sample results for COCs are shown on Table 5-3. Site CPP-31 contained the highest activities 
for Cs-137 (8,990,000 pCi/g at 18–20 ft bgs [below ground surface]) and for Sr-90 (20,700,000 pCi/g at 
22–24 ft bgs). Site CPP-79 contained the highest concentration of nitrate (9 mg/kg at 44–46 ft bgs). I-129 
was not detected. 
Table 5-3. Fiscal Year 2004 soil sampling summary for contaminants of concern.a  
 
Depth  
(ft) 
Cs-137  
(pCi/g) 
Sr-90  
(pCi/g) 
I-129  
(pCi/g) 
Tc-99  
(pCi/g) 
Nitrate-N  
(mg/kg) 
CPP-15 1.4-2.8 59 27J U UJ 4 
(slant) 4.2-5.7 90 12J U 4 3 
 7.1-8.5 85 21J U 11 4 
 9.9-11.3 47,000 7,180J U 15 4 
 11.3-12.7 5,830 13,900J U 26 3 
CPP-27 2-4 U U U UJ 3 
  6-8 40 126J U U 3 
  10-12 25 8J U U 4 
  14-16 288 711J U UJ 3 
  18-20 7 24J U 4 3 
  20-24 U U U 7 3 
  24-28 U UJ U 3 2 
  28-32 UJ U U U 3 
  32-36 UJ U U U 2 
CPP-28 2-3 1,070 78J U UJ 4 
 6-7 217 34J U 3 2 
 8-12 1,180 32,600 U 16 1 
 12-16 1 21,600 U 100 1 
 16-20 3 3,040 U 4J U 
 20-24 0.5 3,950 U 4J 1 
 20-24 
duplicate 
0.5 2,460 U 3J 1 
 24-28 3 56 U 3J 1 
 28-32 2,540,000 223,000 U 196J 1 
 32-36 110 379,000 U 40J 1 
Table 5-3. (continued). 
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Depth  
(ft) 
Cs-137  
(pCi/g) 
Sr-90  
(pCi/g) 
I-129  
(pCi/g) 
Tc-99  
(pCi/g) 
Nitrate-N  
(mg/kg) 
CPP-28 
(con’t.) 36-40 1 1,950 U 3J U 
 40-44 1 95 UJ 7J U 
 44-48 4 19 U 5J 1 
 48-52 2 18,000 U 2J 1 
 52-56 1 85,200 U 3J 1 
CPP-31 0-4 214 U U U 0.033J 
  6-8 438 175 U U 0.065 
  10-12 428 815 UJ U 0.162 
  14-16 241,000 547,000 U 13 0.099 
 16-18 3,720,000 1,320,000b NA NA NA 
  18-20 8,990,000 1,850,000 U 69 0.054J 
  22-24 57,500 20,700,000 U 23 0.038J 
  26-28 63 810,000 U 25 0.072 
  30-32 126 663,000 U 17 0.049J 
  32-36 73 941,000 UJ 16 0.089 
  36-40 33 528,000 U 7 0.097 
  
36-40 
duplicate 32 603,000 U 65 0.111 
CPP-79 2-4 30 20 UJ 3J 1 
  6-8 53 48 U 2J 1 
  10-12 78 76 U U 1 
  14-16 110 38 U 1J 1 
  16-18 19,600 25,900 U 33 3 
  20-22 0.2 29,200 U UJ 3 
  24-26 UJ 13,400 U 65 1 
  30-32 0.02J 9J U 19 1 
  34-36 3,350,000 219,000 U 182 1 
  36-38 1,770 60,100 U 15 0.2J 
  42-44 455 6 U 4J 4 
  44-46 300 10 U 2J 9 
  
44-46 
duplicate 301 8 UJ 3J 8 
  48-52 293 126 U 3J 7 
  52-56 31 25 U 2J 5 
  56-60 1,350,000 34,700 UJ 13J 6 
a. U means not detected; UJ means false positive; J means estimated quantity. NA means not analyzed; standard error not shown but can be 
found in Appendix G of DOE-NE-ID (2006a). 
b. Total strontium, which is equivalent to Sr-90 for this sample. 
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5.2.3 Soil Site Descriptions 
The following sections provide a brief summary of each OU 3-14 soil site. CPP-96 sites will be 
discussed first, followed by the no action sites. All the individual OU 3-14 soil sites are shown in 
Figure 4-2 except the shallow injection wells, which will be discussed in Section 5.2.3.19. The results of 
field investigations, analytical data, employee interviews, historical record searches, and process 
knowledge have been used to determine the nature and extent of contamination and establish the source 
terms (volume and composition of liquid released) at the OU 3-14 sites. Extensive details on the releases, 
previous sampling and cleanup, and nature and extent of contamination remaining can be found in 
Section 5 of the RI/BRA (DOE-NE-ID 2006a). 
5.2.3.1 CPP-96. CPP-96 includes all soil inside the tank farm boundary, including contaminated 
backfill (Sites CPP-16, CPP-20, CPP-24, CPP-25, CPP-26, CPP-27, CPP-28, CPP-30, CPP-31, CPP-32, 
CPP-33, CPP-58W, CPP-79, and CPP-112) and two soil sites adjacent to the tank farm (CPP-15 and 
CPP-58). Three of these sites (CPP-16, CPP-20, and CPP-30) were no action sites in OU 3-13 but were 
reinvestigated under OU 3-14 and are to be remediated under this OU 3-14 ROD. 
All soil inside the tank farm boundary is included in Site CPP-96 because major tank farm 
construction and maintenance projects spread contamination from the CERCLA release sites to other 
areas of the tank farm when contaminated soil was placed back in excavations as backfill. The backfill 
met requirements for use as backfill in the tank farm at the time, but does not meet the more stringent 
cleanup criteria under CERCLA. Sampling data collected in 2004, historical records, and photos support 
this conclusion. However, estimating the amount and location of the contaminated backfill is not possible 
due to the lack of complete historical records detailing the location of contaminated backfill and estimates 
of contamination levels. 
5.2.3.2 CPP-15. CPP-15 is near the site of the former solvent burner and is located just outside the 
tank farm boundary near the southeast corner of Building CPP-605 (Figure 4-1). CPP-15 was a release in 
1974 of approximately 100 L of kerosene and condensate from the main INTEC stack onto the ground. 
The bulk of the contamination was removed shortly after the release and during the removal of the solvent 
burner and organic waste storage tank in 1983. The site was excavated in 1995 to a depth of 10 ft or until 
clean alluvium was encountered, whichever came first. This information is confirmed by the low 
radionuclide activity (consistent with backfill) in the 2004 soil samples (see Table 5-3) from the 
near-surface locations and the high levels of radiological contamination encountered below approximately 
10 ft (9.9–11.3 ft below grade level). A concrete transformer pad and electrical duct banks are located on 
top of Site CPP-15. 
5.2.3.3 CPP-16. Site CPP-16 is between underground tanks WM-180 and WM-181 (see Figure 4-2). 
CPP-16 was a release in January 1976 of noncontaminated service wastewater with about 5% PEW 
evaporator concentrate. An estimated 150 gal, containing 1.4 Ci, leaked in an unlined gravel-bottomed 
manhole at a depth of 5.7 ft. The manhole was replaced when Valve Box C-8 was installed during the 
ICPP Radioactive Liquid Waste System Improvement project in 1977 and much of the contaminated soil 
removed. The site has been disturbed during construction activities. This was a no action site under 
OU 3-13 that was transferred to OU 3-14 for evaluation as part of CPP-96. 
5.2.3.4 CPP-20. Site CPP-20 is located on top of the berm immediately north of Building CPP-604 
(see Figure 4-2) and overlaps Site CPP-25. The source of contamination to the ground surface was 
low-activity waste from temporary hoses used for unloading waste from tank trucks prior to 1978. The 
total volume was estimated at approximately 100 gal of waste containing 16 mCi of activity. Leaks from 
the system were observed and cleaned up at the time of the leak. The entire waste unloading area was 
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excavated in the early 1980s during installation of new waste transfer lines from CPP-601 to CPP-604 
and Valve Box C-32 to waste tanks WL-132 and WL-133.  
5.2.3.5 CPP-24. CPP-24 is the site near Tank WM-180 (see Figure 4-2) where a bucket 
(approximately 1 gal) of low-activity liquid waste was dumped on the ground on February 15, 1954. The 
incident report indicates that cleanup of the contaminated soil began immediately and none of the 
contamination is expected to remain at the site. This was a no action site under OU 3-13 that was 
transferred to OU 3-14 for evaluation as part of CPP-96. 
5.2.3.6 CPP-25. Site CPP-25 (see Figure 4-2) is located on top of the berm immediately north of 
Building CPP-604 and overlaps Site CPP-20. The ground surface was contaminated on August 28, 1960, 
with approximately 10 gal of waste containing approximately 0.5 Ci bound for underground tank 
WL-102. The contaminated soil was immediately removed. As described for CPP-20, the entire area was 
thoroughly excavated in the early 1980s during construction work to install new waste transfer lines. 
Therefore, little, if any, of the original contamination remains in the area. 
5.2.3.7 CPP-26. Site CPP-26 is located in the northeast corner of the tank farm (see Figure 4-2). The 
ground surface was contaminated on May 10, 1964, when steam lines used for decontamination failed. 
The contaminated area was large due to dispersion by high winds at the time of the leak, which was 
estimated at 2 gal of mist containing approximately 15 Ci. Much of the surface contaminated by the 
release was disturbed by subsequent construction activities and has been covered with 2 ft of soil, a 
20-mil-thick membrane liner, and an additional 6 in. of soil to prevent the liner from blowing away. 
Therefore, the contamination from the steam release would be expected to be approximately 2.5 ft bgs in 
the tank farm area. 
5.2.3.8 CPP-27/33. Site CPP-27/33 is located east of CPP-604 (see Figure 4-2). The two sites were 
contaminated by the same source but encountered in two separate construction and excavation activities. 
The release occurred in the mid-1960s when transfers of nitric acid solution from the WCF to the PEW 
evaporator backed up (via a drain line) into the carbon-steel tank farm pressure relief line. The acidic 
solution dissolved the carbon-steel line and then leaked into the surrounding soil. The release, 12 ft bgs, 
contained approximately 540 gal of WCF scrub solution with approximately 1,500 Ci of activity and an 
additional 500 gal of low-activity, 4.5 molar nitric acid waste. The soil contaminated by these releases 
was excavated in 1974 to basalt for the CPP-604 basement and again in 1983 while excavating soil to 
replace Tank WL-102. Approximately 14,000 yd3 of contaminated soil were removed from the site and 
disposed of at the Radioactive Waste Management Complex. The remaining 12,000 yd3 were disposed of 
in trenches located in the northeast corner of INTEC.b The excavated area was backfilled using the 
stockpiled clean soil and clean off-Site soil, and a portion of the area was covered by an asphalt road. This 
was confirmed by soil samples collected every 4 ft to basalt in 2004 (see Table 5-3). The remaining low 
levels of contamination are consistent with backfill. 
5.2.3.9 CPP-28. Site CPP-28 is located a few yards south of Tank WM-181 (see Figure 4-2). In the 
early 1970s, 230 gal of first-cycle waste (with an estimated activity of 18 Ci/gal) leaked from a waste 
transfer line 7 ft bgs that had a hole accidentally drilled in it during construction. A total of 56 yd3 of 
contaminated soil containing an estimated 3,000 Ci of gross radionuclides was removed from the release 
site. The original line and the other similarly constructed line with split carbon/stainless-steel encasement 
were removed and replaced with a system having welded, stainless-steel, pipe-in-pipe encasement. The 
site was disturbed during the 1993–1996 tank farm upgrades. As confirmed by sampling results (see 
Table 5-3), contamination was removed to a depth of 8 ft and replaced with low-activity backfill. The site 
                                                     
b. These trenches were identified as CPP-34 in the OU 3-13 ROD and were remediated as a Group 3 site during OU 3-13 
RD/RA. 
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is adjacent to CPP-79. The deeper contamination below 28 ft is associated with the release at CPP-79 
(deep). 
5.2.3.10 CPP-30. Site CPP-30 is located just west of the four-pack tanks (WM-187 through 
WM-190) (see Figure 4-2). The ground surface around the valve boxes was contaminated with a 
maximum of 10 mL of first-cycle raffinate on June 2, 1975, during activities associated with valve 
maintenance. Cleanup of the contamination commenced immediately after the incident occurred, which 
included removal of contaminated soil. This was a no action site under OU 3-13 that was transferred to 
OU 3-14 for evaluation as part of CPP-96. 
5.2.3.11 CPP-31. Site CPP-31, located between the westernmost six tanks (WM-180 to WM-185, 
see Figure 4-2), is associated with a large release during transfer of SBW from Tank WM-181 to 
Tank WM-180 in 1972. An estimated 18,600 gal containing approximately 30,000 Ci of activity were 
released at approximately 6 ft bgs. It is the site with the largest release of curies in the tank farm and 
accounts for a vast majority of the radioactivity (greater than 87% of the Sr-90 and Cs-137 activity in 
OU 3-14). Table 5-3 shows concentrations in 2004 of the COCs remaining in the alluvium. Following 
discovery of the leak, the carbon-steel line was cut and capped. No cleanup at this site has been 
performed. Results from the OU 3-14 and previous investigations indicate that a significant amount of 
contamination remains in the alluvium. Most of the Cs-137 contamination released at CPP-31 remains in 
the alluvium, while much of the Sr-90, which was more mobile, migrated into perched water and the 
interbeds. 
5.2.3.12 CPP-32E. Site CPP-32E, also known as CPP-32A in some earlier documents, is a small site 
located west of the four-pack tanks (WM-187 to WM-190) near the southwest corner of Site CPP-30 (see 
Figure 4-2). Site CPP-32E was contaminated in December 1976 with liquid that dripped to the ground 
from the equipment used to sample liquid in the Valve Box B-4 sump. The amount of liquid that 
contaminated the soil was approximately 2 mL, but with high activity (about 1 Ci/L Cs-137). The site was 
covered with 2.5 ft of soil and the tank farm membrane in 1977. 
5.2.3.13 CPP-32W. Site CPP-32W, also known as CPP-32B in some earlier documents, is located 
near Tank WM-186 (see Figure 4-2). CPP-32W is the result of a release of 1 gal of slightly contaminated 
water (5 mCi of activity) from a temporary, aboveground piping system that existed in the mid-1970s. 
This site has since been covered with 2.5 ft of soil and the tank farm membrane. 
5.2.3.14 CPP-58. Site CPP-58 is located outside the tank farm adjacent to the Building CPP-604/605 
complex (see Figure 4-2). The site was contaminated by three leaks of service wastewater at 6 ft bgs (one 
each in 1976, 1977, and 1980) and a nitric acid spill. The volume is estimated at 1,000 gal. CPP-58 
contains sites that were referred to in some earlier documents as CPP-58A (also known as CPP-58E) and 
CPP-58B and newly identified sites in the area. The boundary was changed under OU 3-14 to exclude 
OU 3-13 Group 2 sites under buildings. Numerous excavations have occurred throughout the site. 
Contaminated soil removed during the TFIA excavation activities was disposed of at ICDF. 
5.2.3.15 CPP-58W. Site CPP-58W is located in the yard about halfway between Buildings CPP-601 
and CPP-604, due east of CPP-709 (see Figure 4-2). Previous OU 3-13 documents incorrectly identified 
the location of the site outside the tank farm boundary. Site CPP-58W was contaminated in August 1954 
by a leak from a concrete pipe, 6–8 ft bgs, containing the CPP-604 service wastewater. The service 
wastewater included slightly contaminated PEW evaporator condensate. The amount of waste that leaked 
was likely not more than 1,000 gal and contained approximately 40 mCi of activity. This site was 
disturbed when the leaking portion of the pipe was replaced by iron pipe but no documentation was found 
describing cleanup. 
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5.2.3.16 CPP-79 (shallow). OU 3-14 determined that there were two releases at CPP-79, shallow 
and deep. Site CPP-79 (shallow) is northeast of the CPP-604 tank vault (see Figure 4-2). CPP-79 was 
contaminated by a leak of 2,650 gal of PEW evaporator feed solution containing approximately 2.8 Ci of 
activity that caused low-activity contamination in a shallow area (9 ft bgs) in 1986. This site was 
disturbed during the 1993–1994 tank farm upgrade project. The soil above 16 ft bgs is consistent with 
backfill (see Table 5-3). 
5.2.3.17 CPP-79 (deep). Site CPP-79 (deep) was contaminated by a release in the late 1960s to early 
1970s of 400 gal of first-cycle waste, PEW, and SBW when Teflon flange gaskets failed in two valve 
boxes. Because the exact proportion of each waste stream was unknown, it was conservatively assumed 
that the release was all first-cycle waste and contained approximately 1,800 Ci of activity. Some of the 
leaking solution went into the tile pipe encasements that penetrated the floors of the valve boxes and into 
a horizontal encasement 30 ft below the surface of the tank farm. The site extends under two different 
shallow releases, CPP-79 (shallow) and CPP-28. Personnel discovered the valve leak in the 1970s when 
looking for the source of the CPP-28 contamination, and they replaced the gaskets with radiation-resistant 
material. During an upgrade project in the 1990s, the valve boxes and associated tile-encased lines were 
replaced to comply with HWMA/RCRA requirements.  
5.2.3.18 CPP-112. Site CPP-112 is a potential release from the tank farm concrete containment vault 
(CPP-784) around Tank WM-184 (see Figure 4-2). On November 18, 2003, approximately 2,000 gal of 
deionized water were used to rinse down the interior sides of the concrete vault containing stainless-steel 
tank WM-184. This deionized water/rinsate was then pumped into Tank WM-184. The quantity of water 
possibly lost was measured at 1,000 gal, less than the level of accuracy (2,000 gal) of the two devices 
used to measure the flow. Therefore, it was not possible to conclusively determine whether 1,000 gal 
were missing. Duplicate samples of the deionized water/rinsate were taken from the vault sumps for 
analysis. The results indicated the deionized water/rinsate was nonhazardous (i.e., no constituents 
exceeded the HWMA/RCRA action limits). 
More information on the tank/vault configuration and analytical results of the vault water appear in 
the new site identification information form for CPP-112 (ICP 2005d). Although a release to the 
environment was not likely, a conservative source term for CPP-112 was developed based on assuming 
that 1,000 gal leaked and that the water contained the maximum concentration of the sample or the 
duplicate. This resulted in an assumed source term of 57 μCi. 
5.2.3.19 No Action Sites (CPP-102–CPP-110, CPP-113–CPP-116, CPP-125, CPP-126, and 
CPP-128). Since the signing of the OU 3-13 ROD, 16 previously unidentified sites have been discovered 
at INTEC outside the tank farm that the Agencies added to OU 3-14. These sites are discussed below. 
Thirteen sites, CPP-102 to CPP-110 and CPP-113 to CPP-116, are shallow injection wells that 
received steam condensate discharges from two boiler plants that supplied steam to various buildings and 
structures throughout INTEC. The location of these wells is depicted on Figure 5-2. As a result of a 
review of historical information and a qualitative risk screening (Bragassa 2004a, 2004b), the Agencies 
determined that no action is appropriate due to the low risk from the CERCLA hazardous substances 
associated with steam condensate at these sites. Soil at three of the sites (CPP-106, CPP-107, and 
CPP-108) is contaminated with petroleum. The Agencies noted that when these three sites exit the 
CERCLA process as no action sites, the State of Idaho requirements for assessing releases of petroleum 
will need to be addressed. This process has been initiated with DEQ. 
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Figure 5-2. Location of shallow injection wells. 
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CPP-125 consists of leaks from a 1-1/2-in. transfer line that carries nonradioactive, nonhazardous 
waste steam condensate to the service waste system for disposal. The steam condensate from this system 
meets the requirements for the Wastewater Land Application Permit. Past leaks in this line at a location 
north of Building CPP-1618 have been repaired as recently as July 2002. Because this system was 
designed to transfer nonhazardous, nonradioactive waste, there is no reason to believe that hazardous or 
radioactive substances were released to the environment from this pipe. The approximate location of 
CPP-125 is shown on Figure 4-2. 
CPP-126 consists of a leak from a flange in a 20-in. transfer line used to convey service wastewater 
for disposal. The service waste system was designed to transfer nonradioactive, nonhazardous waste. In 
June 1989, during an upgrade to the service waste system, a leak was observed at a flange and repaired by 
tightening the flange. The wastewater in the transfer line is nonhazardous, is continuously monitored for 
radioactivity, and meets the requirements for the Wastewater Land Application Permit. If radioactivity is 
detected, the monitoring system is designed to reroute the water to a holding tank. Therefore, no 
unacceptable risk to human health or the environment exists because of the flange leak. The approximate 
location of CPP-126 is shown on Figure 4-2. 
CPP-128 consists of a leak from a 4-in. transfer line that carries steam condensate from the 
CPP-649 Atmospheric Protection System to the service waste system for disposal. The pipe failed 
because steam with temperatures in excess of the temperature rating for the pipe epoxy was delivered 
through the system. The leak was repaired in 1990. Because this system was designed to transfer only 
nonhazardous, nonradioactive waste, there is no reason to believe that hazardous or radioactive waste was 
released to the environment from this pipe. The approximate location of CPP-128 is shown on Figure 4-2. 
The OU 3-14 RI/BRA evaluated CPP-102 through CPP-110 and identified that no action under 
CERCLA was necessary due to the lack of an unacceptable risk associated with the discharge of the 
steam condensate to these shallow injection wells. The OU 3-14 RI/BRA did not include the most recent 
new sites (CPP-113–CPP-116, CPP-125, CPP-126, and CPP-128). Sites CPP-113 through CPP-116 have 
been added to this ROD because the discharges of steam condensate were at levels and quantities that 
would not pose an unacceptable risk. The Agencies identified that Sites CPP-125, CPP-126, and CPP-128 
had releases of nonradioactive, nonhazardous steam condensate or service wastewater and that no action 
is also appropriate for these sites. A more detailed discussion of the releases associated with these sites 
can be found in the New Site Identification forms in the Administrative Record (ICP 2005a, b, c). 
Upon finalization of the CERCLA no action decision, these sites will exit the CERCLA process 
and the requirements of the State of Idaho for abandonment of shallow injection wells and assessment of 
petroleum releases will be met, as applicable to these sites. 
5.3 Geology 
The INL Site is located in the Eastern Snake River Plain and occupies 890 mi2 (570,000 acres). The 
portion of the plain occupied by the INL Site may be divided into three minor physiographic provinces: a 
central trough that extends from southwest to northeast through the INL Site (see Figure 5-3) and two 
flanking slopes that descend to the trough, one from the mountains to the northwest and the other from a 
broad lava ridge on the plain to the southeast. The slopes on the northwestern flank of the trough are older 
lava flows and younger alluvial fans originating from sediments of Birch Creek and the Little Lost River. 
The land formations on the southeast flank of the trough were created by basalt flows that spread 
northeastward onto the INL Site from the Axial Volcanic High. The lavas that erupted along the Axial 
Volcanic High built up a broad topographic swell directing the Snake River to its current course along the 
southern and southeastern edges of the plain. This ridge effectively separates the drainage of mountain  
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Figure 5-3. Geologic features in the area surrounding INTEC. 
ranges northwest of the INL Site from the Snake River. Big Southern, Middle, and East Buttes are aligned 
roughly along this zone. These rhyolitic domes erupted through older flat-lying basalts of the Axial 
Volcanic High. Their bases were then covered in the mid-to-late Pleistocene by younger basalts that 
erupted from the Axial Volcanic High. 
INTEC is located in the south-central portion of the INL Site (see Figure 1-1) and is constructed on 
relatively thick, gravelly, medium-to-coarse alluvial deposits. The tank farm, which covers 4 acres in the 
northern central portion of INTEC, was constructed in an area that originally had approximately 40 ft of 
alluvium. The alluvial material was excavated to, and in some cases up to 20 ft into, the underlying basalt. 
Few, if any, original stratigraphic layers remain in the tank farm alluvium. 
5.4 Surface Water Sources 
The migration of contaminants at OU 3-14 is influenced by infiltration of surface water. The two 
natural sources of surface water are precipitation and the BLR (when flowing). 
5.4.1 Big Lost River 
The BLR is an intermittent stream that flows north through the INL Site to its terminus at the Lost 
River sinks, where all of the water infiltrates into the ground. There is a U.S. Geologic Survey (USGS) 
gaging station at Lincoln Boulevard (northwest corner of the INTEC facility). When flow occurs, peak 
flows are typically in June and July due to snowmelt, and there is often no flow in the river during the 
winter months. BLR flows are regulated at Mackay Reservoir, which is located approximately 40 miles to 
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the northwest of the INL Site. Flows that reach the INL Site may be diverted to the flood control 
“spreading areas” located southwest of the Radioactive Waste Management Complex by the INL 
diversion dam. Water that is not diverted to the spreading areas continues to flow northward across the 
INL Site in a shallow channel to its terminus at the Lost River sinks. Flow in the sinks is lost to 
evaporation and infiltration. 
The channel of the BLR lies within 100 ft of the northwest corner of the INTEC facility 
(Figure 5-4). It has been straightened and bermed in the vicinity of INTEC. The average elevation of the 
INTEC facility (4,917 ft) is about 9 ft higher than the elevation of the BLR channel immediately to the 
northwest and is about 5 ft higher than the elevation of the BLR berm. An extensive study of the BLR 
floodplain was completed in 2005. The study concluded that the tank farm is not in the 100-year 
floodplain of the BLR (BOR 2005). 
5.4.2 Precipitation 
Rain and snowmelt periodically infiltrate into the gravelly alluvium in and around the INTEC 
facility. Rapid snowmelt and rainwater flowing over partially frozen ground can cause ponding of water 
in low areas. The tank farm is mounded, but water accumulates in low areas outside the tank farm. Even 
though the average annual precipitation (22.1 cm/yr) is much less than the pan evaporation rate 
(109 cm/yr), water from snowmelt or heavy rains infiltrates into the ground to depths where it cannot 
evaporate. This water then continues to move downward until it recharges perched water and the aquifer. 
The combination of coarse surficial sediments and lack of vegetation permits infiltration of a large 
fraction of the natural precipitation. Furthermore, many areas at INTEC are occupied by buildings or are 
paved with asphalt or concrete. Precipitation falling on building roofs is routed to downspouts. Water 
falling on paved surfaces tends to flow laterally to the pavement edge, where it may then flow into 
drainage ditches. The ditches are mostly unlined, and a significant fraction of infiltration likely occurs 
along the ditches. Therefore, infiltration may actually be greater due to the impervious areas, which focus 
much of the surface run-off into gravelly areas or unlined drainage ditches. 
The degree of correlation between the timing of upper shallow perched water level changes and 
calculated “relative soil moisture” strongly indicates that seasonal water level changes are primarily 
due to infiltration of rain and snowmelt rather than recharge from BLR streambed infiltration 
(DOE-ID 2006b). 
5.5 Hydrogeology 
A series of basalt flows and sedimentary interbeds underlie the surficial alluvium. Water that 
infiltrates downward through the alluvium encounters zones of low-permeability interbed material, 
low-permeability basalt flows, and high-permeability basalt flows. Infiltrating water from the surface 
tends to flow vertically downward but may flow laterally where low-permeability units are present that 
impede downward flow. The lower-permeability zones allow local accumulations of water that result in 
areas of high moisture content or saturation. In regions receiving sufficient recharge waters, perched 
water bodies form and persist as long as the recharge sources are present. 
Perched water zones have been present at various depths within the 460-ft-thick vadose zone 
beneath INTEC since at least as early as 1956 (Robertson, Schoen, and Barraclough 1974). Perched water 
exists under northern INTEC. The northern perched water system consists of the shallow and deep 
perched water zones. The northern shallow perched water system has been further divided into the upper 
shallow and lower shallow perched water zones, which generally correspond with the 110- and 140-ft 
sedimentary interbeds. The deep perched water zone coincides with the 380-ft interbed.  
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Figure 5-4. Big Lost River (upper left) and monitoring wells in the vicinity of INTEC. 
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5.5.1 Northern Shallow Perched Water 
Figure 5-5 shows the southern and eastern extent of northern shallow perched water in 2006. The 
northern shallow perched water level elevation data suggest that lateral flow in the shallow perched water 
beneath the northern INTEC area is generally to the southeast, which is consistent with the southeasterly 
dip of the top of the 110-ft interbed beneath and south of the tank farm (DOE-ID 2006b). 
Based on an analysis of downhole neutron moisture logs performed at the INTEC tank farm during 
1994, the annual precipitation infiltration rate inside INTEC has been estimated to be approximately 
18 cm/yr (7.1 in./yr) or about 85% of the total average annual precipitation (Appendix B of 
DOE-NE-ID 2006a). This equates to 0.59 acre-feet of precipitation infiltration per acre, or an infiltration 
rate of 193,000 gal/acre. The total fenced area of INTEC is approximately 175 acres. Therefore, 
precipitation infiltration for the entire facility totals approximately 34 M gal/yr. Because the northern 
portion of INTEC that is over the shallow perched water accounts for about 60% of the total facility area, 
approximately 20 M gal/yr of precipitation infiltration recharges the northern perched water, which 
contains the highest concentrations of radionuclides. This volume is comparable to estimates of the upper 
shallow perched water volume (6 to 18 M gal). Taken together, this information indicates that the upper 
shallow perched water is being continuously replaced by recharge, and the mean residence time for the 
upper shallow perched water is estimated as less than 1 year. 
Although the BLR loses much water to streambed infiltration, BLR infiltration appears to have 
little influence on the shallow perched water as far away from the river as under the tank farm. No 
response has been observed in the shallow perched water wells surrounding the tank farm from flows in 
the BLR. Rather, a combination of precipitation infiltration (rainfall and snowmelt) and discharges and 
leaks of water from facility pipelines appears to account for continued recharge of the perched water 
beneath the northern part of INTEC (Figure 5-5). A detailed analysis of shallow perched water level 
fluctuations indicates that the combined recharge from precipitation infiltration and leaks from INTEC 
pipelines is more important than BLR streamflow infiltration with respect to formation of the shallow 
perched water beneath the tank farm area (DOE-ID 2006b). This conclusion is consistent with the 
observation that the northern shallow perched water persisted during 2002–2005, in spite of the fact that 
the BLR did not flow during that time. 
5.5.2 Northern Deep Perched Water 
Deep perched water occurs approximately 380 to 400 ft below the surface and generally coincides 
with the 380-ft sedimentary interbed. Only a few monitoring wells have been completed in the northern 
deep perched water. USGS-50 and BLR-DP have always had water in them. Wells MW-18-1 and TF-DP 
have gone dry since they were installed and Wells STL-DP, ICPP-2020-DP, and ICPP-2021-DP have 
been essentially dry since they were installed. It is difficult to estimate the lateral extent and continuity of 
the deep perched water zone from the limited number of wells to that depth. 
5.5.3 Snake River Plain Aquifer 
The SRPA underlies the entire INL Site and is among the nation’s most productive aquifers. It is 
the primary source of water for domestic, municipal, and industrial use in southeastern Idaho and also 
provides large quantities of water for agricultural irrigation. The SRPA consists of a thick sequence of 
Quaternary basalt flows, some of which are separated by thin sedimentary interbeds deposited at the 
former land surface during the periods between volcanic eruptions. 
  5-17
 
Figure 5-5. Approximate southern and eastern extent of northern shallow perched water in 2006. 
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Groundwater flow in the SRPA occurs predominantly through fractures (joints) in the basalt and 
along rubble zones at flow contacts (bedding planes). In the eastern SRPA, regional groundwater flow is 
to the southwest. Recharge occurs primarily in mountain-front areas near the Yellowstone Plateau and 
Lost River Ranges. Lesser recharge sources include seepage into the bed of the BLR (when flowing) and 
infiltration of irrigation water applied to agricultural lands near Howe and Mud Lake to the north and 
northeast of the INL Site, respectively. On a local scale, groundwater flow directions may differ from 
regional flow paths. 
Hydraulic conductivities beneath INTEC are among the highest anywhere in the INL Site. The very 
large hydraulic conductivities and fractured nature of the basalt aquifer matrix result in very rapid 
groundwater flow velocities, typically 5 ft/day in the SRPA near INTEC. Based on observations of H-3 
migration from the former injection well, even higher flow velocities occurred when the injection well 
was in operation (1952–1984) (Robertson, Schoen, and Barraclough 1974). 
5.6 Current Perched Water and Aquifer Contamination 
The perched water beneath northern INTEC and the SRPA was impacted by the OU 3-14 releases 
described above and the former injection well. During its operation, the INTEC injection well constituted 
a source of low-level radioactivity to the aquifer and deep perched water. The service wastewater 
included primarily clean plant cooling water with small amounts of evaporator condensates, demineralizer 
water, and boiler blowdown water. The condensate contained radionuclides, primarily H-3. The well was 
designed to discharge wastewater directly into the SRPA. However, the casing of the INTEC injection 
well is known to have failed twice, allowing service wastewater to flow out into the deep vadose zone 
(DOE-ID 2004c). Contamination of the deep perched water zone also occurred for approximately 
1 month during September–October 1970 when service waste was temporarily sent to deep perched 
monitoring well USGS-50 during reconstruction of the injection well. The history of the former injection 
well was summarized in EDF-3943, “INTEC Injection Well: Summary of Historical Information and 
Groundwater Quality Trends.” Since it was plugged with cement grout and abandoned in 1989, the 
former INTEC injection well is not a continuing source of contaminants to the aquifer. However, 
drain-out of service waste from the deep perched zone continues to contribute a slow flux of H-3, Sr-90, 
I-129, and other radionuclides to the SRPA (DOE-ID 2004c). 
The maximum 2005 concentration in the perched water and the SRPA for the OU 3-14 
groundwater COCs is shown on Table 5-4 along with the well where the maximum concentration 
occurred (see Figure 5-4 for a map of well locations). For Sr-90, the highest concentrations occur in the 
shallow perched water, and concentrations decrease toward the aquifer. For technetium-99 (Tc-99), the 
highest concentrations occur in the aquifer. The maximum I-129 concentrations are around the MCL of 
1 pCi/L except in the lower shallow perched water, where it is not detected. The maximum nitrate 
concentration occurs in deep perched water well MW-1-4, which is near the former injection well. 
Sr-90 is the constituent whose concentrations exceed its MCL by the greatest margin in perched 
water at INTEC (perched water is not a source of drinking water and the MCL is used as a point of 
reference only). The reasons Sr-90 is a concern for the SRPA include (1) the total (undecayed) inventory 
of Sr-90 in the known historical liquid releases at the tank farm was approximately 18,000 Ci at the time 
of release (DOE-NE-ID 2006a), (2) Sr-90 has a 29-year half-life, (3) Sr-90 can remain somewhat mobile 
under certain subsurface conditions (unlike many other fission products), and (4) Sr-90 has a high specific 
activity and relatively low MCL (8 pCi/L). 
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Table 5-4. Maximum 2005 concentrations of COCs in perched water and the SRPA.  
(Well name shown in italics.) 
Contaminants of Concern for the SRPA 
 
Sr-90  
(pCi/L) 
Tc-99  
(pCi/L) 
I-129  
(pCi/L) 
Nitrate-N  
(mg/L) 
Water body     
Upper shallow perched 192,000 
MW-2 
43.8 
MW-5-2 
1.3 
ICPP-2019 
24.9 
37-4 
Lower shallow perched 13,100 
MW-10-2 
349 
MW-10-2 
Not detected 11 
MW-9-2 
Deep perched 120 
USGS-50 
31.1 
USGS-50 
0.8 
USGS-50 
41.4 
MW-1-4 
SRPA 35.3 
USGS-47 
(MCL = 8) 
2,900 
ICPP-MON-A-230
(MCL = 900a) 
1.2 
USGS-47 
(MCL = 1a) 
13.2 
ICPP-2021 
(MCL = 10) 
a. The MCL is derived based on an annual dose equivalent to the total body or any internal organ of 4 mrem per year 
calculated on the basis of 2 L/day drinking water using the 168-hr data list in Maximum Permissible Body Burdens and 
Maximum Permissible Concentrations of Radionuclides in Air and in Water for Occupational Exposure, NBS (1963). 
 
In the SRPA, two contaminants (Sr-90 and I-129) exceed the MCLs due to past discharges to the 
former injection well. As shown on Figure 5-6, Sr-90 concentrations (in pCi/L) in 2005 in the SRPA 
exceeded the MCL (8 pCi/L) in nine of 18 monitoring wells. The portion of the plume that exceeds the 
standard extends 3/4 of a mile downgradient of INTEC, with peak concentrations slowly declining as a 
result of radioactive decay and dilution/dispersion. The peak concentration in 2005 was 35.3 ± 0.8 pCi/L 
in USGS-47, which is located downgradient of the former INTEC injection well within the INTEC 
facility. In 2005, I-129 concentrations in the aquifer exceeded the MCL of 1 pCi/L in one well, USGS-47 
(1.23 ± 0.01 pCi/L). 
Two contaminants in the SRPA, Tc-99 and nitrate as nitrogen (N), exceed the MCLs from 
historical releases to tank farm soil. In May 2003, groundwater monitoring at aquifer monitoring well 
ICPP-MON-A-230 just north of the tank farm measured Tc-99 in the SRPA at concentrations 
approximately three times the derived MCL for Tc-99 of 900 pCi/L. The results of the Tc-99 
investigation indicated that the elevated Tc-99 in groundwater at Well ICPP MON-A-230 was most likely 
attributable to historical liquid waste releases at the tank farm, in particular the Site CPP-31 release 
(ICP 2004). In 2005, an additional aquifer monitoring well was drilled southeast of the tank farm 
(ICPP-2021) that also found elevated concentrations of Tc-99 (1,220 ± 20 pCi/L). In 2005, the SRPA 
exceeded the MCL for nitrate as N of 10 mg/L in one well, ICPP-MON-A-230 (13.2 mg/L). 
In contrast to the fission products, none of the actinide elements (uranium [U], plutonium [Pu], 
neptunium [Np], americium [Am]) have ever exceeded their MCLs in groundwater at or downgradient of 
INTEC. 
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Figure 5-6. Distribution of Sr-90 in the SRPA in 2005 and initial groundwater and drilling institutional 
control (IC) area. Sr-90 concentrations, in pCi/L, are shown in color. Red values are >MCL, blue <MCL. 
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5.7 Source Term 
To model the release of contaminants into the subsurface and predict the fate and transport of 
contaminants, a source term was developed to account for the mass or activity released at the WAG 3 
CERCLA sites. Approximately 18,000 Ci of Sr-90; 19,000 Ci of Cs-137; 15.5 Ci of Tc-99; 1 Ci of I-129; 
and 2,850,000 kg of nitrate are estimated to have been released into OU 3-14 soil and the former INTEC 
injection well. Table 5-5 shows the relative percentage that each of these sites contributed and the curies 
or mass for each COC. The former injection well accounted for a large percentage of the total Tc-99 and 
nitrate released, but the wastewater concentrations were relatively low. However, monitoring results 
indicate that the current plume in the SRPA that exceeds MCLs for Tc-99 and nitrate likely came from the 
tank farm sources, rather than the former injection well. The contaminants in the tank farm releases were 
much more concentrated than those in the injection well. 
Table 5-5. Comparison of selected contaminant sources and their relative contributions. 
Contaminants of Concern 
Site Sr-90 Cs-137 Tc-99 I-129 Nitrate 
CPP-31 87% 87% 21% <1% <1% 
CPP-28, -27/33, -79 (deep) 12% 12% 2% <1% <1% 
All other OU 3-14 sites <1% <1% <1% <1% <1% 
Former injection well <1% <1% 77% 99% 99%  
Total releasea 18,000 Ci 19,000 Ci 15.5 Ci 1 Ci 2,850,000 kg 
a. Ci values reported were at time of release and have not been decayed. Over half of the Cs-137 and Sr-90 reported on this 
table has already decayed. 
 
As shown on Table 5-5, Site CPP-31 was the largest radionuclide release in OU 3-14. Site CPP-31 
accounts for over 87% of the total Sr-90 and Cs-137 released at the tank farm. Sites CPP-28, CPP-27/33, 
and CPP-79 (deep) account for about 8–12% of these contaminants, and the remaining OU 3-14 soil sites 
account for less than 1% of the radionuclides. Sampling data show that Cs-137 and Sr-90 remain in the 
soil and that a portion of the Sr-90 has moved downward into the underlying perched water and interbed 
sediments. Sr-90 concentrations in the perched water decrease with depth. There is no evidence that the 
Sr-90 from the tank farm releases has yet reached the SRPA. The former INTEC injection well accounted 
for almost all of the I-129 released at INTEC, but less than 1% of the Sr-90 and Cs-137. Although the 
former injection well was a small percentage of the total Sr-90 released at INTEC, it created a Sr-90 
plume in the aquifer because the waste was injected directly into the aquifer. 
5.8 Conceptual Model 
Figure 5-7 is a conceptual model of the subsurface that shows the contamination currently beneath 
INTEC. Some contaminants released to the environment remain in the tank farm soil (Cs-137 and residual 
Sr-90). Some contaminants have been carried by water from surface sources into perched water, 
interbeds, and basalt (Sr-90); and other contaminants (Tc-99 and nitrate) have migrated through the 
subsurface to the aquifer. The concentration of Sr-90 in the perched water decreases with depth as it sorbs 
to interbeds and basalt during transport. Some contamination in the aquifer and deep perched water zone 
(Sr-90 and I-129) is from the former INTEC injection well. I-129 concentrations exceed the MCL in a 
single aquifer monitoring well near the former INTEC injection well. Production wells, which provide 
drinking water for INTEC, are northeast of INTEC and meet MCLs. Two older production wells in  
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Figure 5-7. Conceptual model of the subsurface showing the contamination beneath INTEC.  
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northern INTEC that do not provide drinking water have caused groundwater contaminated with Sr-90 to 
move to the north against the regional gradient. The deep perched water is contaminated with Sr-90 from 
historical failures of the casing of the INTEC injection well in the deep subsurface above the aquifer. The 
former injection well has been plugged and abandoned and is no longer a source of contamination. 
Infiltration of precipitation and anthropogenic water is the primary driving force for contaminant transport 
from the perched water, basalt, and interbeds to the aquifer. The BLR does not appear to impact the 
shallow perched water bodies beneath the tank farm. 
The conceptual model provides the basis for the groundwater model, which is used to predict 
aquifer concentrations in the future to assess risk from the contaminant sources. The conceptual site 
model, which identifies exposure pathways, exposure routes, and classes of receptors for the risk 
assessment, is in Section 7.1. 
5.9 Groundwater Modeling 
The OU 3-13 ROD presented modeling results that were inconsistent with subsequent monitoring 
data. That model overestimated transport and groundwater and perched water concentrations for I-129 
and Pu and underestimated groundwater concentrations for Tc-99. The OU 3-14 model included revised 
model input parameters to more accurately predict transport. 
Modeling was conducted to simulate release and migration of contaminants from the OU 3-13 and 
OU 3-14 sites, including the former injection well, and to estimate future contaminant concentrations in 
the SRPA. The updated OU 3-14 source terms are based on descriptions in Section 5 of the RI/BRA 
(DOE-NE-ID 2006a) that were briefly summarized in Section 5.7 of this ROD. No credit was taken for 
soil removed from the tank farm and disposed elsewhere. A separate source term for CPP-96 was not 
developed because it was accounted for in the individual tank farm release sites. The modeling predicts 
the fate and transport of contaminants over time if no remedial action is taken. The modeling is 
summarized in Section 8 of the RI/BRA, and details on the modeling can be found in Appendix A of the 
RI/BRA for all contaminants except Sr-90, which can be found in Appendix J (DOE-NE-ID 2006a). 
The numerical code was the same one used in OU 3-13 (the TETRAD simulator, Vinsome and 
Shook 1993). The model (Version 12.7 ms) was updated with new information, and the subsurface 
structure was incorporated using detailed geostatistical representations of sedimentary units rather than 
simply representing interbed tops geostatistically and preserving total sediment thickness (effective 
interbeds) as was done in the OU 3-13 model. Hydraulic properties assigned to the updated model were 
also assigned geostatistically as opposed to assigning uniform hydraulic properties within each material 
type. Model parameters specific to contaminant migration, such as partition coefficients, were defined 
using site-specific information. Reasonable values from the literature were selected when site-specific 
data were not available. Some contaminants, like Tc-99, I-129, and nitrate, are very mobile—they move 
at about the same rate as water. Other contaminants, like Cs-137 and Sr-90, are less mobile—their 
movement is slowed because they attach to the surrounding soil and rock. 
The simulation process involved three steps: (1) representation of the time-release of each 
contaminant at each source location; (2) prediction of the evolution (transport, decay, adsorption, 
dispersion, etc.) of the contaminant through the vadose zone; and (3) prediction of transport processes in 
the aquifer. In Step 1, for all contaminants with the exception of Sr-90, the source terms developed in 
Section 5 were represented as time-varying mass fluxes that were either placed in the vadose zone model 
for those releases occurring near land surface or into the aquifer model during the periods when the 
injection well was operative. Simulation Steps 2 and 3 were linked through a mass-flux boundary between 
the vadose zone and aquifer portions of the model.  
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The near-surface release of Sr-90 at Site CPP-31 was treated more rigorously in Step 1 because of 
the composition of the SBW at that site. Specifically, a geochemical model (TOUGHREACT, 
Xu et al. 2004) of the alluvium was necessary to account for the evolution of the SBW release of Sr-90 at 
Site CPP-31 because of the unusual chemistry (highly acidic and high in salts). Being highly acidic, the 
waste released at CPP-31 dissolved naturally occurring salts contained in the soil particles (primarily 
calcium). The dissolved salts competed with the Sr-90 for soil attachment sites. This allowed some of the 
Sr-90 to migrate rapidly downward into the perched water where the background chemistry existed. 
Dilution with the background water and contact with the interbed sediments then reduced the Sr-90 
mobility allowing most of it to attach to the interbed sediments. Closer to the CPP-31 release area, the 
naturally alkaline soil eventually neutralized the acidic waste. As infiltrating snowmelt and rainwater 
dissolved and washed away the salts, the binding strength and the chemistry of the soil was restored to 
background. This allowed the Sr-90 remaining in the tank farm soil to become tightly bound to the soil. 
To account for this complex release in the context of simulation Steps 2 and 3, Sr-90 mass flux out of the 
alluvium predicted by the geochemical model was placed into the TETRAD vadose zone model below the 
alluvium, and the portion predicted to remain in the alluvium was placed nearer land surface. As with the 
other contaminants, simulation Steps 2 and 3 were linked through a mass-flux boundary between the 
vadose zone and aquifer portions of the model accounting for all of the releases of Sr-90. 
Predictive modeling was then conducted for each contaminant as far out in the future as necessary 
to capture the peak arrival(s) in the aquifer. Aquifer model termination dates ranged from 2095 to the 
year 4587, depending on the contaminant. In all cases, simulated and actual peak aquifer concentrations 
are stable or trending downward. Peak aquifer concentrations are predicted to decline over time. 
Sr-90 is the only contaminant that is predicted to exceed MCLs in 2095 and beyond if no further 
remedial action is taken to protect groundwater. The geochemical modeling indicates that most of the 
Sr-90 has migrated into the perched water and interbed sediments. Infiltration of precipitation and 
discharges of clean INTEC process water would aid desorption of the Sr-90 currently in the perched water 
in and above the interbed sediments, facilitating downward transport toward the SRPA. The model also 
predicts that the residual Sr-90 in the tank farm alluvium is relatively immobile (cation exchange) and is 
an insignificant contributor to the overall groundwater risk. Because of this, remedial action on the 
contaminated alluvium would not significantly reduce groundwater risk. 
If no action is taken, the predicted extent of the Sr-90 plume is shown on Figure 5-8 from 2005 to 
2096 and on Figure 5-9 from 2049 to 2151. The red contour is the MCL (8 pCi/L) and the black contour 
is one-tenth the MCL (0.8 pCi/L). The model predicts that the maximum concentration in the aquifer will 
fall below 19 pCi/L in 2095 and be below the MCL in 2129, largely as a result of decay and dispersion if 
no action is taken. The peak measured concentration in 2005 was 35.3 ± 0.8 pCi/L. 
To address specific public concern over the long-lived contaminants Pu-239 and Pu-240, the 
analysis for these contaminants was extended beyond 2095. Adsorption to soil retards the migration rate 
of these contaminants, preventing them from reaching the aquifer from the near-surface release sites for 
thousands of years. Concentrations in the vadose zone and the mass flux of these contaminants into the 
aquifer were predicted through year 87,594. In the analysis of long-term concentrations, the following 
were considered: 
• Predicted concentrations in the vadose zone – In the vadose zone, the water saturation is less than 
one, which results in higher contaminant concentrations than would be observed in the aquifer. 
Additionally, higher water flow velocities occurring in the aquifer dilute the slower water fluxes 
arriving from the vadose zone. The combined effects result in aquifer concentrations several times 
smaller than vadose zone concentrations. 
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Figure 5-8. Predicted SRPA Sr-90 plumes (in pCi/L) for the years 2005, 2022, 2077, and 2096 if no 
action is taken. Red contour is the MCL, and black contour is one-tenth the MCL. 
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Figure 5-9. Predicted SRPA Sr-90 plumes for the years 2049, 2077, 2096, and 2151 near INTEC if no 
action is taken. Red contour is the MCL, and black contour is one-tenth the MCL. 
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• Predicted mass-flux rates from the vadose zone compared to the mass fluxes that occurred during 
use of the injection well – The aquifer model incorporated Pu-239 and Pu-240 injection well 
discharges and predicted the peak aquifer concentrations resulting from those mass fluxes. 
Injection well mass fluxes can be directly compared to the predicted mass flux arriving from the 
vadose zone, which allows estimation of the concentration for the very long-term arrival of 
contaminants from land surface. 
For Pu-239, the predicted peak vadose zone concentration occurred in 1973 and was 104 pCi/L. 
This concentration and retarded migration rate result in a mass flux on the order of 1 × 10-8 Ci/day 
through the 60,000-year time frame. In comparison, the failed injection well resulted in a mass flux of 
4 × 10-9 Ci/day and peak aquifer concentration of 0.03 pCi/L. The slightly higher flux rate arriving from 
the vadose zone would be expected to result in a peak aquifer concentration on the order of 0.12 pCi/L, 
which is well below the drinking water standard of 15 pCi/L. 
For Pu-240, the predicted peak vadose zone concentration was 19.4 pCi/L, just slightly higher than 
the drinking water standard of 15 pCi/L. Use of the injection well resulted in an early mass-flux rate of 
2 × 10-9 Ci/day during the 1950–2000 time period and a peak aquifer concentration of 0.16 pCi/L. Pu-240 
originating from the near-land-surface releases is predicted to arrive much later, with fluxes peaking at 
7 × 10-11 Ci/day. This much slower arrival from the vadose zone would be expected to result in a peak 
aquifer concentration on the order of 0.005 pCi/L, which is also well below the drinking water standard of 
15 pCi/L. 
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6. CURRENT AND POTENTIAL FUTURE SITE 
AND RESOURCE USES 
The INL Site is approximately 890 mi2 (570,000 acres). Land use on the entire INL Site is 
restricted, and access to the INL Site and INTEC is controlled. Access to ICP and INL facilities requires 
proper clearance, training or an escort, and controls to limit exposures. Although 90 miles of public 
highways pass through the northern and southern portions of the INL Site, public access beyond the 
highway right-of-way is not allowed. Current and projected land uses are summarized below for the INL 
Site, surrounding lands, and INTEC. 
6.1 Land Use on and around the INL Site 
DOE administers land within the INL Site, and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) 
(Department of Interior) administers livestock grazing leases within the undeveloped portion of the INL 
Site (Figure 6-1). The BLM classified the acreage within the INL Site (570,000 acres) as industrial and 
mixed use (DOE 1991). The current primary use of the INL Site is to support facility and program 
operations. Large tracts of land are reserved as buffer and safety zones along the boundary of the INL 
Site. Portions within the central area are reserved for ICP/INL operations. The remaining land within the 
core, which is largely undeveloped, is used for environmental research, ecological preservation, and 
sociocultural preservation. The buffer consists of 500 mi2 of grazing land (DOE 1991) administered by 
the BLM. 
In the counties surrounding the INL Site, approximately 45% of the land is used for agricultural 
production of livestock and crops, 45% is undeveloped, and 10% is urban (DOE 1991). Most of the land 
surrounding the INL Site is owned by private individuals or the U.S. Government. 
Future land use is addressed in the Long-Term Land Use Future Scenarios document 
(DOE-ID 1995) and the Infrastructure Long-Range Plan (INEEL 2001). Because future land-use 
scenarios are uncertain, assumptions were made in the Long-Term Land Use Future Scenarios document 
for defining factors such as development pressure, advances in research and technology, and ownership 
patterns. The following assumptions were applied to develop forecasts for land use within the INL Site: 
• The INL Site will remain under DOE ownership and control until at least 2095. The boundary is 
currently static. INEEL (2003) indicates that the boundaries of the INL Site may shrink at some 
future date. Portions of the INL Site will be managed beyond 2095 due to DOE’s responsibility for 
long-term stewardship. 
• The life expectancy of current and new facilities is expected to range between 30 and 50 years. The 
decontamination and dismantlement process will commence following closure of each facility if 
new missions for the facility are not determined. 
• No residential development (e.g., housing) will be allowed to occur within the current INL Site 
boundaries before 2095, and there are no specific reasons to expect such development after that 
date. 
• No new major, private developments (residential or nonresidential) are expected in areas adjacent 
to the INL Site. 
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Figure 6-1. Land ownership and use in the vicinity of the Idaho National Laboratory Site. 
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Future land use most likely will remain essentially the same as the current use: a research facility 
within the INL Site boundaries and agriculture and open land surrounding the INL Site. In addition, future 
land use will include the ICP/INL mission of nuclear energy research, development, and demonstration. 
Laws and regulations that govern the transfer of federal land are presented in the INL Sitewide 
Institutional Controls Plan (DOE-ID 2006c). These will ensure future protection of human health and the 
environment through property transfer documentation required by CERCLA § 120 (42 USC 9620) and 
EPA ICs policy, which include notices of contamination and remediation history, zoning restrictions 
issued by the appropriate local land use authority in conjunction with any transfer from federal ownership, 
restrictions in transfer deeds that preserve ICs, and warranties and covenants that all necessary remedial 
action has been performed prior to transfer of title and that the government will perform any additional 
remedial action found necessary after transfer. Because most INL Site land was withdrawn in 1949 from 
the BLM for the National Reactor Testing Station, the land that is no longer needed for the INL Site 
would be returned to the Public Domain under BLM management provided BLM agrees to accept 
responsibility for remaining CERCLA requirements related to such land. Some portions of the INL Site 
were acquired from previous nonfederal owners. Any transfer of land from federal to nonfederal 
ownership would require compliance with the detailed property transfer procedures of the Federal 
Property and Administrative Services Act (40 USC Subtitle I) and other applicable statutes, as well as the 
restrictions of CERCLA § 120(h) (42 USC 9620). Due to the significant hurdles associated with transfer 
of federal land containing any residual contamination, including the potential liability of the federal 
government under CERCLA, tort, contract, and real property law, the transfer outside federal ownership, 
or even to unrestricted access under BLM management, would be highly unlikely for any such 
contaminated property at the INL Site. Therefore, the possibility of development of contaminated INL 
Site land by nonfederal entities, whether for residential or commercial purposes, is remote. 
6.2 Land Use at INTEC 
Current land use at INTEC is limited to industrial applications associated with (1) safe storage of 
SNF in preparation for shipment to a repository outside of Idaho, (2) technology development for safely 
treating high-level and liquid radioactive waste generated from previous fuel reprocessing activities, 
(3) remediation of past contamination releases to the environment, and (4) DD&D of excess facilities. 
INTEC is a key part of implementing a 1995 Settlement Agreement (DOE 1995) whose key objectives 
are to remove all SNF from Idaho by 2035 and to prepare waste stored at the INL Site for removal from 
Idaho by the same date. 
The Idaho High-Level Waste & Facilities Disposition Final Environmental Impact Statement 
(HLW&FD FEIS) (DOE 2002) discusses current land use plans that include a 100-year IC period for 
INTEC. For purposes of analysis, the year 2095 was selected as the end of DOE’s ICs, which is consistent 
with the timeframe identified in the OU 3-13 ROD. INTEC has an established industrial infrastructure 
that includes grouted underground tanks and ancillary equipment at the TFF. The WCF, located to the 
southeast of the tank farm, has been closed with waste grouted in place to the standards applicable to a 
HWMA/RCRA landfill, including post-closure groundwater and cap monitoring. Future cleanup of other 
nearby facilities, such as the New Waste Calcining Facility, bin sets where calcined waste is stored, and 
Fuel Reprocessing Complex (see Buildings CPP-601, CPP-602, and CPP-630 on Figure 4-2) may leave 
waste in place. The Agencies have agreed that residential use over these facilities and grouted tanks is not 
a reasonable anticipated future use. The industrial use area is shown on Figure 4-2. 
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In addition to limitations on future development imposed by anticipated physical characteristics, 
ICs will continue to be implemented at the INTEC facility for as long as land use or access restrictions are 
necessary to protect human health and the environment. The use of ICs has been established in the 
OU 3-13 ROD to prevent exposure to contaminated groundwater and soil until the risks reach acceptable 
levels. 
6.3 Groundwater Uses 
The SRPA is the source of all water used at the INL Site. INTEC withdraws raw water from 
production wells located in the northwestern corner of INTEC for industrial uses such as process water 
and fire water. Potable water for workers comes from two production wells located northeast of INTEC 
and meets MCLs. The portion of the SRPA that exceeds MCLs from INTEC sources is not currently 
used. Residential use of the SRPA on the INL Site cannot occur before 2095 and is only a remote 
possibility after that time. For purposes of designing the OU 3-14 remedial action, it is assumed that 
hypothetical future residents could live outside the INTEC industrial use area and use the SRPA as a 
drinking water source in 2095 and beyond. 
 
  7-1
7. SITE RISKS 
The BRA estimates what risks the site would pose if no action were taken and no administrative 
controls were in place to protect workers. It provides the basis for taking action and identifies the 
contaminants and exposure pathways that need to be addressed by the remedial action. This section of the 
ROD summarizes the results of the BRA, which was presented in detail in DOE-NE-ID (2006a) 
Sections 6, 7, and 8. 
7.1 Summary of Human Health Risk Assessment 
The conceptual site model (Figure 7-1) identifies the primary and secondary contaminant sources 
and release mechanisms, exposure pathways, exposure routes, and classes of receptors specific to the 
OU 3-14 risk assessment. Two primary sources exist: the tank farm system and the former injection well. 
Leaks and spills, primarily from the tank farm piping and valves, resulted in contamination of soil, 
perched water, and the SRPA. Human exposures to contaminants can occur primarily by direct contact 
with surface soil at the release sites (for workers) or, in the future, through ingestion of contaminated 
SRPA groundwater (for future residents). A potentially complete exposure pathway/route for a receptor 
means that the source, release mechanism, pathway, and exposure route are possible from contaminants at 
the tank farm. An incomplete exposure pathway indicates that one or more criteria (i.e., pathway, 
exposure route, or receptor) do not exist or have limited exposure. The model indicates incomplete 
exposure routes for current workers because workers infrequently visit the tank farm. Visits are under 
controlled access conditions and workers do not remain there for long periods of time. The Agencies 
agree that significant exposure for current workers is not likely, due to administrative controls that 
currently exist on the tank farm. However, the Agencies evaluated a current worker scenario in the 
OU 3-14 RI/BRA to facilitate remedial action decision-making. The Agencies agree that future residential 
use of the industrial use area of INTEC is also not a reasonable scenario. Because all OU 3-14 soil sites 
are located in the industrial use area, residential contact with soil was considered an incomplete pathway 
and not assessed in the OU 3-14 RI/BRA. Future residents could live outside the industrial use area and 
could be exposed to contaminated groundwater. To be conservative, the Agencies used the maximum 
predicted groundwater concentration in 2095 and beyond for the risk assessment regardless of whether the 
peak occurred inside or outside the industrial use area. The Agencies did not assess potential future 
ingestion of contaminated SRPA groundwater by workers because the residential exposure scenario is 
more conservative. 
The primary potential exposure route is from radionuclide-contaminated soil inside the tank farm 
boundary (direct exposure by workers) and ingestion, by hypothetical future residents, of contaminated 
groundwater from beneath southern INTEC. 
7.1.1 Soil 
A risk assessment for exposure to contaminated soil was conducted using the risk assessment 
previously completed under OU 3-13 (DOE-ID 1997a). In general, CERCLA risk assessments for 
workers at the INL Site use a maximum depth of 4 ft for surface pathways based on an assumption that 
workers would dig only to the depth necessary to complete building foundations below the frost line. 
Risks from the other surface exposure routes calculated in the OU 3-13 RI/BRA⎯inhalation of volatiles 
and particulates, incidental ingestion of surface soil, and dermal absorption, which are calculated from 
contaminant concentrations in the top 6 in. of soil—were calculated to be at far less than 1 × 10-6 excess 
cancer risk (highest was 1 × 10-9) and hazard quotient of 1, cumulatively, for the tank farm. This was 
expected as most of the tank farm sites had releases that occurred below the 6-in. soil depth, making the 
depth of 0 to 4 ft (direct gamma exposure) and deeper (groundwater) the only exposure pathways of 
concern. 
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Figure 7-1. OU 3-14 conceptual site model showing groundwater source term, OU 3-14 and OU 3-13 contributing sources, release mechanisms, exposure pathways, and exposure routes and receptors for the OU 3-14 risk assessment. 
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In addition, the OU 3-13 RI/BRA (DOE-ID 1997a, Tables 10-13 and 10-15) demonstrated that 
there are no noncarcinogenic hazards to the worker from nonradiological contaminants. To confirm this, 
all new nonradiological sampling data from 0 to 10-ft depth bgs (mostly not detected) were screened for 
risk/hazard using EPA Region 9 preliminary remediation goals (PRGs) (EPA 2006a). All nonradiological 
contaminants were eliminated from further consideration during this screening step (see Appendix I of 
DOE-NE-ID 2006a) and, therefore, were not evaluated further in the risk assessment. 
Because of the mixing of surface soil during tank farm excavation projects, all sampling data, 
including historical data, for inside the tank farm boundary were pooled for evaluation of surface soil risk. 
Soil inside the tank farm boundary includes Sites CPP-16, CPP-20, CPP-24, CPP-25, CPP-26, 
CPP-27/33, CPP-28, CPP-30, CPP-31, CPP-32E, CPP-32W, CPP-58W, CPP-79 (shallow), CPP-79 
(deep), CPP-112, and contaminated soil used as backfill in the tank farm. 
Grouping sites within the tank farm boundary is reasonable because it is improbable that a worker 
would remain over any single site for the duration of the exposure scenario (which is assumed to be 
40 hours per week, 50 weeks per year, for 25 years). The risk assessment for the other two sites, CPP-15 
and CPP-58, which are outside the tank farm, was conducted separately for each site because these two 
sites are not contiguous and the contaminant sources were different. 
Contaminants of potential concern, exposure assessment, and toxicity assessment are presented in 
Section 7.2 of DOE-NE-ID (2006a). EPA classifies all radionuclides as known human cancer-causing 
agents (Group A carcinogens), based on their property of emitting ionizing radiation and on the extensive 
weight of evidence provided by epidemiological studies of radiogenic cancers in humans. At Superfund 
radiation sites, EPA generally evaluates potential human health risks based on the radiotoxicity, 
i.e., adverse health effects caused by ionizing radiation, rather than on the chemical toxicity of each 
radionuclide present. These evaluations consider the carcinogenic effects of radionuclides only. In most 
cases, cancer risks are limiting, exceeding both mutagenic and teratogenic risks. For the OU 3-14 
RI/BRA, radionuclide slope factors for converting external exposure to lifetime risk of cancer incidence 
are taken from EPA’s Health Effects Assessment Summary Tables (HEAST) ⎯Radionuclides Table 
(EPA 2006b), formerly HEAST Table 4. HEAST slope factors used in the OU 3-14 RI/BRA for external 
exposure are shown on Table 7-3 of the RI/BRA (DOE-NE-ID 2006a). 
All radionuclides detected at greater-than-detection limits were evaluated for risk in the OU 3-14 
RI/BRA. Screening performed for nonradiological contaminants indicated that these contaminants 
(mostly not detected) would not significantly contribute to risk (see Appendix I of the RI/BRA). EPA 
recommends that the exposure point concentration used to calculate risk at a site represents a reasonable 
estimate of the average concentration likely to be contacted over time. EPA guidance also states that 
because of the uncertainty associated with estimating the true average concentration at a site, the 95% 
upper confidence limit (UCL) for the arithmetic mean should be used for this variable (EPA 1992). The 
exposure point concentration used in the risk assessment is the 95% UCL for the mean or the maximum 
concentration, whichever is less. 
Risk characterization combines the results of the exposure and toxicity assessments to quantify the 
health risk. For carcinogens such as the radionuclides detected at OU 3-14 sites, risks are generally 
expressed as the incremental probability of an individual developing cancer over a lifetime as a result of 
exposure to the carcinogen. Excess lifetime cancer risk is calculated from Equation 7-1: 
Risk = Exposure × CSF (7-1) 
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where 
Risk = potential lifetime excess cancer risk (unitless) for a contaminant 
Exposure = direct radiation exposure (yr-pCi/g) 
CSF = contaminant external exposure slope factor (risk/yr per pCi/g). 
The total cancer risk from all contaminants is calculated by summing the calculated risks for all 
radionuclides considered in the risk assessment. The total risk from all exposure routes from soil was 
calculated by adding the inhalation and ingestion risks calculated in the OU 3-13 RI/BRA 
(DOE-ID 1997a) to the direct exposure risks calculated in the OU 3-14 RI/BRA. Because the risks from 
all other contaminants and all other pathways were low, direct exposure to Cs-137 dominates the risk 
profile. 
The generally acceptable risk range for site-related exposures under the NCP (40 CFR 300) is 10-4 
to 10-6. The Agencies agree that acceptable risk for OU 3-14 is at the upper end of this range (1 × 10-4) 
based on (1) the conservative nature of the risk assessment, e.g., it is unlikely there will be future 
industrial re-use of the OU 3-14 soil sites; therefore, worker exposure is anticipated to be much less than 
40 hours per week for 25 years; (2) use of the 1 × 10-4 risk-based level in the OU 3-13 ROD for all 
CERCLA soil sites at INTEC (which surround OU 3-14); and (3) the isolation of the INL Site.  
Table 7-1 presents the risk for the current worker scenario for soil inside the tank farm boundary. 
The total current worker risk, 2 × 10-2, is due to external radiation (direct exposure) from Cs-137. Eu-154 
contributes about 0.1% to the total current worker risk, with the remaining radionuclides and exposure 
routes (ingestion of soil, inhalation) making an insignificant contribution. This same conclusion, that total 
worker risk is solely due to external radiation from Cs-137, holds true for all other potentially complete 
soil pathways in OU 3-14 (see Tables 7-10 through 7-14 in the OU 3-14 RI/BRA). 
Table 7-1. Current worker scenario risk assessment results for soil inside the tank farm boundary. 
Contaminant 
of Potential 
Concern 
Concentration 
(pCi/g)a 
Average 
Concentration over 
Exposure Durationb
(pCi/g) 
Direct 
Radiation  
Exposure 
(pCi-yr/g) 
Direct 
Radiation Risk 
Other Exposure 
Route Riskc 
Am-241 1.02 1.00 5.72 1.6E-07  —d 
Co-60 0.027 0.0079 0.045 5.6E-07 — 
Cs-134 0.009 0.001 0.006 4.1E-08 — 
Cs-137 1,848 1,405 8,008 2.0E-02 5.0E-08 
Eu-154 1.52 0.664 3.79 2.2E-05 — 
Np-237 0.15 0.15 0.85 6.8E-07 — 
Pu-238 3.17 2.88 16.4 4.5E-07 — 
Pu-239 0.61 0.61 3.5 6.9E-10 — 
Sr-90 89 67 380 1.8E-07 2.0E-08 
Tc-99 2.01 2.01 11.5 9.3E-10 — 
U-234 1.08 1.08 6.2 1.6E-09 — 
U-235 0.075 0.075 0.43 2.3E-07 — 
U-238 e e e e e 
Total N/A N/A N/A 2E-02 7E-08 
a. 95% UCL or maximum of the 0 to 4-ft sampling data decayed to start of the exposure scenario (2004). 
b. 25-year average of the integrated concentration (with decay) over the exposure duration (see Section 7.2.1.3 of DOE-NE-ID 2006a). 
c. Sum of risks from soil ingestion and inhalation taken from both the Tank Farm Group and Tank Farm South Group sites in OU 3-13 
RI/BRA (DOE-ID 1997a). 
d. — indicates no data available and not calculated in OU 3-13. 
e. Less than background (see Table 7-4 of DOE-NE-ID 2006a). 
N/A = not applicable. 
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The results of the soil risk assessment are summarized in Table 7-2. These risk estimates are based 
on a reasonable maximum exposure and were developed by taking into account various conservative 
assumptions about the frequency and duration of a worker’s exposure to soil, as well as the toxicity of 
Cs-137. The total risk from direct exposure to contaminated soil inside the tank farm boundary for a 
current unprotected worker is estimated to be 2 × 10-2 and for a future unprotected worker is 3 × 10-3. 
These risk levels indicate that if no cleanup action is taken, a current worker would have an increased 
probability of 2 in 100 of developing cancer as a result of site-related exposure to Cs-137 and a future 
worker would have an increased probability of 3 in 1,000. These risk results exceed the risk criteria of 
1 × 10-4 established in the OU 3-13 ROD (DOE-ID 1999a). The total risk to a current worker from direct 
exposure to contaminated soil is estimated to be 7 × 10-4 at Site CPP-15 and 4 × 10-4 at Site CPP-58. Due 
to radioactive decay (Cs-137 has a 30-year half life), these risks drop to acceptable levels, i.e., below 
1 × 10-4, before 2095 (8 × 10-5 for Site CPP-15 and 5 × 10-5 for CPP-58). No other metals, chemicals, or 
radionuclides other than Cs-137 pose an unacceptable risk or hazard to human health or the environment 
through the surface pathway. 
Table 7-2. Estimated total riska to an unprotected worker from contaminated surface soil. 
Site Contaminant 
Risk to Current Worker 
(2005)b 
Risk to Future Worker  
(2095)b 
Primary Exposure 
Pathway 
Soil inside tank 
farm boundary 
Cs-137 2E-02 (200 in 10,000) 3E-03 (30 in 10,000) External exposure 
CPP-15 Cs-137 7E-04 (7 in 10,000) 8E-05 (0.8 in 10,000) External exposure 
CPP-58 Cs-137 4E-04 (4 in 10,000) 5E-05 (0.5 in 10,000) External exposure 
Bold = Risks that exceed acceptable levels (1E-04 risk-based level). 
a. Cs-137 risk via external exposure alone exceeds risks for all other pathways and COCs combined by over two orders of magnitude and is 
therefore equivalent to total risk. 
b. No contaminants other than Cs-137 present in the soil pose an unacceptable risk or hazard to human health or the environment. 
 
7.1.2 Groundwater 
The groundwater in the SRPA currently exceeds safe drinking water standards for Tc-99, Sr-90, 
I-129, and nitrate as nitrogen. The model predicts that the maximum concentrations of all contaminants in 
the aquifer reached their peak prior to 2000, are trending downward, and will continue to decline over 
time. Sr-90 is the only contaminant that is predicted to exceed federal MCLs in 2095 and beyond if no 
further remedial action is taken to protect groundwater. Risks from ingesting contaminated groundwater 
were assessed assuming a resident consumes 2 L per day for 30 years. Table 7-3 summarizes the results 
of the groundwater risk assessment and includes the MCL, maximum SRPA concentration measured in 
2005, predicted concentrations in 2005 and 2095, risk to future residents in 2095, and the year the 
concentration is predicted to be below the MCL. Although Sr-90 was the only contaminant predicted to 
exceed MCLs beyond 2095, all contaminants that were considered in the groundwater risk assessment are 
shown because the potential additive effect increases the overall risk from 2 × 10-5 for Sr-90 to 3 × 10-5 
for all groundwater contaminants. The model also predicts that the residual Sr-90 remaining in the tank 
farm soil is relatively immobile (due to ion exchange) and is an insignificant contributor to overall risk to 
the aquifer (see Appendix J of DOE-NE-ID 2006a). The risk to the aquifer is from remobilization of the 
Sr-90 that initially moved quickly out of the alluvium, is reversibly sorbed onto the interbed sediments 
and basalts, and can be carried down to the aquifer through perched water. 
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Table 7-3. Human health contaminants of concern summary (groundwater ingestion pathway) for all INTEC CERCLA sources (if no action 
taken). 
Contaminant MCL 
Year of 
Simulated 
SRPA Peak 
Concentration 
Actual Maximum 
Concentration  
(2005) 
Predicted 
Concentration 
(2005) 
Predicted 
Maximum 
Concentration  
(2095) 
Estimated Risk to 
Future Resident  
(2095) 
Year Predicted to be 
below Safe Drinking 
Water Standard 
Aquifer Model 
Termination 
Date 
H-3 20,000 pCi/L 1965 8,740 ± 207 pCi/L 9,970 pCi/La 123 pCi/L 1E-07 2001 2095 
Sr-90 8 pCi/L 1965 35.3 ± 0.8 pCi/L 40.8 pCi/L 18.6 pCi/L 2E-05 2129 2293 
Tc-99 900 pCi/Lb 1999 2,900 ± 47 pCi/L 235 pCi/L 9.8 pCi/L 6E-07 1999 2095 
I-129 1 pCi/Lb 1970 1.2 ± 0.1 pCi/L 3.9 pCi/L 0.9 pCi/L 3E-06 2080 2095 
Np-237 15 pCi/L 1965 ND 4.1 pCi/L 4.2 pCi/L 5E-06 1987 2304 
Pu-239 15 pCi/L 1960 ND 0.02 pCi/L 0.002 pCi/L 3E-09 Always 2095 (vadose 
zone modeled to 
year 87,594) 
Pu-240 15 pCi/L 1960 ND 0.009 pCi/L 0.001 pCi/L 3E-09 Always 2095 (vadose 
zone modeled to 
year 87,594) 
U-234 30 µg/L 1958 2.5 ± 0.2 µg/L 1.2E-04 µg/Lc 2E-04 µg/L 2E-06 Always 2304 
Total risk 3E-05   
Hg 2 µg/L 1981 0.08 µg/L 0.6 µg/L 0.3 µg/Ld 0.01  
(hazard quotient) 
1993 4587 
NO3-N 10 mg/L 1993 13.2 mg/L 6.2 mg/L 2.1 mg/L 0.04  
(hazard quotient) 
1998 2095 
Total hazard index 0.05   
Bold = Information on contaminants that currently or are predicted to exceed their MCLs. 
ND = Not detected. 
a. This prediction was entered into RI/BRA Tables 8-3 and A-9-12 incorrectly as 99,700 pCi/L (should have been 9,970 pCi/L), but displayed correctly in Figure A-9-7. 
b. Derived MCL. 
c. The predicted U-234 concentration fluctuates over time (2095 prediction exceeds the 2005 prediction) but never exceeds the 1958 predicted peak value (5.4E-04 µg/L). 
d. This prediction was entered into RI/BRA Tables 8-3, 8-4, and A-9-12 incorrectly as 0.13 µg/L (should have been 0.3 µg//L), but displayed correctly in Figure A-9-43. 
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There is uncertainty in the estimate of risks from future ingestion of groundwater because of the 
reliance on modeling to predict future concentrations. The modeling predictions of future concentrations 
have uncertainty corresponding to possible ranges in some of the input values. The inputs were set at 
realistic and, in some cases, conservative, values. The uncertainty analysis is presented in the RI/BRA 
(DOE-NE-ID 2006a). For parameters that had some uncertainty in the input values, sensitivity runs were 
performed at the extreme ends of the range of values to further assess uncertainty. 
The model underpredicts the current Tc-99 maximum concentration by a factor of 12 and 
underpredicts the peak concentration by an estimated factor of 3 (modeled concentrations peaked in 1999 
at 935 pCi/L). Despite this uncertainty, it is likely that the Tc-99 concentrations will be well below the 
MCL by 2095, in part because the predicted 2095 concentration (9.8 pCi/L) is so far below the MCL (by 
a factor of 90). 
7.2 Cumulative Risk 
The baseline risk results have been presented separately for the soil and groundwater pathways. 
The cumulative risk for the surface pathways, across all COCs, is dominated by the risk from the external 
exposure to Cs-137 because this risk is so much greater than the other risks. There is no groundwater 
pathway associated with the current occupational exposures because the water supply wells currently in 
use at INTEC are located upgradient of the facility. Therefore, there is no possibility that a current worker 
would be exposed through both the surface and groundwater pathways and thus the cumulative risk is 
represented by the risk presented in Table 7-2. 
A future resident could hypothetically reside outside the industrial use area and would not be 
exposed to contaminated soil in the industrial use area. The cumulative risk for a future resident is the 
total risk from the groundwater pathway, 3 × 10-5, and the hazard index (HI) is 0.05 (see Table 7-3). This 
is a conservative estimate because the maximum groundwater concentrations for each contaminant do not 
overlap in space and time. 
A future worker inside the industrial use area could be exposed to both contaminated soil and 
contaminated groundwater. The risk from drinking contaminated groundwater would be less than the 
residential exposure of 3 × 10-5 because workers are assumed to ingest less water than a resident. Because 
the risk to a future worker inside the tank farm boundary from ingestion of groundwater would be several 
orders of magnitude less than the risk from external exposure to soil, the cumulative risk for all pathways 
is not greater than the risk through the external exposure pathway. 
For a future worker in the year 2095 and beyond at Sites CPP-15 or CPP-58, which are located 
outside the tank farm boundary, the Cs-137 concentration in the soil will have decayed to acceptable 
levels. However, groundwater is predicted to exceed the MCL for Sr-90 until 2129 if no action is taken. 
7.3 Cumulative Impacts from Non-CERCLA 
Residual Sources at INTEC 
Cumulative impacts from non-CERCLA residual sources at INTEC such as the WCF, which has 
been grouted in place, and the residuals that could be left in place when the tanks, sand pads, and 
associated piping in the TFF are closed are addressed in Section 1.3.12 of the OU 3-14 FS 
(DOE-ID 2006d). This assessment was done to ensure that cumulative risks from remediated CERCLA 
and non-CERCLA sources do not exceed risk-based levels. Releases associated with non-CERCLA 
INTEC sources were determined to occur at different times than the baseline risks for the CERCLA 
INTEC sources—the peaks did not overlap—and the peak risks from conservative estimates of these 
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sources post-closure will be so low that the cumulative risk will not exceed risk-based levels or MCLs. 
The cumulative risk assessment showed that no concern exists over the cumulative effects between the 
closed TFF, WCF, and the tank farm soil. 
7.4 Ecological Risk Assessment 
The ecological risk assessment (ERA) performed for OU 3-13 was updated to incorporate new data 
(see Chapter 7 of the RI/BRA, DOE-NE-ID 2006a). An ERA had previously been performed in the 
OU 3-13 RI/FS and presented in Section 28 of DOE-ID (1997b). The OU 3-13 ERA follows the approach 
presented in the Guidance Manual for Conducting Screening Level Ecological Risk Assessments at the 
INEL (VanHorn, Hampton, and Morris 1995) and uses the 0 to 10-ft depth for evaluation, similar to the 
risk assessments for the residential intrusional scenario. The results of this assessment found that several 
metals and radionuclides are potentially at levels of concern. Because of the availability of new sampling 
data for OU 3-14 and updated input parameters for ecological receptors available from EPA (EPA 2006c) 
and the OU 10-04 Comprehensive RI/FS (DOE-ID 2001), these data were reassessed under OU 3-14 to 
ensure that the conclusions made in the OU 3-13 RI/FS are still valid. 
7.4.1 Ecological Risk Assessment Results 
Initial screening of contaminants was performed as discussed in Sections 7.4 and 7.5 of the 
RI/BRA (DOE-NE-ID 2006a). Both CPP-15 and soil inside the tank farm boundary had contaminants at 
concentrations above screening levels. Hazard quotients and hazard indexes were calculated for both 
nonradionuclides and radionuclides (both for external and internal exposure) using the approach 
documented in the OU 10-04 Comprehensive RI/FS (DOE-ID 2001). Changes based on the new or 
updated chemical-specific documents from EPA (EPA 2006d) were included for antimony, arsenic, 
barium, beryllium, cadmium, chromium (no value is available for exposure to plants), cobalt, lead, and 
vanadium. A hazard quotient is developed by dividing the maximum dose from the contaminant by its 
toxicity value. An HI is developed by summing hazard quotients for each contaminant by species. At the INL 
Site, it is accepted that, if the total HI does not exceed 10, then the contaminants remaining can be eliminated 
for risk to ecological receptors at the population level. 
For CPP-15, none of the HIs exceeded 10 for any of the species evaluated (see Tables 7-16 and 
7-17 of the OU 3-14 RI/BRA, DOE-NE-ID 2006a). 
For soil inside tank farm boundary, none of the HIs exceeded 1 for chromium (see Tables 7-18 and 
7-19 in the RI/BRA). There is a significant risk (with HIs over 400) from internal exposure to 
radionuclides at this site (see Table 7-4); however, the external exposure is at acceptable levels (the 
highest HI is 4.0 as shown on Tables 7-22 and 7-23 of the RI/BRA, DOE-NE-ID 2006a). 
7.4.2 Summary of Results for the Ecological Risk Assessment 
The ERA concluded that a potential exists inside the tank farm for biotic receptors to receive 
unacceptable internal exposure to the individual contaminants Cs-137 and Sr-90. The ERA used the 
conservative assumptions that the habitat in the area was freely available for use by ecological receptors 
and that the maximum concentration of the contamination in the 0 to 10-ft range was available to all 
receptors. In reality, the surface of the tank farm is covered with an impermeable membrane, gravel, 
asphalt, or structures, which inhibit plant growth and discourage use by animals in the area. A more 
detailed assessment that takes these facts into account would result in a reduced calculated risk. 
  7-9
Table 7-4. Hazard quotients for internal exposure of ecological receptors to radionuclides  
from soil inside the tank farm boundary. 
Functional Groups 
Hazard Quotient 
for Cs-137a 
(unitless) 
Hazard Quotient 
for Sr-90b 
(unitless) Hazard Index 
Avian herbivores (AV121) 2.E+01 8.E+01 1.E+02c 
Avian herbivores (AV122) 9.E+01 3.E+02 4.E+02 
Avian insectivores (AV210) 6.E+01 2.E+02 3.E+02 
Black tern 2.E+01 8.E+01 1.E+02 
Avian insectivores (AV210A) 6.E+01 2.E+02 3.E+02 
Avian insectivores (AV221) 6.E+01 2.E+02 3.E+02 
Avian insectivores (AV222) 9.E+01 3.E+02 4.E+02 
Avian insectivores (AV222A) 6.E+01 2.E+02 3.E+02 
Great Basin spadefoot toad 9.E+01 3.E+02 4.E+02 
Mourning dove 9.E+01 3.E+02 4.E+02 
Sage sparrow 6.E+01 2.E+02 3.E+02 
Ferruginous hawk 6.E+01 2.E+02 3.E+02 
Loggerhead shrike 6.E+01 2.E+02 3.E+02 
Burrowing owl 2.E+01 8.E+01 1.E+02 
Black-billed magpie 9.E+01 3.E+02 4.E+02 
Mule deer 9.E+01 2.E+02 3.E+02 
Pygmy rabbit 9.E+01 2.E+02 3.E+02 
Townsend’s western big-eared bat 9.E+01 2.E+02 3.E+02 
Coyote 9.E+01 2.E+02 3.E+02 
Deer mouse 9.E+01 2.E+02 3.E+02 
Sagebrush lizard 9.E+01 3.E+02 4.E+02 
Plants 9.E+00 3.E+01 4.E+01 
Grasshoppers, beetles 9.E+01 4.E+03 4.E+03 
a. Maximum concentration for Cs-137 is 5.10E+04 pCi/g. 
b. Maximum concentration for Sr-90 is 3.26E+04 pCi/g. 
c. Bold indicates HI above 10. 
 
7.5 Basis for Action 
The Agencies determined that soil inside the tank farm boundary poses an unacceptable risk due to 
the high levels of Cs-137 contamination and the significant risk from direct radiation to human health and 
the environment should exposures occur (2 × 10-2 to current worker and 3 × 10-3 to future worker from 
Cs-137). The Agencies determined that soil at Sites CPP-15 and CPP-58, which are located outside the 
tank farm boundary, poses an unacceptable risk to the current worker due to Cs-137 contamination 
(7 × 10-4 and 4 × 10-4 for Sites CPP-15 and CPP-58, respectively), but risks to a future worker are 
acceptable (8 × 10-5 and 5 × 10-5), if direct exposure were to occur. Concentrations in the groundwater 
currently exceed the MCL for Sr-90, Tc-99, I-129, and nitrate in the vicinity of INTEC. The groundwater 
model predicts that the SRPA will be restored to drinking water standards by 2095 for all COCs except 
Sr-90. The model predicts that the source of Sr-90 is currently below the alluvium in the interbeds and 
perched water system and a portion can be mobilized by infiltration. The Cs-137, which is immobile in 
the alluvium, will decay to acceptable levels.  
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The response action selected in this ROD is necessary to protect the public health, welfare, or the 
environment from actual or threatened releases of hazardous substances into the environment. Such a 
release or threat of release may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to public health, 
welfare, or the environment. The remedial actions selected in this ROD are designed to reduce the 
potential threats to human health and the environment to acceptable levels. In addition, the Agencies have 
determined that no action is necessary under CERCLA to protect public health, welfare, or the 
environment at 16 sites located outside the tank farm boundary. 
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8. REMEDIAL ACTION OBJECTIVES 
The RAOs for OU 3-14 provide a general description of what the CERCLA cleanup is designed to 
accomplish. These goals serve as the design basis for the selected remedy identified in this ROD. 
8.1 Remedial Action Objectives for OU 3-14 
RAOs for the SRPA affected by INTEC sources are defined as follows: 
I. Prior to 2095, prevent current workers and the general public from ingesting SRPA groundwater 
contaminated by INTEC releases that exceeds (1) MCLs, currently identified as 8 pCi/L for Sr-90, 
900 pCi/L for Tc-99, 1 pCi/L for I-129, and 10 mg/L for nitrate measured as nitrogen; (2) a 
cumulative excess cancer risk from all carcinogens of 1 in 10,000; or (3) an HI of 1. 
II. In 2095 and beyond, ensure that concentrations of all contaminants in SRPA groundwater 
contaminated by INTEC releases do not exceed (1) MCLs; (2) a cumulative excess cancer risk 
from all carcinogens of 1 in 10,000; or (3) an HI of 1. 
Total excess cancer risk and HI will be determined by summing contaminants that are predicted 
to be in the SRPA at the same place and time. The results of the BRA model predicted that Sr-90 would 
exceed the MCL of 8 pCi/L until 2129. No noncarcinogens have been identified that would exceed an 
MCL in 2095 and beyond, and the total HI is currently below 1 and predicted to remain below 1. 
RAOs I and II can potentially be met through ICs; combinations of actions on the alluvium, the 
SRPA, and/or the vadose zone below the alluvium; and/or recharge controls on infiltration and 
anthropogenic water. 
RAOs for the OU 3-14 soil are defined as follows: 
III. Prevent external exposure to current and future workers inside the tank farm boundary from Cs-137 
contaminated alluvium and prevent biotic transport that would exceed an excess cancer risk of 1 in 
10,000. 
IV. Prevent external exposure to current workers at Sites CPP-15 and CPP-58 from Cs-137 
contaminated alluvium that would exceed an excess cancer risk of 1 in 10,000. 
V. Prevent internal exposure to biological receptors from Cs-137 and Sr-90 inside the tank farm 
boundary that would exceed an ecological hazard quotient of 10 for an individual contaminant and 
a total ecological HI of 10. 
RAOs III and IV for soil are focused on external exposure to Cs-137, which represents the 
predominant risk. The risk and hazard quotient for other exposure routes, such as soil ingestion, are well 
below the risk threshold of 1 × 10-4 or the hazard quotient of 1 and are extremely small (0.0002% or less 
of the total) relative to impacts from external exposure. RAO III also addresses the potential for biotic 
transport of contamination as a possible pathway. Intrusion by deep-rooted plants and burrowing 
mammals and insects (such as ants) into contaminated soil can create a pathway for movement of 
contamination to the surface. This transported material could then be a potential source of exposure to 
human receptors on the surface. To ensure protection of workers, the remedy will inhibit transport of 
COCs to the surface by plants and animals. RAO V focuses on internal exposure for biological receptors. 
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8.2 Basis and Rationale for Remedial Action Objectives 
The basis for the RAOs for the soil is to clean up the site to industrial use standards, the anticipated 
future land use for this portion of INTEC. 
The basis for the RAOs for groundwater is to ensure that current workers are not exposed to 
contaminated groundwater during implementation of the selected remedy and to restore groundwater to 
MCLs for hypothetical future residents living at INTEC (outside the industrial use area) and future 
INTEC workers. 
8.3 Risks Addressed by the Remedial Action Objectives 
The risks associated with Cs-137 contaminated soil will be addressed by containment until the 
Cs-137 decays to risk levels below 1 × 10-4 for a future worker. The risks associated with ingestion of 
contaminated INTEC groundwater will be addressed through (1) ICs until the portion of the SRPA 
contaminated by INTEC releases is restored to MCLs or below on or before 2095 and (2) reducing 
infiltration. 
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9. REMEDIATION GOALS 
Remediation goals (RGs) are established based on the results of the BRA and the evaluation of 
expected exposures and risks for selected alternatives. The remediation goals will be used to assess the 
effectiveness of the selected remedial alternatives in meeting the RAOs. 
Groundwater RGs are based on meeting the MCLs in the portion of the SRPA contaminated by 
INTEC releases by 2095 and beyond and are presented in Table 9-1. The RG for beta-gamma-emitting 
radionuclides (H-3, I-129, Tc-99, and Sr-90 and its daughters) is restricted to a cumulative dose of 
4 mrem/yr in 2095 and beyond. The cumulative dose is determined by contaminants that overlap in space 
and time. The cumulative dose from alpha-emitting radionuclides (such as Am-241, Np-237, and Pu 
isotopes) is much lower than the MCL of 15 pCi/L for all alpha-emitting radionuclides. 
Table 9-1. Groundwater remediation goals for the year 2095 and beyond. 
Contaminant of Concern a Remediation Goal 
Sr-90 8 pCi/L 
Total (Sr-90, I-129, and Tc-99) 4 mrem/yr 
a. Tc-99, I-129, Sr-90, and nitrate currently exceed MCLs in the SRPA but Tc-99, 
I-129, and nitrate are predicted to meet MCLs before 2095. 
 
The RGs for Cs-137 in OU 3-14 soil were developed from EPA PRGs (EPA 2006a). EPA PRGs 
are back-calculated, current soil concentrations that correspond to a risk of 1 in 1,000,000. They are 
calculated using standard EPA exposure route equations and EPA cancer slope factors. 
For future outdoor workers, the EPA PRG for outdoor worker soil was initially selected. Because 
EPA PRGs are calculated for a 1-in-1,000,000 target risk criteria, they were multiplied by 100 to obtain 
the RGs for the 1-in-10,000 risk criteria for the OU 3-14 sites. The RG for an outdoor worker having a 
1 × 10-4 (1-in-10,000) risk-based level for external exposure to Cs-137 was calculated to be 11.3 pCi/g in 
2095. This calculation was based on a worker spending 40 hours per week on the tank farm, for 50 weeks 
per year, and for 25 years (2095 to 2120). Current workers are protected by ICs. 
Due to radioactive decay, the RG depends on the year the cleanup is performed. The calculated 
outdoor worker RG for year 2095 of 11.3 pCi/g is used to calculate the RG for any year from the present 
to 2095 by dividing the RG by an exponential decay factor. This decay factor was calculated as [e-λt], 
where λ is the Cs-137 decay rate constant (0.023 yr-1) and t is the decay time (in years) between the 
cleanup date and 2095 when the future worker exposure scenario begins. 
For example, the Cs-137 RG in 2006 is calculated as 
.  pCi/g 87.5  e / pCi/g 11.3 )]89)(yr -[(0.023
-1 =yr  
Example calculations for future years are summarized in Table 9-2. 
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Table 9-2. Soil remediation goals for Cs-137 for various remedial decision dates. 
Remedial Decision Date 
Cs-137 Soil Remediation Goal  
(pCi/g) 
2095 11.3 
2035 (projected INTEC facility closure) 45 
2012 (projected TFF closure) 76 
 
The RG will apply to the top 4 ft of alluvium in the industrial use area. The RGs will be used to 
verify the effectiveness of the selected remedial action and to determine if additional remedial action is 
necessary prior to termination of the remedial action. 
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10. DESCRIPTION OF ALTERNATIVES 
This section describes remedial alternatives developed to meet the RAOs cited in Section 8. As 
required under the NCP (40 CFR 300.430), technologies that may potentially meet RAOs were identified 
and screened. Representative technologies were selected from those retained after screening, and the 
retained technologies were combined into a range of alternatives, including 
• Source control alternatives involving treatment of contamination to reduce the toxicity, mobility, 
and volume of contamination 
• Alternatives involving little or no treatment but providing protection of human health and the 
environment by preventing exposures to receptors, e.g., containment and ICs 
• Groundwater alternatives that attain RGs within different restoration time periods using one or 
more different technologies. 
The alternatives were formulated to meet RAOs while adding progressively more protective 
measures; therefore, some elements are common to several or all of the alternatives. 
Groundwater modeling was used to predict the effect on SRPA water quality of potential remedial 
alternatives under OU 3-14, in combination with potential remedies under OU 3-13. The model predicts 
that the most effective way to meet the groundwater RAOs is to control recharge to the SRPA by reducing 
infiltration of precipitation to 1 mm/year or less over a 10-acre area around and including the tank farm. 
Figure 4-1 shows this recharge control zone (RCZ). 
The modeling also predicted that removing or treating the contaminated alluvium does not 
significantly reduce risk to the SRPA because the mobile Sr-90 has already migrated to the perched water 
and the residual Sr-90 contamination in the alluvium is essentially immobile. Furthermore, the model 
predicted that lining the BLR near INTEC would have a negligible effect on risk because infiltration of 
river water does not recharge the shallow perched water directly under the tank farm. 
The alternatives will be described in reference to the RCZ border (area outside the tank farm) and 
the north, central, and south tank farm as shown on Figure 4-1. The central tank farm includes Site 
CPP-31, where most of the contamination was released from the tank farm to the alluvium and underlying 
groundwater, and includes underground tanks WM-180 through WM-190 as well as extensive surface 
infrastructure projected to be removed from service by 2012. The north tank farm has no release sites and 
has not been characterized but is considered part of CPP-96. The south tank farm includes release sites 
CPP-20, CPP-25, CPP-27, and CPP-33; the berm adjacent to CPP-604; and buried tanks WM-100 
through WM-102 and WL-101, WL-102, and WL-133. It is adjacent to infrastructure projected to remain 
active through 2035, including Buildings CPP-604, CPP-605, CPP-756, and the main stack. Following 
closure of the TFF tanks in 2012, INTEC cleanup and closure activities will continue with completion 
expected in 2035. Several components of tank farm infrastructure (transfer pipelines and valve boxes) are 
required for INTEC closure activities and will remain active beyond tank closure. This infrastructure is 
shown in purple in Figure 4-1. 
Because of the preference in the NCP for treatment, an SRPA pump and treat alternative was 
evaluated. Small, mobile fractions of Sr-90 from the northern perched water and interbeds (originating 
from the tank farm and from the deep vadose zone [injection well failure]) are predicted to slowly move 
down to the SRPA. Based on technical limitations, pump and treat would be very inefficient at removing 
Sr-90. The model predicted that if pump and treat started in 2077 (design based on manual iterations), it 
would need to continue until 2123. Less than 0.1 Ci of Sr-90 could be removed each year from the SRPA. 
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Over 45 years of pumping, this alternative would remove less than 4.5 Ci of Sr-90. A contingent pump 
and treat alternative was evaluated in detail in the OU 3-14 FS, Appendix A (DOE-ID 2006d). In addition 
to the inefficiency of pumping and treatment, the technical practicability of selecting a remedy for 
groundwater that would not be implemented for 70 years is very low. For these reasons, SRPA pump and 
treat will not be considered further in this ROD. The other alternatives are summarized below. 
10.1 No Action Alternative 
DOE is required by federal orders and state and federal laws to protect workers and the public from 
unacceptable exposures, and the INL Site currently has administrative and physical controls in place to 
prevent unacceptable exposures to contaminated soil and groundwater. DOE cannot implement a 
no action alternative (i.e., no controls) because it would put workers at risk and would not meet the 
requirements of federal orders and state and federal laws. Therefore, the no action alternative is not 
considered further. 
10.2 Alternative 1 – Limited Action 
The limited action alternative includes all of the ongoing OU 3-13 remedies for tank farm soil and 
groundwater and serves as a basis for comparison in the FS against the other alternatives as required 
under the NCP. This alternative includes 
• Institutional controls for OU 3-14 soil and the SRPA until 2095 
• Operating and maintaining existing surface water controls implemented under the TFIA 
• Monitoring the SRPA until 2095. 
Existing ICs will remain in effect as long as hazards remain that limit unrestricted use of the site 
for the planned land use, i.e., through at least 2095 for the tank farm. These ICs include the control of 
activities, access restrictions, and restrictions on leasing or transferring property, as described in the INL 
Sitewide Institutional Controls Plan (DOE-ID 2006c), and maintaining notification requirements in 
response to failed control/corrective action. The ICs will be maintained on both OU 3-14 soil and the 
SRPA. Operations and maintenance (O&M) will continue on the IC components through inspection of 
CPP-96 that will lead to necessary updates to the INL Sitewide Institutional Controls Plan. O&M of the 
TFIA components will continue as described in DOE-ID (2006e). This will include O&M of the paved 
areas in and around the tank farm, the lift station, the evaporation pond (see Figure 1-1) and leak detection 
system, and the lined drainage ditches and culverts that are used to transfer surface water run-off away 
from the tank farm and to the evaporation pond. Monitoring of the SRPA, currently addressed under 
OU 3-13, would continue under OU 3-14 using existing wells. 
Soil exposure carcinogenic risks identified for future workers would remain unchanged for 
Alternative 1 if ICs end. The direct radiation exposure risk for a worker inside the tank farm border would 
remain above 1 × 10-4 for about 220 years or until about 2227. Direct exposure risks to workers at CPP-15 
and CPP-58 would decrease to allowable levels before 2095. Risks to ecological receptors due to 
radionuclides in soil would not be mitigated by this alternative. 
Ingestion of contaminated groundwater would be administratively prevented until at least 2095. 
From 2095 until 2129, Sr-90 concentrations in the SRPA would remain above acceptable levels for 
ingestion by hypothetical future residents living outside the industrial use area or future workers, based on 
BRA groundwater modeling predictions. 
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10.3 Alternative 2 – Containment and Monitoring 
Alternative 2, illustrated in Figure 10-1, expands upon the actions in Alternative 1: 
• Cover the RCZ outside the tank farm with low-permeability pavement. 
• Cap the central and south tank farm with an evapotranspiration cap with a capillary biobarrier 
(ET/CB).  
• Install a protective cover over the north tank farm. Characterize the north tank farm soil for Cs-137 
in the top 4 ft and 
a) If soil is less than the future worker RG, cover the north tank farm with low-permeability 
pavement or  
b) If soil is above the future worker RG, remove soil contaminated above the future worker RG 
prior to installing low-permeability pavement. 
• Maintain, modify, and upgrade as necessary, the TFIA components as the remedy is implemented 
until at least 2095. Components include lined drainage ditches, culverts, an evaporation pond, and a 
lift station.  
• Monitor and maintain the ET/CB.  
• Implement ICs for OU 3-14 soil and the SRPA until 2095. 
• Monitor the portion of the SRPA contaminated by INTEC releases until MCLs have been met 
(expected to be on or before 2095). 
The RCZ outside the tank farm, about 3.5 acres excluding aboveground infrastructure, and the 
north tank farm, about 0.5 acre, would be covered with 4–6 in. of low-permeability pavement, the features 
of which are shown on Figure 10-2. This type of cover can be readily installed around existing 
infrastructure, such as the concrete pad over Site CPP-15, and can be easily expanded as facility 
infrastructure is removed. This cover requires ongoing maintenance to ensure its effectiveness (such as 
patching) and use of lift stations to transport accumulated surface water to a lined evaporation pond. 
The central and south tank farm, about 3.2 acres and 0.7 acres, respectively, would be capped with 
an ET/CB. Figure 10-3 shows the features of this cap. The ET/CB varies in thickness from 6 ft at the 
edges to 18 ft at the crown and would protect workers from external exposure to contaminated soil, 
reduce water infiltration, and prevent biota from intruding through the cap and bringing contamination to 
the surface. This type of cap requires less maintenance than the low-permeability pavement and does not 
require lift stations or evaporation ponds for managing surface water. Instead, it minimizes recharge by 
storing moisture and returning it to the air using plants and evaporation. 
The immediate installation of the ET/CB over the south tank farm is prevented by ongoing INTEC 
cleanup activities that require access to Buildings CPP-604, CPP-605, and CPP-1659, and other 
infrastructure, including active underground waste lines and tanks (see Figure 4-1). Therefore, the south 
tank farm would initially be covered with low-permeability pavement to reduce infiltration to the northern 
perched water until after INTEC closure (~2035) when the south tank farm would be covered with an 
ET/CB. 
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Figure 10-1. Alternative 2, Containment and Monitoring. 
 
Figure 10-2. Conceptual design features of the low-permeability pavement. 
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Figure 10-3. Conceptual design features of the evapotranspiration cap with capillary biobarrier. 
The north tank farm area will be characterized to determine Cs-137 levels in the top 4 ft of soil. If 
the soil is above the RGs, a determination will be made whether to remove contaminated soil before 
installing the same low-permeability pavement planned for the RCZ outside the tank farm or whether to 
leave the contaminated soil in place and extend the central tank farm ET/CB to cover the north tank farm 
area. Excavated soil will be disposed of in the ICDF, which is scheduled for last receipt of waste in 2013 
and closure in 2015. (ICDF was assumed to be the disposal location for contaminated soil and debris, 
secondary waste, and investigation-derived waste only through 2013, with an equivalent facility assumed 
to be available after that.) 
Until the ET/CB is installed, worker exposures would be reduced to allowable levels by 
administrative controls and access restrictions discussed under Alternative 1. The ET/CB would provide 
additional worker protection for the duration of unacceptable risk. Environmental risks would be reduced 
or eliminated by the ET/CB. Worker ingestion of contaminated groundwater would be administratively 
controlled until at least 2095 by providing drinking water from production wells located outside the 
plume. In 2095 and beyond, Sr-90 concentrations in the SRPA would be at allowable levels for ingestion 
by hypothetical future residents living outside the industrial use area based on modeling results of 
reducing infiltration over 10 acres. 
The central tank farm ET/CB can be installed directly following TFF closure, which will require 
extending active valve boxes to the surface of the cap and constructing retaining walls to protect 
Buildings CPP-604/CPP-605 and CPP-659, which house critical ventilation and evaporation processes. 
Or, the central tank farm ET/CB can be installed following INTEC closure and following DD&D of all 
remaining infrastructure. Therefore, two variants of Alternative 2 will be presented, installing the ET/CB 
on the central tank farm following TFF closure (Option a) or following INTEC closure (Option b). 
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10.3.1 Alternative 2a 
Alternative 2a would be completed before INTEC closure, with the exception of the south tank 
farm (see the top of Figure 10-4). Low-permeability pavement would be installed over the RCZ outside 
the tank farm, north tank farm, and south tank farm and integrated into existing buildings and structures. 
This low-permeability pavement would be maintained and expanded as INTEC infrastructure was 
removed. 
After DD&D of inactive surface infrastructure (following tank farm closure) in the central tank 
farm, the ET/CB would be installed. Retaining walls would be installed around active infrastructure, 
surface water drainage would be rerouted as necessary, and valve boxes in the cap area would be 
extended to allow access to valves on active transfer lines. As the peripheral infrastructure is no longer 
needed and removed, the retaining walls would be removed and the ET/CB would be contoured in these 
areas. The south tank farm would initially be covered with low-permeability pavement to reduce 
infiltration to the aquifer until after INTEC closure (~2035) when the south tank farm would be covered 
with an ET/CB. Table 10-1 presents the timing for installation of each component of Alternative 2a. 
10.3.2 Alternative 2b 
Alternative 2b is similar to Alternative 2a, except for the central tank farm where a 
low-permeability pavement will be installed followed by an ET/CB. Following TFF closure, 
low-permeability pavement would be installed over the central tank farm (see bottom left drawing on 
Figure 10-4). After INTEC closure, when the interfering infrastructure is no longer needed and has been 
closed, the ET/CB would be constructed on top of the low-permeability pavement (see drawing on right 
side of Figure 10-4). 
The ET/CB would be installed over both the central and south tank farm during a single effort. The 
ET/CB could be extended over a larger area (for example, the north tank farm) and combined with other 
caps if that is more cost-effective than maintaining the low-permeability pavement. The final capping 
configuration of Alternatives 2a and 2b, after removal of interfering infrastructure, would be identical. 
Table 10-1 presents the timing for installation of each component of Alternative 2b. 
OU 3-14 actions to be completed initially, between 2008 and immediately following TFF closure 
planned for 2012, will be fully protective of workers through administrative controls and access 
restrictions and will reduce risks to groundwater. This allows for staged implementation of additional 
components after the interfering infrastructure is removed or no longer in use, which is estimated to be 
after 2035. These additional remedy components will add measures for long-term protection of workers 
and biota, while minimizing long-term maintenance requirements. 
10.4 Alternative 3 – Hot Spot Removal, Containment, and Monitoring 
Alternative 3 would add the following actions to those implemented under Alternative 2: 
• Removal of contaminated alluvium at CPP-31 
• Disposal at ICDF 
• Backfilling with clean material. 
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Figure 10-4. Cap extent for Alternatives 2 through 4 during and following facility operation. 
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Table 10-1. Installation timing for alternatives.  
Area Remedy 
Alternative 2a 
Containment and 
Monitoring 
Alternative 2b 
Containment and 
Monitoring 
Alternative 3a 
Hot Spot Removal, 
Containment, and 
Monitoring 
Alternative 3b 
Hot Spot Removal, 
Containment, and 
Monitoring 
Alternative 4a 
In Situ Treatment, 
Containment, and 
Monitoring 
Alternative 4b 
In Situ Treatment, 
Containment, and 
Monitoring 
RCZ outside the tank 
farm Low-permeability pavement Before TFF closure
a Before TFF closure Before TFF closure Before TFF closure Before TFF closure Before TFF closure 
North tank farm If soil < RG, low-permeability pavement 
 If soil > RG,  
 • Excavate and low-permeability pavement 
Before TFF closure 
 
Before TFF closure 
 
Before TFF closure 
 
Before TFF closure 
 
Before TFF closure 
 
Before TFF closure 
 
 or  
 • ET/CBb NA
c After INTEC closured NA After INTEC closure NA After INTEC closure 
Central tank farm Low-permeability pavement NA After TFF closure NA After TFF closure NA After TFF closure 
 ET/CB After TFF closure After INTEC closure After TFF closure After INTEC closure After TFF closure After INTEC closure 
 CPP-31 excavation NA NA After TFF closure After INTEC closure NA NA 
 CPP-31 in situ treatment NA NA NA NA After TFF closure After INTEC closure 
South tank farm Low-permeability pavement Before TFF closure Before TFF closure Before TFF closure Before TFF closure Before TFF closure Before TFF closure 
 ET/CB After INTEC closure After INTEC closure After INTEC closure After INTEC closure After INTEC closure After INTEC closure 
a. TFF closure – Tanks have been cleaned and grouted, and interfering infrastructure has been removed. 
b. Need determined based on engineering evaluation in the Phase II RD/RA work plan. 
c. NA = not applicable. 
d. INTEC closure – Infrastructure within the OU 3-14 industrial use area has been removed. 
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Site CPP-31 was the source of the largest OU 3-14 contaminant release to the alluvium and the 
underlying basalt and perched water. A relatively small fraction of the approximately 15,900 Ci of Sr-90 
originally released is estimated to remain in the alluvium at CPP-31. The modeling predicts that the 
residual Sr-90 in the alluvium is essentially immobile and will not contribute significantly to groundwater 
risk. Given the immobile nature of Cs-137, most of it remains in the alluvium. Removal of contaminated 
alluvium would require worker protection from gamma radiation. As a result, excavation would likely be 
performed using remote handling techniques, which complicates this alternative. Because excavation 
using remote handling techniques would be to 60 ft deep in some areas but limited horizontally to 50 ft 
due to the distance between tank vaults, ramps and shoring would also be required. Excavated alluvium 
would be transported to ICDF for disposal and the excavation backfilled with clean fill. 
Removal of contaminated alluvium at CPP-31 would provide no additional worker protection 
beyond that resulting from administrative controls through 2095 and capping the south and central tank 
farm with the ET/CB. After 2095, the ET/CB would maintain worker protection for the duration of 
unacceptable risk. Environmental risks would be reduced or eliminated by the ET/CB. 
Excavating and disposing of contaminated CPP-31 alluvium, combined with capping, would 
achieve Sr-90 MCLs in the SRPA approximately 5 years sooner than just reducing infiltration over 
10 acres. Sr-90 concentrations in the SRPA would remain above MCLs until approximately 2090 (as 
compared to 2095 for Alternative 2). Ingestion of the SRPA contaminated by INTEC releases would be 
administratively prevented until MCLs are attained. In 2090 and beyond, Sr-90 concentrations in the 
SRPA would be at allowable levels for ingestion by hypothetical future residents living outside the 
industrial use area. 
There are two variants of Alternative 3. The difference between the two options is when CPP-31 is 
excavated and the ET/CB is constructed, either following TFF closure (Option a) or following INTEC 
closure (Option b). 
10.4.1 Alternative 3a 
Contaminated alluvium at Site CPP-31 would be excavated and disposed of at the ICDF, and the 
excavation would be backfilled with clean soil before constructing the ET/CB over the central tank farm. 
Excavation and cap construction would both occur immediately following tank farm closure. Other than 
excavating Site CPP-31, the paving/capping remedy would follow the sequence described for 
Alternative 2a (see top left and right drawings on Figure 10-4). Table 10-1 presents the timing for 
installation of each component of Alternative 3a. 
10.4.2 Alternative 3b 
In this alternative, the low-permeability pavement would be installed over the contaminated 
alluvium at Site CPP-31. Following INTEC closure, Site CPP-31 would be excavated and disposed of at 
an equivalent facility to the ICDF, and the excavation would be backfilled with clean soil. Other than 
excavating Site CPP-31, the paving/capping remedy would follow the sequence of activities described for 
Alternative 2b (see bottom left and right drawings on Figure 10-4). Table 10-1 presents the timing for 
installation of each component of Alternative 3b. 
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10.5 Alternative 4 – In Situ Hot Spot Treatment, Containment, 
and Monitoring 
Alternative 4 adds the following actions to those implemented under Alternative 2: 
• In situ treatment of contaminated alluvium at Site CPP-31 using injection of cementitious grout 
• Disposal of grout returns at ICDF or an equivalent facility. 
The alluvium within Site CPP-31, from the surface down to the basalt interface, would be grouted 
to ensure that the Sr-90 remaining in the alluvium is immobilized. Some grout and drill cuttings would be 
forced out of the drill annulus in any grouting scenario. These grout returns would be contaminated and 
are assumed to require remote handling, thereby requiring increased work controls to protect workers. 
Grouting the contaminated alluvium at CPP-31 would provide no additional worker protection 
beyond that resulting from administrative controls through 2095 and capping the south and central tank 
farm with the ET/CB. After 2095, the ET/CB would maintain worker protection for the duration of risk. 
Environmental risks would be reduced or eliminated by the ET/CB. 
Treating contaminated alluvium in situ at Site CPP-31, combined with capping, would provide only 
a very minor reduction in the Sr-90 concentration in the SRPA compared to just reducing infiltration over 
10 acres. This is because the Sr-90 in the alluvium is already essentially immobile and grouting provides 
little additional benefit. Sr-90 concentrations in the SRPA would remain above the MCL until 
approximately 2090 (as compared to 2095 for Alternative 2). Groundwater ingestion by workers would be 
administratively controlled until at least 2090. In 2090 and beyond, Sr-90 concentrations in the SRPA 
would be at allowable levels for ingestion by hypothetical future residents living outside the industrial use 
area. 
Because of buried and surface infrastructure at CPP-31, only about half of the grout holes installed 
would reach the alluvium-basalt interface, resulting in less than 100% of the contaminated alluvium being 
contacted by grout. Grouting after TFF closure (Option a) and grouting after INTEC closure (Option b) 
for Alternative 4 are described below. 
10.5.1 Alternative 4a 
Contaminated alluvium at Site CPP-31 would be grouted in situ prior to constructing the ET/CB 
over the central tank farm. Other than this grouting, the paving/capping remedy would follow the 
sequence described for Alternative 2a (see top left and right drawings on Figure 10-4). Table 10-1 
presents the timing for installation of each component of Alternative 4a. 
10.5.2 Alternative 4b 
The low-permeability pavement would be constructed over the central tank farm and maintained 
until INTEC closure. Contaminated alluvium at Site CPP-31 would then be grouted in situ prior to 
constructing the ET/CB over the central tank farm. Other than this grouting, the paving/capping remedy 
would follow the sequence of activities described for Alternative 2b (see bottom left and right drawings 
on Figure 10-4). Table 10-1 presents the timing for installation of each component of Alternative 4b. 
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11. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES 
The alternatives were evaluated using the nine evaluation criteria specified by CERCLA 
(40 CFR 300.430(f)(5)(i)). The purpose of this evaluation is to identify the relative advantages and 
disadvantages of each alternative. The alternatives are compared to each other and the comparative 
analysis is summarized below. The relative performance of each alternative is described in Table 11-1. 
11.1 Overall Protection of Human Health and the Environment 
This criterion addresses whether each alternative provides adequate protection of human health and 
the environment and describes how risks posed through each exposure pathway are eliminated, reduced, 
or controlled through treatment, engineering controls, and/or ICs. RAOs are used as a measure of how 
well an alternative meets this criterion. 
All alternatives (1, 2a, 2b, 3a, 3b, 4a, and 4b) would meet RAO I by implementing ICs, including 
access restrictions through at least 2095. 
Alternatives 2a, 2b, 3a, 3b, 4a, and 4b would meet RAO II by combining ICs with capping to 
reduce infiltration in the RCZ. By reducing this infiltration, the modeling predicts that the MCLs would 
be met by 2095 for the portion of the SRPA contaminated by INTEC releases. 
Installing a final ET/CB on the central tank farm after closure of the TFF, as for Alternatives 2a, 
3a, and 4a, versus after INTEC closure, as for Alternatives 2b, 3b, and 4b, would have no effect on 
attainment of RAO II, because the interim low-permeability pavement would be maintained to provide 
adequate infiltration control. 
Alternative 1 meets RAO III for current workers only (not future), because active ICs are assumed 
to end in 2095, and meets RAO IV. DOE will not rely on ICs alone as a sole remedy after 2095; therefore, 
Alternative 1 does not meet RAO III after 2095. Alternatives 2a, 2b, 3a, 3b, 4a, and 4b meet RAOs III and 
IV by maintaining ICs through 2095 and by removing, grouting, or capping contaminated soil. 
Alternative 1 does not meet RAO V because ICs, operations and maintenance, and monitoring 
were assumed to not prevent exposures to ecological receptors. Alternatives 2a, 2b, 3a, 3b, 4a, and 4b 
would meet RAO V by removing or capping contaminated soil. 
11.2 Compliance with Applicable or Relevant 
and Appropriate Requirements 
Per Section 121(d) of CERCLA (42 USC 9621(d)) and the NCP (40 CFR 300.430(f)(1)(ii)(B)), 
remedial actions at CERCLA sites must attain applicable or relevant and appropriate requirements 
(ARARs), unless waived under CERCLA Section 121(d)(4) (42 USC 9621(d)(4), Public Law 99-499). 
ARARs are promulgated, or legally enforceable, federal and state requirements. EPA has also developed 
another category, known as “to be considered,” that includes nonpromulgated criteria, advisories, 
guidance, and proposed standards issued by federal or state governments. Since to-be-considered criteria 
are nonbinding, they are not included in this list. Applicable requirements are those cleanup standards, 
standards of control, and other substantive requirements, criteria, or limitations promulgated under federal 
environmental or state environmental or facility siting laws that specifically address a hazardous 
substance, pollutant, contaminant, remedial action, location, or other circumstance found at a CERCLA 
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Table 11-1. Detailed analysis summary for the OU 3-14 tank farm soil and groundwater. 
Alternative 2  
Containment and Monitoring 
Alternative 3  
Hot Spot Removal, Containment, and Monitoring 
Alternative 4  
Hot Spot Treatment, Containment, and Monitoring 
Criteria 
Alternative 1  
Limited Action 2a 2b 3a 3b 4a 4b 
Overall protection of human health and the environment (threshold criterion) 
Human health protection Protective of human health 
using existing ICs through 
2095. Not protective beyond 
2095 
Soil and groundwater 
exposure risks are controlled 
for duration of risk 
Soil and groundwater 
exposure risks are controlled 
for duration of risk 
Soil and groundwater 
exposure risks are controlled 
for duration of risk 
Soil and groundwater 
exposure risks are controlled 
for duration of risk 
Soil and groundwater 
exposure risks are controlled 
for duration of risk 
Soil and groundwater 
exposure risks are controlled 
for duration of risk 
Environmental protection Allows continued ecological 
exposures 
Soil exposure risks are 
controlled for duration of risk 
Soil exposure risks are 
controlled for duration of risk 
Soil exposure risks are 
controlled for duration of risk 
Soil exposure risks are 
controlled for duration of risk 
Soil exposure risks are 
controlled for duration of risk 
Soil exposure risks are 
controlled for duration of risk 
Compliance with ARARs (threshold criterion) 
Action-Specific 
National Emission Standards for 
Hazardous Air Pollutants, 
40 CFR 61.93, “Emission 
Monitoring and Test 
Procedures” 
Would meet ARARs, 
emissions would be below 
allowable levels 
Would meet ARARs, 
emissions would be below 
allowable levels 
Would meet ARARs, 
emissions would be below 
allowable levels 
Would meet ARARs by 
engineering and 
administrative controls 
implemented through the 
RD/RA work plan 
Would meet ARARs by 
engineering and 
administrative controls 
implemented through the 
RD/RA work plan 
Would meet ARARs by 
engineering and 
administrative controls 
implemented through the 
RD/RA work plan 
Would meet ARARs by 
engineering and 
administrative controls 
implemented through the 
RD/RA work plan 
National Emission Standards for 
Hazardous Air Pollutants, 
40 CFR 61.94(a), “Compliance 
and Reporting” 
Would meet ARARs, 
emissions would be below 
allowable levels 
Would meet ARARs, 
emissions would be below 
allowable levels 
Would meet ARARs, 
emissions would be below 
allowable levels 
Would meet ARARs by 
engineering and 
administrative controls 
implemented through the 
RD/RA work plan 
Would meet ARARs by 
engineering and 
administrative controls 
implemented through the 
RD/RA work plan 
Would meet ARARs by 
engineering and 
administrative controls 
implemented through the 
RD/RA work plan 
Would meet ARARs by 
engineering and 
administrative controls 
implemented through the 
RD/RA work plan 
“Rules for Control of Fugitive 
Dust,” and “General Rules,” 
IDAPA 58.01.01.650 and 
58.01.01.651 
Would meet ARARs, 
emissions would be below 
allowable levels 
Would meet ARARs, 
emissions would be below 
allowable levels 
Would meet ARARs, 
emissions would be below 
allowable levels 
Would meet ARARs by 
engineering and 
administrative controls 
implemented through the 
RD/RA work plan 
Would meet ARARs by 
engineering and 
administrative controls 
implemented through the 
RD/RA work plan 
Would meet ARARs by 
engineering and 
administrative controls 
implemented through the 
RD/RA work plan 
Would meet ARARs by 
engineering and 
administrative controls 
implemented through the 
RD/RA work plan 
“Ground Water Quality Rule,” 
IDAPA 58.01.11 
Would not meet ARARs Would meet ARARs by 2095 Would meet ARARs by 2095 Would meet ARARs by 2090 Would meet ARARs by 2090 Would meet ARARs by 2090 Would meet ARARs by 2090 
“Rules and Minimum Standards 
for the Construction and Use of 
Injection Wells in the State of 
Idaho,” IDAPA 37.03.03 
Not applicable Would meet ARARs, shallow 
injection wells impacted by 
the remedy would be 
abandoned, if necessary, in 
accordance with the required 
standards 
Would meet ARARs, shallow 
injection wells impacted by 
the remedy would be 
abandoned, if necessary, in 
accordance with the required 
standards 
Would meet ARARs, shallow 
injection wells impacted by 
the remedy would be 
abandoned, if necessary, in 
accordance with the required 
standards 
Would meet ARARs, shallow 
injection wells impacted by 
the remedy would be 
abandoned, if necessary, in 
accordance with the required 
standards 
Would meet ARARs, shallow 
injection wells impacted by 
the remedy would be 
abandoned, if necessary, in 
accordance with the required 
standards 
Would meet ARARs, shallow 
injection wells impacted by 
the remedy would be 
abandoned, if necessary, in 
accordance with the required 
standards 
“Well Construction Standards 
Rules,” IDAPA 37.03.09 
Not applicable Would meet ARARs, 
boreholes or wells impacted 
by the remedy would be 
modified or abandoned, if 
necessary, in accordance with 
the required standards 
Would meet ARARs, 
boreholes or wells impacted 
by the remedy would be 
modified or abandoned, if 
necessary, in accordance with 
the required standards 
Would meet ARARs, 
boreholes or wells impacted 
by the remedy would be 
modified or abandoned, if 
necessary, in accordance with 
the required standards 
Would meet ARARs, 
boreholes or wells impacted 
by the remedy would be 
modified or abandoned, if 
necessary, in accordance with 
the required standards 
Would meet ARARs, 
boreholes or wells impacted 
by the remedy would be 
modified or abandoned, if 
necessary, in accordance with 
the required standards 
Would meet ARARs, 
boreholes or wells impacted 
by the remedy would be 
modified or abandoned, if 
necessary, in accordance with 
the required standards 
“Hazardous Waste 
Determination,” 40 CFR 262.11 
Not applicable Not applicable for 
management within WAG 3 
AOCa (disposal at ICDF) 
Not applicable for 
management within WAG 3 
AOC (disposal at ICDF) 
Not applicable for 
management within WAG 3 
AOC (disposal at ICDF) 
Not applicable for 
management within WAG 3 
AOC (disposal at ICDF) 
Not applicable for 
management within WAG 3 
AOC (disposal at ICDF) 
Not applicable for 
management within WAG 3 
AOC (disposal at ICDF) 
Table 11-1. (continued). 
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Alternative 2  
Containment and Monitoring 
Alternative 3  
Hot Spot Removal, Containment, and Monitoring 
Alternative 4  
Hot Spot Treatment, Containment, and Monitoring 
Criteria 
Alternative 1  
Limited Action 2a 2b 3a 3b 4a 4b 
“Temporary Units” IDAPA 
58.01.05.008 (40 CFR 264.553) 
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Would meet ARARs by 
engineering and 
administrative controls 
implemented through the 
RD/RA work plan 
Would meet ARARs by 
engineering and 
administrative controls 
implemented through the 
RD/RA work plan 
Would meet ARARs by 
engineering and 
administrative controls 
implemented through the 
RD/RA work plan 
Would meet ARARs by 
engineering and 
administrative controls 
implemented through the 
RD/RA work plan 
“Land Disposal Requirements” 
IDAPA 58.01.05.011 
(40 CFR 268) 
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Would meet ARARs by 
characterization and treatment 
if required 
Would meet ARARs by 
characterization and treatment 
if required 
Would meet ARARs by 
characterization and treatment 
if required 
Would meet ARARs by 
characterization and treatment 
if required 
“Alternative LDR Treatment 
Standards for Contaminated 
Soil” IDAPA 58.01.05.011 
(40 CFR 268.49) 
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Would meet ARARs by 
characterization and treatment 
if required 
Would meet ARARs by 
characterization and treatment 
if required 
Would meet ARARs by 
characterization and treatment 
if required 
Would meet ARARs by 
characterization and treatment 
if required 
Chemical-Specific 
“Toxic Substances,” 
IDAPA 58.01.01.161 
“Toxic Air Pollutants, 
Noncarcinogenic Increments,” 
IDAPA 58.01.01.585 
“Toxic Air Pollutants, 
Carcinogenic Increments,” 
IDAPA 58.01.01.586 
“Environmental Remediation 
Source,” 
IDAPA 58.01.01.210.16(a) 
Would meet ARARs, 
emissions would be below 
allowable levels 
Would meet ARARs by 
engineering and 
administrative controls 
implemented through the 
RD/RA work plan 
Would meet ARARs by 
engineering and 
administrative controls 
implemented through the 
RD/RA work plan 
Would meet ARARs by 
engineering and 
administrative controls 
implemented through the 
RD/RA work plan 
Would meet ARARs by 
engineering and 
administrative controls 
implemented through the 
RD/RA work plan 
Would meet ARARs by 
engineering and 
administrative controls 
implemented through the 
RD/RA work plan 
Would meet ARARs by 
engineering and 
administrative controls 
implemented through the 
RD/RA work plan 
“Ambient Air Quality Standards 
For Specific Air Pollutants,” 
IDAPA 58.01.01.577 
Would meet ARARs, 
emissions would be below 
allowable levels 
Would meet ARARs Would meet ARARs Would meet ARARs Would meet ARARs Would meet ARARs Would meet ARARs 
National Emission Standards for 
Hazardous Air Pollutants, 
40 CFR 61.92, “Standard” 
Would meet ARARs, 
emissions would be below 
allowable levels 
Would meet ARARs, 
emissions would be below 
allowable levels 
Would meet ARARs, 
emissions would be below 
allowable levels 
Would meet ARARs by 
administrative and 
engineering controls 
Would meet ARARs by 
administrative and 
engineering controls 
Would meet ARARs by 
administrative and 
engineering controls 
Would meet ARARs by 
administrative and 
engineering controls 
Location-Specific (none identified) 
Long-term effectiveness and 
permanence (balancing 
criterion) 
No long-term effectiveness or 
permanence 
Provides long-term 
effectiveness and permanence 
for duration of risk by capping 
contaminated soil. MCLs are 
attained in SRPA in 2095 and 
after. 
Provides long-term 
effectiveness and permanence 
for duration of risk by capping 
contaminated soil. MCLs are 
attained in SRPA in 2095 and 
after. 
Provides long-term 
effectiveness and permanence 
for duration of risk by capping 
contaminated soil (removing 
hot spot does not reduce risk). 
MCLs are attained in SRPA in 
2090 and after. 
Provides long-term 
effectiveness and permanence 
for duration of risk by capping 
contaminated soil (removing 
hot spot does not reduce risk). 
MCLs are attained in SRPA in 
2090 and after. 
Provides long-term 
effectiveness and permanence 
for duration of risk by capping 
contaminated soil (grouting 
hot spot does not reduce risk). 
MCLs are attained in SRPA in 
2090 and after. 
Provides long-term 
effectiveness and permanence 
for duration of risk by capping 
contaminated soil (grouting 
hot spot does not reduce risk). 
MCLs are attained in SRPA in 
2090 and after. 
Reduction of toxicity, mobility, 
or volume through treatment 
(balancing criterion) 
Provides no treatment except 
radioactive decay 
Provides no treatment except 
radioactive decay 
Provides no treatment except 
radioactive decay 
Provides no treatment except 
radioactive decay 
Provides no treatment except 
radioactive decay 
In situ grouting would 
immobilize a fraction of the 
Sr-90 remaining in soil inside 
tank farm boundary 
In situ grouting would 
immobilize a fraction of the 
Sr-90 remaining in soil inside 
tank farm boundary 
Table 11-1. (continued). 
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Alternative 2  
Containment and Monitoring 
Alternative 3  
Hot Spot Removal, Containment, and Monitoring 
Alternative 4  
Hot Spot Treatment, Containment, and Monitoring 
Criteria 
Alternative 1  
Limited Action 2a 2b 3a 3b 4a 4b 
Short-term effectiveness 
(balancing criterion) 
Highly effective. Risks are 
eliminated during IC period 
No risks to outlying 
communities or environment. 
Risks to workers during 
remedy implementation would 
be reduced to allowable levels 
by engineering and 
administrative controls 
No risks to outlying 
communities or environment. 
Risks to workers during 
remedy implementation would 
be reduced to allowable levels 
by engineering and 
administrative controls 
No risks to outlying 
communities or environment. 
CPP-31 removal remedy has 
lowest short-term 
effectiveness, highest risks of 
worker exposures during 
remedy implementation 
No risks to outlying 
communities or environment. 
CPP-31 removal remedy has 
lowest short-term 
effectiveness, highest risks of 
worker exposures during 
remedy implementation 
No risks to outlying 
communities or environment. 
CPP-31 in situ grouting has 
lower risks of worker 
exposures during remedy 
implementation than 
excavating soil 
No risks to outlying 
communities or environment. 
CPP-31 in situ grouting has 
lower risks of worker 
exposures during remedy 
implementation than 
excavating soil 
Implementability (balancing 
criterion) 
Readily implemented because 
it only involves continuing 
existing ICs 
Technically complex due to 
required infrastructure 
modifications and extent of 
low-permeability pavement 
Less technically complex than 
Alternative 2a since less 
infrastructure modification 
required as part of remedy 
Very technically complex due 
to required infrastructure 
modifications, remote 
retrieval of large fraction of 
CPP-31 soil, and extent of 
infiltration-reduction capping. 
CPP-31 removal is moderately 
implementable. Limited 
commercial availability of 
remote excavation services 
Less technically complex than 
Alternative 3a since less 
infrastructure modification 
would be required as part of 
remedy 
Very technically complex due 
to required infrastructure 
modification and extent of 
low-permeability pavement. 
CPP-31 in situ grouting is 
technically complex due to 
subsurface infrastructure, 
difficulty in monitoring 
effectiveness. Commercial jet 
grouting services are 
available. 
Less technically complex than 
Alternative 4a since less 
infrastructure modification 
would be required as part of 
remedy 
Cost (million) (net present value in Fiscal Year [FY] 2006 dollars) (balancing criterion) 
Capital cost $0 $6.9 $3.7 $37.8 $22.2 $10.8 $6.0 
Operating and maintenance 
cost 
$3.3 $5.3 $5.3 $5.3 $5.3 $5.3 $5.3 
Total cost $3.3 $12.2 $9.0 $43.1 $27.5 $16.1 $11.3 
a. AOC = area of contamination. 
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site. Relevant and appropriate requirements are those cleanup standards, standards of control, and other 
substantive requirements, criteria, or limitations promulgated under federal environmental or state 
environmental or facility siting laws that, while not “applicable” to a hazardous substance, pollutant, 
contaminant, remedial action, location, or other circumstance at a CERCLA site, address problems or 
situations sufficiently similar to those encountered at the CERCLA site that their use is well-suited to the 
particular site. 
A summary discussion of compliance with ARARs is provided in Table 11-1. Alternative 1 would 
meet all Clean Air Act (42 USC 7401 et seq.) and Idaho air regulations identified in Table 11-1 by 
implementing ICs and monitoring through administrative controls. Alternative 1 would not meet MCLs 
after 2095 because Sr-90 concentrations in the SRPA would exceed standards. 
Alternatives 2a, 2b, 3a, 3b, 4a, and 4b would meet soil removal and disposal ARARs identified in 
this section. Clean Air Act and Idaho air regulations would be met during remediation activities through 
administrative and engineering controls. Administrative and engineering controls would be implemented 
during soil excavation and cap construction to limit radiological doses in accordance with DOE 
Order 5400.5, “Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment.” Completing final remedy 
implementation by 2012, as for Alternatives 2a, 3a, and 4a, versus completing phased-remedy 
implementation by 2035, as for Alternatives 2b, 3b, and 4b, would have no effect on attainment of 
ARARs. Alternatives 2a, 2b, 3a, 3b, 4a, and 4b would meet MCLs by 2095 based on groundwater 
modeling predictions. 
11.3 Long-Term Effectiveness and Permanence 
This criterion refers to expected residual risk and the ability of a remedy to maintain reliable 
protection of human health and the environment over time, after cleanup levels have been met. This 
criterion includes consideration of residual risk that will remain onsite following remediation and the 
adequacy and reliability of controls. 
Alternative 1 would provide no long-term effectiveness or permanence because no physical 
controls would be implemented, other than the TFIA asphalt surfaces, drainage system, and evaporation 
pond. The TFIA asphalt surfaces are assumed to require relatively frequent repair and sealing and to not 
limit infiltration into CPP-31 soil after 2095. The surface water controls would not be effective after 2095. 
The existing asphalt surface covering would not provide an adequate surface barrier to prevent exposures 
to future workers after 2095. 
Alternatives 2 through 4 had medium long-term effectiveness and permanence. This criterion 
applies to the soil and the SRPA. The long-term worker exposure to the soil is controlled by the ET/CB 
and/or administrative controls, which are the same for each of these alternatives. Alternatives 2 through 4 
also result in roughly equivalent long-term effectiveness and permanence for the SRPA. Removing 
(Alternative 3) or grouting (Alternative 4) CPP-31 soil was predicted by modeling to have only a slight 
effect on Sr-90 concentrations in the SRPA. Thus, recharge control by low-permeability pavement, 
implemented under Alternatives 2, 3, and 4, would provide adequate long-term effectiveness and 
permanence for the soil and for the SRPA until the MCL for Sr-90 is met, which is predicted to be by 
2095. All alternatives include groundwater monitoring for OU 3-14 contaminants to ensure MCLs will be 
met in the SRPA beneath INTEC by 2095. 
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11.4 Reduction of Toxicity, Mobility, and Volume 
through Treatment 
This criterion considers the expected performance of treatment technologies that may be included 
as part of a remedy. Alternative 1 would not implement treatment and would not reduce Cs-137 or Sr-90 
toxicity, mobility, or volume except through natural radioactive decay. Alternatives 4a and 4b would 
implement treatment through in situ grouting at CPP-31, thereby reducing mobility of most of the Sr-90 
present in soil at OU 3-14. 
Alternatives 2a, 2b, 3a, and 3b would not use treatment. However, mobility of Sr-90 would be 
lowered by reducing the infiltration that drives downward migration from contaminated perched water to 
the SRPA. 
11.5 Short-Term Effectiveness 
The period of time needed to implement the remedy and any adverse effects that may be posed to 
workers, the public, and the environment during construction and operation of the remedy until cleanup 
levels are achieved are included in this criterion. No added risks to the public or the environment would 
result from implementing any of the alternatives; therefore, only worker risks during remedy 
implementation are discussed. 
Alternative 1 has the best short-term effectiveness, because existing ICs, TFIA O&M, and 
monitoring could be continued with no added risks or hazards to workers. Soil removal and cap 
construction implemented as part of Alternatives 2a, 2b, 3a, 3b, 4a, and 4b would have incrementally 
higher risks to workers, but they could be mitigated by INL Site work controls and physical controls. 
Short-term effectiveness for Alternative 2b would be essentially the same as for Alternative 2a. 
Construction of a low-permeability pavement on the central tank farm as part of phased remedy 
implementation would not increase risks to workers, the public, or the environment. 
Alternatives 4a and 4b would have increased chances of worker exposures and injuries due to 
production of radioactive drill cuttings and grout returns. Mitigating risks and hazards would require 
significant administrative and engineering controls. Gamma radiation exposures from drill cuttings and 
grout returns under Alternative 4b would be lower than for Alternative 4a because an additional 23 years 
of radioactive decay of Cs-137 would reduce gamma radiation levels. 
Alternatives 3a and 3b would likely have the highest worker direct radiation exposures and would 
require more substantive administrative and engineering controls, including shielding and a work 
enclosure. Even if all worker exposures were controlled to facility limits by using shielding, reducing 
exposure times, and increasing the numbers of workers, the total occupational exposures would be higher 
for Alternatives 3a and 3b than for any other alternative due to removal of CPP-31 soil. Exposures under 
Alternative 3b would be somewhat lower than for Alternative 3a because an additional 23 years of 
radioactive decay of Cs-137 would reduce gamma radiation levels. 
11.6 Implementability 
Implementability addresses the technical and administrative feasibility of a remedy from design 
through construction and operation. Factors such as availability of services and materials, administrative 
feasibility, and coordination with other governmental entities are considered. 
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Alternative 1 would be the most readily implementable alternative because it only involves 
continuing existing ICs, TFIA O&M, and monitoring. Covering the RCZ with low-permeability pavement 
is technically implementable; however, achieving the required positive drainage over the entire area 
would require regrading in some areas as well as additional lined drainage ditches and potentially at least 
one additional lift station. 
Capping the central tank farm with an ET/CB after TFF closure, as for Alternatives 2a, 3a, and 4a, 
is technically complex, because of the interfering infrastructure. Decontamination and decommissioning 
of existing buildings and construction of retaining walls as part of remedy implementation would greatly 
reduce the technical implementability of these alternatives. Capping the central tank farm with an ET/CB 
after INTEC closure, as for Alternatives 2b, 3b, and 4b, is much more feasible, because interfering 
infrastructure would have been removed by the decontamination and decommissioning program prior to 
capping. 
Alternative 2b is the only viable alternative (Alternative 1 does not meet threshold criteria) that is 
highly implementable. Capping would not require digging or drilling into the hot spot, and the final 
ET/CB would be constructed in the central tank farm when INTEC operations have ended and interfering 
infrastructure has been removed. 
CPP-31 soil removal (Alternatives 3a and 3b) has relatively low implementability. This is because 
of the high direct radiation exposures that would be encountered, which would require remote retrieval 
(no worker contact) inside an enclosure and specialized equipment and services with limited availability, 
as well as the required depth of retrieval (up to 40 ft), which would require shoring and access ramps. 
Alternative 3b is more technically feasible than Alternative 3a, because interfering infrastructure would 
be reduced by the end of INTEC activities. 
In situ grouting (Alternatives 4a and 4b) also has relatively low implementability due to the 
extensive subsurface infrastructure, potential for worker exposures and injury, and requirements for 
specialized equipment and services that have limited availability. Alternative 4a has low implementability 
because of (1) the combined complexity of drilling into the hot spot with existing INTEC infrastructure 
still operating and (2) capping the central tank farm with an ET/CB up to 18 ft thick adjacent to an active 
building and over active waste lines and valve boxes. Alternative 4b is more technically feasible than 
Alternative 4a because interfering infrastructure would be reduced by the end of INTEC activities. 
11.7 Cost 
Total project costs, in net present value, are listed in Table 11-1. Detailed cost estimates are 
included in the OU 3-14 Tank Farm Soil and Groundwater Feasibility Study (DOE-ID 2006d), 
Appendix B, and are presented in present day dollar values. 
11.8 State Acceptance 
DEQ has been involved in the development and review of all aspects of this project, including the 
documents in the Administrative Record and this ROD. All comments received from DEQ on these 
documents have been resolved and the documents revised accordingly. In addition, DEQ has participated 
in public meetings where public comments and concerns have been received and discussed. DEQ concurs 
with the selected remedial alternative for the tank farm soil and INTEC groundwater contained in this 
ROD and is a signatory to the ROD with DOE and EPA. 
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11.9 Community Acceptance 
Community participation in the remedy selection process and Proposed Plan reviews included 
participation in the public meetings held August 29 and 30, 2006. The 30-day public comment period was 
extended an additional 30 days, from August 22, 2006, through October 21, 2006. The Responsiveness 
Summary, presented as Part 3 of this ROD, includes verbal and written comments received from the 
public with the corresponding Agencies’ responses to these comments. The public provided a broad range 
of comments, ranging from acceptance of the preferred alternative to requesting removal of all 
contaminants. 
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12. SELECTED REMEDY 
The selected remedy for OU 3-14 soil and groundwater is Alternative 2b—ICs, monitoring, soil 
excavation and disposal as necessary, containment (low-permeability pavement and ET/CB)—along with 
additional infiltration controls. The selected remedy will reduce toxicity by reducing contaminant 
migration to the SRPA sufficiently to attain MCLs beneath INTEC by 2095, reduce potential gamma 
radiation exposures to current and future workers and biota to allowable levels, and prevent biotic 
intrusion. 
12.1 Summary of the Rationale for the Selected Remedy 
The selected remedy is protective of human health and the environment, complies with all federal 
and state ARARs, meets all of the RAOs, and maintains long-term protectiveness and permanence. This 
alternative was selected over the other alternatives because it 
• Is highly implementable—The remedy is highly implementable because it takes into account 
interfering infrastructure and activities of other INTEC cleanup projects. The ET/CB can be 
constructed in a single phase over an inactive surface rather than constructing a cap with 
aboveground structures protruding through it and patching as the structures are removed. 
• Provides higher short-term effectiveness—The remedy poses less short-term risk to workers during 
implementation because remote handling of waste or complex excavations or enclosures are not 
needed, and it has less risk of exposure to contaminated soil from excavation or grout returns. 
• Is the most cost-effective—The remedy is fully protective of workers and the SRPA and the least 
costly. The other alternatives cost significantly more but do not achieve a significant decrease in 
risks or restoration timeframe. 
Due to practical limitations for achieving an infiltration rate of 1 mm/yr in the middle of an 
operating facility, the Agencies will implement additional recharge controls within a larger area over the 
northern perched water. Potential actions to reduce water infiltration and recharge of the perched water 
zones beneath the northern portion of INTEC were identified in “Methods to Reduce Water Infiltration 
and Recharge of the Northern Shallow Perched Water Zone at INTEC” (EDF-6868). The actions include 
eliminating unnecessary discharges of clean water to the ground, improving the storm water drainage 
system, and monitoring process meter flows so that leaks can be detected and fixed. These actions will be 
implemented under OU 3-14 and defined during remedial design.  
12.2 Description of the Selected Remedy 
The selected remedy for OU 3-14 consists of remedial actions for tank farm soil and groundwater 
contaminated by INTEC releases, no action for a group of sites outside the tank farm, and potential 
actions for any newly discovered sites assigned to OU 3-14 under the new site identification process. The 
OU 3-14 remedy supersedes the OU 3-13 interim actions and is integrated with the OU 3-13 final actions. 
The selected remedy details are described below. A summary of component installation timing is 
presented in Table 12-1. Note that the timing of the selected remedy is slightly different from 
Alternative 2b. 
 
  12-2
Table 12-1. Installation timing for the selected remedy.  
Area Remedy Timing 
RCZ outside the tank farm Low-permeability pavement Before TFF closurea 
Northern INTEC Additional recharge controls Before TFF closure 
North tank farm Low-permeability pavement After TFF closure 
 
If soil < RG, maintain low-permeability 
pavement 
If soil > RG, excavate and reinstall 
low-permeability pavement 
or  
ET/CB 
After INTEC closureb 
Central tank farm Low-permeability pavement After TFF closure 
 ET/CB After INTEC closure 
South tank farm Low-permeability pavement After TFF closure 
 ET/CB After INTEC closure 
a. TFF closure – Tanks have been cleaned and grouted, and interfering infrastructure has been removed. 
b. INTEC closure – Infrastructure within the OU 3-14 industrial use area has been removed.  
 
12.2.1 Components of the Selected Remedy Prior to Tank Farm Facility Closure 
The components of the selected remedy to begin prior to TFF closure include the following 
(engineering detail and performance criteria will be provided in the OU 3-14 RD/RA work plan, which 
follows signature of this ROD):  
• Implement ICs for the INTEC groundwater that exceeds MCLs, the contaminated tank farm soil, 
and the area in proximity to the tank farm designated for industrial land use (see Figure 4-2). 
Section 12.2.4 identifies the type of controls that will be implemented. These ICs will be 
implemented as part of the remedy and included in the INL Sitewide Institutional Controls Plan 
(DOE-ID 2006c or subsequent revisions). This supports RAOs I, III, and IV. 
• Install and maintain a low-permeability pavement (or equivalent barrier to reduce infiltration) over 
the RCZ outside the tank farm (see bottom left drawing of Figure 10-4) with an expanded drainage 
system to reduce infiltration of precipitation without interfering with ongoing INTEC operations 
and remediation activities. Installation will be performed in sections as geographical areas become 
available. The low-permeability pavement will be designed to abut existing buildings and 
structures as practical to minimize (to the extent possible) surface water infiltration. As buildings 
and structures are removed through DD&D, the low-permeability pavement will be extended to 
maintain an infiltration-reducing barrier over the RCZ outside the tank farm. Water run-off will be 
directed toward lined ditches (i.e., concrete-lined TFIA ditches) (see Figure 10-2), which will 
divert it to an evaporation pond. The goal will be to capture and send to the evaporation pond an 
equivalent volume of infiltration that would fall on the RCZ outside the tank farm. Operations and 
maintenance details will be specified in the OU 3-14 RD/RA work plan. This supports RAO II. 
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• Maintain the TFIA system per the O&M Plan (DOE-ID 2006e) until the system is incorporated 
into, and expanded to accommodate, the drainage and water management requirements of the 
selected remedy. Approval of the OU 3-14 RD/RA work plan with its O&M plan, and expansion, 
completes the TFIA. This supports RAOs II and V. 
• Implement and maintain additional recharge controls in northern INTEC to reduce anthropogenic 
and storm water recharge sources to the northern perched water zones. Actions will include such 
activities as capturing roof run-off from area buildings, eliminating excessive landscape watering, 
eliminating steam condensate drip-leg discharges, lining drainage ditches and improving INTEC 
drainage, and extending pavement to reduce water infiltration. Water run-off will be directed 
toward lined ditches (i.e., concrete-lined TFIA ditches), which will divert it to the evaporation 
pond. Other actions will be designed to detect anthropogenic recharge and will include pipeline 
valve isolation tests and hydrostatic tests to identify leaks in suspect areas, calculating water 
balances to identify changes in system flows that could indicate leaks, installing additional flow 
meters to improve the accuracy of water balances, and expanding the telemetry for real-time water 
level monitoring in perched water wells to detect subsurface leaks. This supports RAO II. 
• Monitor contaminant concentrations and water levels in indicator monitoring wells to determine 
the effectiveness of the groundwater remedy. Monitor perched water and groundwater in the SRPA 
to ensure that the portions of the SRPA contaminated by INTEC sources will meet MCLs by 2095. 
Monitoring of perched water and the SRPA under the OU 3-13 ROD (DOE-ID 1999a) will be 
superseded by a long-term monitoring plan for OU 3-14. In the interim, Group 4 (perched water) 
and Group 5 (SRPA) will continue to follow the OU 3-13 monitoring plans (DOE-ID 2005, 2004d, 
respectively). This supports RAOs I and II. 
12.2.2 Remedy Components following Tank Farm Facility Closure 
Components of the selected remedy to be installed or maintained after TFF closure (tanks grouted 
and interfering infrastructure removed) include  
• Install a low-permeability pavement (or equivalent barrier to reduce infiltration) over the north, 
central, and south tank farm to reduce infiltration of precipitation (see bottom left drawing of 
Figure 10-4). The low-permeability pavement will be designed to abut existing buildings, 
structures, or retaining walls (as practical) to ensure maximum capture of precipitation. Captured 
surface water run-off will be directed toward lined ditches, culverts, and lift station(s) for transport 
to the lined evaporation pond. This supports RAO II. 
• Continue ICs for the INTEC groundwater that exceeds MCLs, the contaminated tank farm soil, and 
the area in proximity to the tank farm designated for industrial land use (Figure 4-2). Section 12.2.4 
identifies the type of controls. These ICs will be included in the INL Sitewide Institutional Controls 
Plan (DOE-ID 2006c or subsequent revisions). This supports RAOs I, III, and IV. 
• Maintain the drainage system and low-permeability pavement over the RCZ (see Figure 4-1) to 
reduce infiltration of precipitation without interfering with ongoing INTEC cleanup operations. As 
buildings and structures are removed through DD&D, the low-permeability pavement will be 
extended to maintain an infiltration-reducing barrier over the RCZ. Surface water run-off will be 
directed toward lined ditches (i.e., concrete-lined ditches) (see Figure 10-2), which will divert it to 
the lined evaporation pond. Operations and maintenance details will be specified in the OU 3-14 
RD/RA work plan. This supports RAO II. 
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• Maintain the recharge controls in northern INTEC to reduce anthropogenic and storm water 
recharge sources to the northern perched water zones. Actions will include the maintenance of 
activities that captured roof run-off from area buildings, lined drainage ditches and INTEC 
drainage, and pavement to reduce water infiltration. Water run-off will be directed toward lined 
ditches (i.e., concrete-lined ditches), which will divert it to the lined evaporation pond. Actions will 
continue that were designed to detect anthropogenic recharge, which include performing pipeline 
valve isolation tests and hydrostatic tests to identify leaks in suspect areas, calculating water 
balances to identify changes in system flows that could indicate leaks, installing additional flow 
meters to improve the accuracy of water balances, and installing telemetry for real-time water level 
monitoring in perched water wells to detect subsurface leaks. This supports RAO II. 
• Monitor contaminant concentrations and water levels in indicator monitoring wells to determine 
the effectiveness of the groundwater remedy. Monitor perched water and the SRPA in accordance 
with a long-term monitoring plan to ensure that the portions of the SRPA contaminated by INTEC 
sources will meet MCLs by 2095. This supports RAOs I and II. 
12.2.3 Remedy Components Coordinated with INTEC Facility Closure  
INTEC facility closure is defined as when the active infrastructures, as shown in Figure 4-1, reach 
their final end state. Components of the selected remedy to be installed or maintained after INTEC 
closure include the following:  
• Install a protective cover over the north tank farm (see Figure 10-1). Characterization results will 
be used to design the protective cover (e.g., maintain the low-permeability pavement, excavate soil 
and replace with clean backfill and new low-permeability pavement or equivalent barrier to reduce 
infiltration, or extend the ET/CB that is placed over the central area). This supports RAOs II, III, 
and V. 
• Install an ET/CB over the central and south tank farm to protect workers from exposure (see 
Figure 10-3). The ET/CB will be installed in a single action after interfering infrastructure is 
removed. Native vegetation will be planted on the cover to minimize erosion and infiltration of 
precipitation. The upper layers of the ET/CB will contain topsoil and fine-grained soil to store 
water and promote plant growth; the lower section will consist of compacted fill that will be used 
to shape the crowned surface and isolate contaminated soil from current and future workers and 
biota. Between the two sections will be a biointrusion and capillary barrier that will prevent both 
water and biota from entering the compacted fill. This supports RAOs II, III, and V. 
• Monitor and maintain the ET/CB, low-permeability pavement, and drainage system to reduce 
infiltration of precipitation. This supports RAOs II, III, and V. 
• Continue ICs for the INTEC groundwater that exceeds MCLs, the contaminated tank farm soil, and 
the area in proximity to the tank farm designated for industrial land use (Figure 4-2). Section 12.2.4 
identifies the type of controls. These ICs will be included in the INL Sitewide Institutional Controls 
Plan (DOE-ID 2006c or subsequent revisions). This supports RAOs I, III, and IV. 
• Monitor contaminant concentrations and water levels in indicator monitoring wells to determine 
the effectiveness of the groundwater remedy. Monitor perched water and the SRPA in accordance 
with a long-term monitoring plan to ensure that the portions of the SRPA contaminated by INTEC 
sources will meet MCLs by 2095. This supports RAOs I and II. 
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12.2.4 Institutional Controls Component of the Selected Remedy 
Institutional controls are used to prevent unacceptable exposure to contamination remaining at a 
site. This is accomplished through the use of administrative, physical, and legal controls and access 
restrictions. The remedy for tank farm soil and INTEC groundwater includes actions to isolate 
contaminants and prevent unacceptable exposure pathways through engineered controls. To ensure 
success of the remedy, ICs will be used to prevent unacceptable exposure to the contaminated soil and 
groundwater in addition to preventing land uses that would be inconsistent with the selected remedy. 
These controls include the designation of the land use in the proximity of the tank farm as industrial 
(Figure 4-2) and a groundwater and drilling IC area (Figure 5-6). The institutional controls will be 
maintained until the concentration of hazardous substances in the soil and groundwater is at levels that 
would allow for unlimited use and unrestricted exposure.  
Institutional controls will be implemented to prevent unacceptable exposure to contaminated soil or 
groundwater. The process to control disturbances of CERCLA sites as documented in the INL Sitewide 
Institutional Controls Plan (DOE-ID 2006c) will be updated to manage disturbances of contaminated 
tank farm soil by non-CERCLA activities, including ensuring that intrusions in the ET/CB cap are 
repaired properly and in a timely manner. To prevent use of contaminated groundwater, restrictions will 
be implemented for the portion of the SRPA in proximity to INTEC that exceeds MCLs. Administrative 
controls will also be necessary to prevent cross contamination between contaminated perched water and 
the SRPA from drilling activities. Figure 5-6 identifies the initial area that will have restrictions 
associated with drilling and prohibitions on water use for drinking or irrigation purposes if the boring will 
encounter perched water and/or the SRPA. The boundary of this controlled area is based on sampling data 
and has been conservatively estimated to include those areas where groundwater could be expected to 
approach or exceed the MCLs for Sr-90, Tc-99, I-129, and nitrate. Through the use of the ongoing review 
process for the IC plan and the CERCLA 5-year reviews, this boundary will be adjusted, as necessary, to 
ensure that the areas where groundwater exceeds MCLs due to INTEC releases are included in this 
restricted area. In the future when the sampling results and trends identify that the groundwater meets 
MCLs and is acceptable for unrestricted use, the boundary will be adjusted until such time as the ICs 
associated with the groundwater restrictions are eliminated. The predicted timeframe for the portion of the 
SRPA contaminated by INTEC releases to meet the MCLs is on or before 2095. 
DOE is responsible for implementing, maintaining, reporting on, and enforcing the ICs, including 
land use controls that are required under this ROD. Although DOE may later transfer these procedural 
responsibilities to another party, by contract, property transfer agreement, or through other means, DOE 
shall retain ultimate responsibility for remedy integrity. The current implementation, maintenance, and 
periodic inspection requirements for the ICs at the INL Site are described in the approved CERCLA work 
plans, which include operation and maintenance plans and the INL Sitewide Institutional Controls Plan 
(DOE-ID 2006c).  
12.2.4.1 Revision to the INL Sitewide Institutional Controls Plan. No later than 180 days 
after the ROD is signed, DOE shall revise and submit to EPA and DEQ for review and approval the INL 
Sitewide Institutional Controls Plan. The revised plan will include ICs required by this ROD and specify 
the implementation and maintenance actions that will be taken, including periodic inspections. The INL 
Sitewide Institutional Controls Plan is the Agency-approved document that is used by DOE and 
establishes a consistent approach for implementation of ICs at the INL Site. In accordance with EPA 
guidance on ICs, the INL Sitewide Institutional Controls Plan has been implemented to address those 
general requirements needed to successfully implement ICs at all CERCLA sites. Those general 
requirements and controls in the INL Sitewide Institutional Controls Plan include 
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• Roles and responsibilities for IC implementation 
• Listing of DOE-controlled INL Site areas with ICs and identification of the ICs 
• Agency notification of activities or situations that may interfere with the effectiveness of land use 
controls or are inconsistent with the land use control or IC objectives and identification and 
implementation of corrective actions 
• Notification regarding transfers of IC-controlled sites, including federal transfers 
• Establishment of requirements for Agency concurrence with modification or termination of land 
use controls 
• Performance of annual assessments of ICs and reporting results to the Agencies 
• Implementation of a tracking mechanism that identifies land areas under IC control and current 
and projected land uses at the INL Site.  
12.2.4.2 Planned Institutional Controls. The following land use control objectives, followed by 
the implementation actions/mechanisms, are identified and will be maintained by DOE until modified or 
discontinued by the Agencies: 
1. Ensure that land use within the area designated as “industrial land use” remains industrial and that 
use of the property for nonindustrial uses such as residential housing, elementary and secondary 
schools, child care facilities, and playgrounds will be prohibited (DOE-ID 2006c or subsequent 
revisions). 
Implementation Actions/Mechanisms:  
a. The INL Sitewide Institutional Controls Plan (DOE-ID 2006c) will continue to require 
notification to the Agencies before any transfer, sale, or lease of an area with ICs to a federal 
entity and/or a nonfederal entity (such as a state or local government or private party). DOE 
will coordinate with the Agencies to ensure that the appropriate controls, such as deed 
notices and other informational devices, are provided in the conveyance or lease documents 
and protections are in place to maintain effective ICs. 
b. Post warning signs in portions of the area designated as “industrial land use” to caution 
workers of potential hazards associated with the radiological contamination remaining in the 
soil where exposure would cause an unacceptable risk. 
2. Prohibit use of groundwater for drinking water or irrigation purposes in the portion of the SRPA 
that exceeds MCLs within the groundwater and drilling IC area (Figure 5-6) until groundwater 
quality has been restored.  
Implementation Actions/Mechanisms:  
a. The INL Sitewide Institutional Controls Plan (DOE-ID 2006c) will include controls to 
prevent the use of groundwater that exceeds MCLs for drinking water or irrigation. 
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3. Control drilling of new wells and boreholes within the groundwater and drilling IC area 
(Figure 5-6) to prevent spread of contamination to the SRPA. 
Implementation Actions/Mechanisms:  
a. The INL Sitewide Institutional Controls Plan (DOE-ID 2006c) will include a process to 
review plans for drilling of new wells and boreholes in the perched water or SRPA in those 
areas exceeding MCLs due to INTEC releases until water quality has been restored (below 
MCLs). The review and approval of plans for new wells and boreholes by the Agencies will 
ensure that the drilling techniques and planned use of the well/borehole are appropriate. 
Specifically, the method of construction of the wells and boreholes will not provide a 
conduit for accelerated infiltration of contaminants during drilling or thereafter.  
4. Control the disturbance of soil in the area designated as industrial land use (soil IC area identified 
in Figure 4-2) to prevent the potential spread of contaminated soil that exceeds the OU 3-14 RAOs 
unless prior approval is obtained from the Agencies. Soil disturbances include actions disturbing 
soil during the course of maintenance, construction, or investigation activities. 
Implementation Actions/Mechanisms:  
a. The INL Sitewide Institutional Controls Plan (DOE-ID 2006c) process for review of soil 
disturbances of CERCLA sites by non-CERCLA activities will be updated to require a 
notice of soil disturbance for maintenance, construction, or investigation activities within the 
area designated as industrial land use. 
5. Maintain the integrity of current or future remedial or monitoring systems. 
Implementation Actions/Mechanisms: 
a. The INL Sitewide Institutional Controls Plan (DOE-ID 2006c) will include a process to 
restrict actions or activities that would permanently disrupt or lessen the performance of the 
low-permeability pavement or the ET/CB.  
b. An operations and maintenance plan will be developed to monitor the integrity of and repair 
the low-permeability pavement and associated drainage system. 
c. Monitoring plans will include a mechanism to monitor and maintain the integrity of current 
or future remedial or monitoring systems.  
12.2.5 No Action Sites 
The selected remedy for 16 sites outside the tank farm boundary is no action under CERCLA. 
Three of these sites (CPP-125, CPP-126, and CPP-128) had leaks or releases of nonradioactive, 
nonhazardous steam condensate or service wastewater and, therefore, require no action. The remaining 
13 no action sites (CPP-102, CPP-103, CPP-104, CPP-105, CPP-106, CPP-107, CPP-108, CPP-109, 
CPP-110, CPP-113, CPP-114, CPP-115, CPP-116) are shallow injection wells. Releases associated with 
these sites do not pose an unacceptable risk to human health or the environment that requires CERCLA 
remediation or implementation of ICs. Upon finalization of the no action decision, the sites will exit the 
CERCLA process. The requirements of the State of Idaho Department of Water Resources for 
abandonment of shallow injection wells and assessment of the petroleum releases will be met, as 
applicable. 
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12.2.6 Newly Discovered Sites 
If historical releases to the environment are discovered, these sites will be addressed using the new 
site identification process the Agencies have established for evaluation and inclusion of potential new 
sites under the FFA/CO. Using this process, a newly identified release is evaluated and decisions are 
made concerning actions to be taken to address the site. This approach allows new sites with releases to 
be cleaned up under an existing ROD under certain conditions. These decisions for new sites are based on 
an evaluation of the information known about the release and the associated risk posed. The following is a 
summary of the approaches that may be taken for newly identified sites: 
1. Sites with no CERCLA contaminants that “exit” CERCLA – If there are no CERCLA 
contaminants, the site will exit the CERCLA process and will be documented on the new site 
identification evaluation form that is signed by the Agencies.  
2. Sites with no unacceptable risks and decision deferred to OU 10-08 ROD – If the site has 
CERCLA contaminants but the contaminants pose no unacceptable short-term and/or long-term 
risk, the “no-action” or “no further action” decision on the site will be documented in the OU 10-08 
ROD. 
3. Sites with unacceptable risk, contaminants included in an existing ROD, and remediation 
may be expedited – Remediation may be expedited for sites where the Agencies determine that the 
CERCLA contaminants are similar to those that have already been addressed in the scope of an 
existing ROD. In this circumstance, the Agencies may use the regulatory framework for a 
“Plug-In” or “Analogous Sites” approach for new sites. This approach provides that when new sites 
meet specific criteria (contaminants included in an existing ROD) and remediation may be 
performed under that ROD, the sites will be cleaned up in accordance with the ROD’s RAOs. The 
completion of remediation is documented in a remedial action report. 
4. Sites with an unacceptable risk and the contaminants are not included in an existing ROD – 
If contaminants at a site pose an unacceptable risk but are not included in an existing ROD, a 
CERCLA removal action may be taken. If additional evaluation is needed prior to taking an action, 
the site may be further evaluated using the process to be identified in the OU 10-08 ROD. 
New sites that are remediated using an existing ROD or a removal action will undergo evaluation 
during the 5-year review process to assess whether the actions taken are sufficient to protect human health 
and the environment. To protect workers, the public, and the environment, the ICs for newly identified 
sites being evaluated will be implemented using the controls in place for similar sites at the INL Site. 
12.3 Estimated Cost for the Selected Remedy 
Tables 12-2 through 12-4 give detailed and summary estimated costs to construct, operate, and 
maintain the selected remedy (Alternative 2b plus additional infiltration controls such as those described 
in EDF-6868) for OU 3-14 tank farm soil and groundwater. The estimated total cost of the remedy, 
through the year 2095, is $14,770,941 in net present value 2006 dollars. The information in this cost 
estimate is based on the best available information regarding the anticipated scope of the remedial 
alternative. Changes in the cost elements are likely to occur as a result of new information and data 
collected during the engineering design of the remedial alternative. Major changes may be documented in 
the form of a memorandum in the Administrative Record file, an ESD, or a ROD amendment. This is a 
rough order-of-magnitude engineering cost estimate that is expected to be within +50 to -30% of the 
actual project cost.  
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Table 12-2. Detailed capital cost of the selected remedy. 
Description of Capital Cost 
Present Day 
Cost (2012) 
Present Day 
Cost (2035) 
Remedial design   
Remedial design work plan $48,000 $48,000 
Remedial action work plan $39,500 $39,500 
Engineering design drawings, specifications $65,000 $65,000 
Operations and maintenance plan $27,500 $27,500 
Miscellaneous environmental documents $88,500 $88,500 
Subtotal for Remedial Design $268,500 $268,500 
Remediation/technical support activities   
Operational plans $104,500 $104,500 
Develop management self-assessment plan $28,500 $28,500 
Develop Operational Readiness Review, provisional 
operating authorization, and implementation plan 
$28,500 $28,500 
Subtotal for Remediation/Technical Support Activities $161,500 $161,500 
Remedial action   
Construction equipment $28,000 $28,000 
Drainage ditches and culverts (2035)  $144,000 
North tank farm excavation, backfill, disposal (2035)  $518,000 
Install infiltration barrier (2012) $3,075,000  
Install infiltration barrier (2035)  $120,000 
Install ET/CB cover central tank farm (2035)  $2,967,000 
Install ET/CB cover south tank farm (2035)  $765,000 
Infiltration controls $1,396,806  
Subtotal for Remedial Action $4,499,806 $4,542,000 
Remedial action report   
Final inspection/remedial action report $174,500 $174,500 
Subtotal for Remedial Action Report $174,500 $174,500 
Professional/technical services   
Project management $168,000 $168,000 
Construction management $201,500 $201,500 
Subtotal for Professional/Technical Services $369,500 $369,500 
Subtotal Capital Cost $5,473,806 $5,516,000 
Total Capital Cost $10,989,806 
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Table 12-3. Detailed operations and maintenance and periodic cost of the selected remedy. 
Description of Operation and Maintenance Cost 
Estimated Cost  
(Annual) 
Extended Cost 
(Life of Project) 
O&M activities   
Extraction, containment $86,000  
Project management $10,000  
Subtotal for O&M Activities $96,000  
Surveillance and monitoring   
Project management $10,000  
Monitoring, sampling, testing, analysis (2013, 2015, 2020, 2025…2095)  $147,000  
Subtotal for Surveillance and Monitoring $157,000  
Infiltration controls   
Subtotal for Infiltration Controls $240,975  
Institutional controls    
Site information database $3,000  
Annual IC inspection $3,000  
Project management $10,000  
Subtotal for Institutional Controls $16,000  
Total O&M Cost $509,975 $22,152,961 
Description of Periodic Cost 
  
Construction/O&M activities (periodic)a    
Remedy failure or replacement $4,000  
Infiltration barrier maintenance $122,000  
Subtotal for Construction/O&M Activities (periodic)a $126,000  
Professional/technical services (5-year reviews)   
Subtotal for Professional/Technical Services (5-year reviews) $52,000  
Update ICs plan (annual)   
Subtotal for Update ICs Plan (annual) $21,000  
Total Periodic Cost $199,000 $13,137,000 
a. Periodic costs are included in operations and maintenance costs.   
 
Table 12-4. Summary of cost of the selected remedy. 
Description of Cost Estimated Cost 
Total Capital Cost 10,989,806 
Total O&M Cost 22,152,961 
Total Periodic Cost 13,137,000 
TOTAL PROJECT COST IN PRESENT VALUEa $46,279,767 
TOTAL PROJECT COST IN NET PRESENT VALUEb $14,771,000 
a. Present value cost includes an average 19.8% contingency. 
b. Net present value in 2006 dollars. Net present value adjusts the value of a dollar today by the value of that same dollar in the future 
after accounting for return and inflation. Estimated accuracy is +50 to -30%. A 6.5% discount rate used to calculate net present value. 
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12.4 Expected Outcomes of the Selected Remedy 
Following are the expected outcomes of the selected remedy in terms of resulting land and 
groundwater uses, cleanup levels, and risk reduction achieved as a result of the action:  
• Available land use and cleanup levels—The available land use is industrial. Institutional controls, 
the ET/CB, and/or removal and disposal will protect workers from unacceptable external exposure 
to contaminated soil, based on the 1 × 10-4 risk-based level for an industrial worker. For soil 
outside the ET/CB, the cleanup level is 11.3 pCi/g Cs-137 to be met by 2095 in the top 4 ft. 
• Available groundwater uses and cleanup levels—By 2095, the SRPA near INTEC will be restored 
to beneficial use as an unrestricted source of drinking water for workers and future residents. The 
cleanup levels for the SRPA to be met by 2095 are the MCLs, which are 8 pCi/L for Sr-90 and 
4 mrem/yr for total Sr-90, Tc-99, and I-129. Until the MCLs are met, ICs will prevent use of the 
portion of the SRPA contaminated from INTEC sources. 
• Ecological benefits—The installation of the biobarrier component of the ET/CB will protect biota 
from internal exposure to unacceptable levels of Cs-137 and Sr-90 and prevent biota from bringing 
contaminants to the surface. 
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13. STATUTORY DETERMINATIONS 
CERCLA requires that statutory determinations are made regarding the selected remedy. 
Protection of Human Health and the Environment, Compliance with ARARs, and 
Cost-Effectiveness—The selected remedy for each site has been determined to be protective of human 
health and the environment through the use of engineering controls and institutional controls to prevent 
external exposures that exceed 1 × 10-4 risk-based levels and ingestion of contaminated groundwater that 
exceeds MCLs. Current workers will continue to be protected from external exposures exceeding 1 × 10-4 
risk-based levels to Cs-137 contaminated soil using administrative procedures to control access to the 
tank farm soil. Future workers will be protected by the ET/CB from external exposure to Cs-137 
contaminated soil in the tank farm. The biobarrier will prevent biotic intrusion into the contaminated soil, 
which will both protect biota from contamination and prevent biota from bringing contamination to the 
surface. 
Restoration of the portion of the SRPA contaminated by INTEC releases to MCLs by 2095 will 
protect hypothetical future residents from ingesting contaminated groundwater. This will be accomplished 
by reducing infiltration of precipitation and anthropogenic water to the underlying perched water and 
SRPA. The selected remedy will not pose unacceptable short-term risks to workers during 
implementation.  
The Agencies believe that the selected remedy’s combination of ICs, capping, infiltration controls, 
and monitoring will provide an overall level of protection comparable to grouting with capping and soil 
removal with capping at a significantly lower cost.  
The remedy complies with ARARs. Table 13-1 lists all ARARs for the selected remedy and 
provides a brief explanation of how the ARAR applies. This table includes nonbinding criteria that are 
to-be-considered such as EPA Region 10’s IC policy. This policy will be used to guide the development 
of ICs and their inclusion in the INL Sitewide Institutional Controls Plan (DOE-ID 2006c). In 
implementing the selected remedy, the Agencies have agreed to consider nonbinding criteria that are 
to-be-considered. This includes DOE Order 435.1, which protects the public and the environment from 
radiation and addresses the management of radioactive waste. EPA’s policy on ICs is also 
to-be-considered because contamination would remain in place above levels that would allow for 
unrestricted use. 
It is the Agencies’ judgment that the selected remedy is cost-effective and represents a reasonable 
value for the money spent. In making this determination, the following definition from the NCP was 
used: “A remedy shall be cost-effective if its costs are proportional to its overall effectiveness” 
(40 CFR 300.430(f)(1)(ii)(D)) and (40 CFR 300.430(f)). The selected remedy (Alternative 2b plus 
additional infiltration controls) is the most cost-effective of the alternatives because it is the least costly 
alternative that satisfies the threshold criteria. When compared to other potential remedial actions, the 
selected remedy provides the best balance between cost and effectiveness in protecting human health and 
the environment. It meets long-term effectiveness and permanence criteria while protecting workers in the 
short term during implementation of the remedy. It provides a potentially greater return on investment 
than the other alternatives because it provides a similar reduction in risk to the SRPA as grouting and 
removal but is safer for the remediation workers. The low-permeability pavement is equally protective of 
the SRPA as an ET/CB, as long as it is maintained, and installing the ET/CB over a flat surface is more 
cost-effective than installing it in and around operating facilities and over aboveground structures that 
would protrude through the ET/CB because they would still require access. 
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Table 13-1. Summary of applicable or relevant and appropriate requirements for the selected remedy. 
ARAR Type 
Requirement  
(Citation) 
Action-
Specific 
Chemical-
Specific 
Location-
Specific Comments 
Clean Air Act and Idaho Air Regulations 
“Toxic Substances,” IDAPA 58.01.01.161 
“Toxic Air Pollutants, Noncarcinogenic Increments,” 
IDAPA 58.01.01.585 
“Toxic Air Pollutants, Carcinogenic Increments,” 
IDAPA 58.01.01.586 
“Environmental Remediation Source,” 
IDAPA 58.01.01.210.16(a) 
 A  Applies to remediation activities. Compliance with 
IDAPA 58.01.01.161 requires that the release of 
noncarcinogenic and carcinogenic contaminants into 
the air must be estimated in accordance with 
IDAPA 58.01.01.210 before start of construction, 
controlled, and, as necessary, monitored. If these 
increments cannot be met for remediation sources, 
compliance with IDAPA 58.01.01.161 will be met in 
accordance with IDAPA 58.01.01.210.16(a), 
“Environmental Remediation Source.” 
“Ambient Air Quality Standards For Specific Air Pollutants,” 
IDAPA 58.01.01.577  
 A  The remediation activities will comply with the 
applicable emission standards and will not cause or 
significantly contribute to a violation of an ambient 
air quality standard. Modeling will be performed if 
deemed necessary. 
“National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants,” 
40 CFR 61.92, “Standard” 
 A  Applies to soil removal and cap construction 
activities. Will be met, because emissions will be 
below allowable levels. 
“National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants,” 
40 CFR 61.93, “Emission Monitoring and Test Procedures” 
A   Applies to soil removal and cap construction 
activities. Will be met, because emissions will be 
below allowable levels. 
“National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants,” 
40 CFR 61.94(a), “Compliance and Reporting” 
A   Applies to soil removal and cap construction 
activities. Will be met, because emissions will be 
below allowable levels. 
“Rules for Control of Fugitive Dust,” and “General Rules,” 
IDAPA 58.01.01.650 and 58.01.01.651 
A   Applies to soil removal and cap construction 
activities. Will be met, because emissions will be 
below allowable levels. 
Table 13-1. (continued). 
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ARAR Type 
Requirement  
(Citation) 
Action-
Specific 
Chemical-
Specific 
Location-
Specific Comments 
Idaho Hazardous Waste Management Act 
“Hazardous Waste Determination,” IDAPA 58.01.05.006 
(40 CFR 262.11) 
A A  Applies to wastes that have been placed, treated, 
stored, or are being sent to an off-Site facility for 
management. 
“Temporary Units,” IDAPA 58.01.05.008 (40 CFR 264.553) A A  Applies to wastes that require staging, storage, or 
treatment.  
“Land Disposal Requirements,” IDAPA 58.01.05.011 
(40 CFR 268) 
A A  Applies to wastes that have been placed, stored, 
treated, or are being sent to an off-Site facility for 
management. 
“Alternative LDR Treatment Standards for Contaminated 
Soil,” IDAPA 58.01.05.011 (40 CFR 268.49) 
A A  Applies to soil wastes that have been placed, stored, 
treated, or are being sent to an off-Site facility for 
management. 
Idaho Ground Water Quality Rule 
“Ground Water Quality Rule,” IDAPA 58.01.11 A A  The State of Idaho Ground Water Quality Rule’s 
regulated levels of contaminants are equivalent to the 
Clean Water Act MCLs. Will be met because Sr-90, 
Tc-99, I-129, and nitrate concentrations in the SRPA 
will be below applicable State of Idaho groundwater 
quality standards in 2095 and after.  
Idaho Shallow Injection Well, Monitoring Well, and Borehole Standards 
“Rules and Minimum Standards for the Construction and Use 
of Injection Wells in the State of Idaho,” IDAPA 37.03.03 
A   Applies to the shallow injection wells that are 
impacted by the remedy and need to be abandoned.  
“Well Construction Standards Rules,” IDAPA 37.03.09 A   Applies to wells and boreholes that are impacted by 
the remedy and need to be abandoned or modified. 
Table 13-1. (continued). 
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ARAR Type 
Requirement  
(Citation) 
Action-
Specific 
Chemical-
Specific 
Location-
Specific Comments 
To-Be-Considered Requirements 
“Radioactive Waste Management,” DOE Order 435.1 TBC   Applies to radioactive waste generated from 
remediation activities. Will be met by disposal in 
ICDF or at an ICDF-equivalent on-Site or off-Site 
disposal facility. 
EPA Region 10 Final Policy on the Use of Institutional 
Controls at Federal Facilities (EPA 2006e) 
TBC   Applies to tank farm soil during IC period, because 
contamination will remain in place after remediation 
above levels that allow for unrestricted use and 
access. Will be met by IC approach defined in 
RD/RA work plan. 
Key:  
A = applicable requirement. 
TBC = to be considered. 
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Use of Permanent Solutions and Alternative Treatment Technologies to the Maximum Extent 
Practicable and Preference for Treatment as a Principal Element—The NCP expresses a preference 
for remedies that use permanent solutions and alternative treatment technologies to the maximum extent 
practicable to reduce toxicity, mobility, and volume. Most of the COC are radionuclides that cannot be 
destroyed through treatment. Management of the contaminated soil will include measures to limit 
contaminant mobility (e.g., containment). A cost-effective method to separate the contaminants from the 
soil is not available. As a result, the concentration of radionuclides in the contaminated soil that exceeds 
the RGs will be reduced only by radioactive decay. Therefore, because treatment for radionuclide-
contaminated soil is not found to be practical, those remedies addressing radionuclide-contaminated soil 
do not satisfy the statutory preference for treatment as a principal element of the remedy. EPA’s 
preference for sites that pose relatively low-level threats or where treatment is impractical is engineering 
controls, such as containment.  
The statutory preference for treatment as a principal element is not satisfied because the selected 
remedy meets the threshold criteria and protects workers from unacceptable direct exposure to Cs-137 
contaminated soil without treatment. Implementation of a treatment technology could result in greater 
overall risk to workers because of the potential for exposure to alpha radiation and high levels of gamma 
radiation. 
Five-Year Reviews—Section 121(c) of CERCLA (42 USC 9621(c)) and the NCP 
(40 CFR 300.430(f)(5)(iii)(C)) provide the statutory and legal bases for conducting 5-year reviews. For 
those sites where contaminants are to be left in place in concentrations in excess of levels that will allow 
for unlimited use and unrestricted exposure, a review will be conducted at least every 5 years after the 
initiation of the first remedial action. The statutory 5-year review will ensure that the remedy is still 
effective in protecting human health and the environment. Additionally, the 5-year review will evaluate 
such factors as contaminant migration from sites where contamination has been left in place, effectiveness 
of ICs, and overall effectiveness of the remedial actions. Five-year reviews will be conducted for 
remediated sites with ICs until it has been determined during a 5-year review that controls and reviews 
are no longer necessary. In an effort to provide a more comprehensive assessment of CERCLA actions 
being implemented at the INL Site, the Agencies performed a comprehensive 5-year review in 2006 
(DOE-NE-ID 2006b). The next INL Site 5-year review is scheduled for completion in 2011 and will 
include the review of OU 3-14 activities. 
If, during a 5-year review, the existing remedy is found to not be protective of human health or the 
environment, the Agencies could consider new technologies that were not available at the time of ROD 
signature. New technologies may be developed in the future that could achieve remediation goals faster, 
better, or for less cost. The Agencies can amend or modify the ROD through the CERCLA process when 
necessary to ensure that the remedy is protective and to improve the remedy. 
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14. DOCUMENTATION OF SIGNIFICANT CHANGES 
CERCLA Section 117(b) (42 USC 9617(b)) requires that an explanation of significant changes 
from the preferred alternative originally presented in the Proposed Plan be provided in the ROD 
(42 USC 9601, Public Law 99-499). There are no significant changes. 
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PART 3: RESPONSIVENESS SUMMARY 
16. RESPONSIVENESS SUMMARY 
The public comment period for the Operable Unit (OU) 3-14 Proposed Plan (DOE-ID 2006a) 
began August 22, 2006, and ended October 21, 2006, for the receipt of written and oral comments. 
Public meetings on the OU 3-14 Proposed Plan were conducted in Idaho Falls on August 29, 2006, and 
Twin Falls on August 30, 2006. Oral and written comments were submitted during the public meetings, 
and written comments were received during the public comment period required by the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) §117 (42 USC 9617) and the 
National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP) 
(40 CFR 300.430(f)(5)(iii)(B)). The oral and written comments are available in the Administrative 
Record for the OU 3-14 remedial investigation/feasibility study (RI/FS) project. The Administrative 
Record is located in the Idaho National Laboratory (INL)/Idaho Cleanup Project (ICP) Technical Library 
in Idaho Falls. Additional copies may be viewed at the Albertsons Library on the campus of Boise State 
University. The Administrative Record can also be accessed on the internet at http://ar.inel.gov. 
Responses to the comments are provided in this section. An index to the comments on the 
OU 3-14 Proposed Plan is provided in Table 16-1. 
Table 16-1. Oral and written comments on the OU 3-14 Proposed Plan. 
Name Affiliation Abbreviation Comment No. 
Comments received during public meetings 
Dennis Donnelly  Concerned citizen DD 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 21, 25, 
27, 28, 60 
Willie Preacher Shoshone-Bannock Tribes WP 21, 29, 30 
Jeremy Maxand Snake River Alliance SRA See SRA below 
Written comments received during public comment period 
John Tanner Coalition 21 C21 7, 23, 37, 38, 44 
Douglas Paddock Concerned citizen DP 21, 33, 39, 46, 55, 
84, 87 
Xenia Williams Concerned citizen XW 9, 30, 31, 47 
Peter Rickards Concerned citizen PR 3–5, 18, 20, 21, 30, 
41–43, 50, 52, 53, 
60, 61, 87 
Char Roth Concerned citizen CR 9, 21, 29, 45 
Bruce Tidwell Concerned citizen BT 8, 21, 31 
Tom Kennelly Concerned citizen TK 21, 31 
William Flannery INL Citizens Advisory Board CAB 5, 39, 54, 63 
Nikki Hixson Concerned citizen NH 16, 21, 30 
Torri Lockman Concerned citizen TL 30, 48, 49, 64 
Mary Woollen Keep Yellowstone Nuclear Free YNF 3–5, 8, 9, 18, 21, 
30, 39, 41, 43, 47, 
65–67, 83, 85, 86 
Table 16-1. (continued). 
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Name Affiliation Abbreviation Comment No. 
Jeremy Maxand Snake River Alliance SRA 5, 8, 10, 15, 21, 26, 
32, 34–36, 39–41, 
56–59, 63, 80, 82, 
83, 86, 87 
Chuck Brocious Environmental Defense Institute EDI 4, 5, 8, 11, 13, 21, 
65–68, 79, 81, 86, 
87 
Roger Turner, Yvette 
Tuell, Kelly Wright, 
Willie Preacher, 
Blaine Edmo 
Shoshone-Bannock Tribes SBT 1, 5, 9, 12, 14, 17, 
19, 20, 22, 24, 51, 
54, 62, 63, 69–78, 
86 
 
The comments, both oral and written, have been grouped into various subject categories. These 
categories are characterization, modeling, risk assessment, remedy selection, design, communications and 
process, tribal issues, and other issues. The comments are summarized and combined where similar 
comments have been received.  
Public Comments and Agency Responses 
Characterization 
Comment 1: The information gathered to date, especially on the subsurface characterization is 
great. [SBT] 
Response: Thank you. The Department of Energy (DOE), the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA), and the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) (collectively referred to as the 
Agencies) have spent a great deal of time searching historical records, interviewing employees, using 
process knowledge, identifying and filling data gaps, drilling, and sampling to characterize the nature and 
extent of the releases. 
Modeling  
Comment 2: There is a problem with Strontium and Cesium in Idaho groundwater [inferring that 
it came from the INL] based on the USGS report 84-4201, which measured these elements in wells near 
Pocatello. On page 17, this report shows seven of eight wells having levels of Strontium-90 in the 
groundwater that exceed the drinking water limit, and Cesium-137 levels are comparable. One well 
analyzed had levels of Strontium-90 roughly eighteen times the drinking water limit. [DD] 
Response: The comment refers to data from the former FMC plant (now a Superfund site) in 
Michaud Flats near Pocatello, Idaho. It is not in the same flow system or aquifer as the INL Site.  
The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) provided a letter that clarifies the data referred to in this 
comment (Rousseau 2006) and excerpts are included here. The commentor “misunderstood the data 
contained in the report. Cesium-137 and strontium-90 data were not provided in the report. 
Concentrations of gross-beta particle radioactivity were reported (Jacobson 1984) along with gross-alpha 
particle radioactivity and tritium. Gross-beta particle radioactivity is a measure of the total radioactivity 
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given off as beta particles during the radioactive decay process. By convention, laboratories report this 
radioactivity as if it were given off by one reference radionuclide…”  
“The Michaud Flats area is situated south of the Snake River and ground-water flows to the north 
and northwest and discharges into the Portneuf River. The Michaud Flats area aquifer system includes the 
Michaud Gravel, the Sunbeam Formation, the Starlight Formation, and the flows of the Bighole Basalt. 
Flow in the Michaud Flats area aquifer system is separated from flow in the ESRPA by the Snake River. 
Because the Snake River prevents groundwater flow between the two aquifer systems, contamination in 
the Michaud Flats area cannot come from the INL.” 
Comment 3: Several comments were received on the modeling time frame: The Proposed Plan 
does not analyze the long-term threat of alpha emitters suspended above the aquifer. This long-term 
analysis looks only until 2095, despite plutonium lasting 240,000 years. Current DOE [Department of 
Energy] analysis extends only to 2095, which is insufficient. [DD, PR, YNF]  
Response: The Agencies evaluated long-lived contaminants, including plutonium (Pu), beyond 
2095. The Proposed Plan summarized the results of the baseline risk assessment (BRA) only for 
contaminants of concern that either have exceeded, or are predicted in the future to exceed, the Idaho 
Ground Water Quality standards (same as maximum contaminant levels [MCLs]). The alpha-emitters, 
including plutonium, were not included in the brief modeling summary in the Proposed Plan because they 
do not, and are not predicted to, exceed MCLs in the aquifer at the Idaho Nuclear Technology and 
Engineering Center (INTEC). However, modeling for all contaminants of potential concern, including 
alpha-emitters is discussed in detail in the BRA. Predictive modeling for each contaminant was continued 
as far out in the future as necessary to capture the peak arrival(s) in the aquifer. Depending on the 
contaminant, vadose zone model termination dates ranged from 2095 to the year 87,594 and aquifer 
model termination dates ranged from 2095 to the year 4587. Because Pu-239 has a long half-life 
(24,000 years, not 240,000 years as stated in the comment), it was evaluated to determine how far in the 
future the model should run. Although the peak Pu-239 and Pu-240 concentrations were predicted to have 
occurred in the Snake River Plain Aquifer in 1960 as a result of injection well discharges, the vadose zone 
model was run out to the year 87,594 because of public concern over these long long-lived contaminants. 
This ensured that the potential slow transport through the vadose zone over thousands of years was 
accounted for. The concentrations of alpha-emitters in vadose zone pore water through the year 87,594 
were predicted to be so low that they could not result in concentrations above the MCL in the aquifer and, 
therefore, the aquifer model for Pu-239 and Pu-240 was not run past the year 2095.  
Comment 4: Commentors were concerned about the location of the tank farm relative to the 
floodplain of the Big Lost River. Several commentors stated that INTEC is in the floodplain of the 
Big Lost River and has been flooded on numerous previous occasions. One commentor stated the area is 
destined for massive flooding, called 500-year floods, but the long-term analysis looks only until 2095. 
[PR, YNF, EDI] 
Response: The tank farm has never flooded. The area of the tank farm that will be covered by the 
evapotranspiration cap with capillary biobarrier is outside of the Big Lost River 100-year and 500-year 
floodplain. The regulatory requirements for facilities in floodplains are in reference to the 100-year flood, 
which is the predicted maximum flood that is expected to occur once every 100 years. INL has an 
exhaustive, updated, peer-reviewed flood hazard study and independent analysis of the INL Diversion 
Dam which shows that the dam is adequate for the 100-year flow (BOR 2005). Nonetheless, flood models 
were developed assuming that the INL Diversion Dam does not exist when in fact the dam is adequate for 
flows up to 1 ft of freeboard, which would likely include the 100-year flood. This study concludes that 
there will be no significant inundation of the tank farm by the 100-year flood. The modeling and risk 
assessment evaluated credible scenarios and were done in accordance with EPA guidance. See response 
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to Comment 3 for the issue of long-term analysis. The cap needs to remain effective in protecting 
industrial workers from exposure to contaminated soil for 220 years until the Cs-137 in the soil has 
decayed to acceptable levels.  
Comment 5: Commentors were concerned that the long-term effects from flooding would spread 
contaminated soils or plumes. Heavy snows and spring thaws could cause the Big Lost River to overflow. 
Flood waters could travel horizontally under the cap. Commentors were concerned about recharge 
upstream of the cap and vadose zone recharge below the cap. How can the DOE assure that in the event 
of flooding, that suspended plutonium and other contaminants will not migrate? Flood water will generate 
recharge which would flush the contaminated soil into perched zones and eventually into the aquifer. 
Commentors would like to see information which addresses these concerns. [DD, PR, CAB, YNF, SRA, 
EDI, SBT]  
Response: As stated in response to Comment 4, the tank farm is outside the Big Lost River 
floodplain. During periods of flow, the Big Lost River loses water through streambed infiltration. This 
water moves primarily vertically downward, but may also move horizontally along low-permeability 
horizons. However, perched water monitoring during periods of river flow during 2005 and 2006 has 
shown that lateral flow of Big Lost River infiltration in the shallow perched zone (depths of 100-150 ft 
below ground) is limited to the extreme northwest corner of INTEC and does not extend beneath the tank 
farm. The basis for this conclusion is that water levels in shallow perched monitor wells located more 
than 1,000 ft away from the river did not rise in response to flow in the Big Lost River. Rather, shallow 
perched water levels in the vicinity of the tank farm respond mainly to infiltration of snowmelt and 
rainfall inside INTEC, as well as to clean water releases within the facility perimeter. A detailed analysis 
of the relative magnitudes of these recharge sources is presented in a report titled Evaluation of Factors 
Affecting Perched Water Levels at INTEC (DOE-ID 2006b, Appendix C). This report concludes that 
“…in both 1993 and 2005, upper shallow perched water levels (near the tank farm) appeared to respond 
to the rapid rise in soil moisture from precipitation infiltration but not to subsequent river flow.” 
Comment 6: Tectonic activity could destroy the proposed protections. [DD] 
Response: New construction at INL is required to be designed to withstand seismic and tectonic 
events per DOE requirements for risk reduction and protection of workers, the public, and the 
environment. The level of rigor of the analysis depends upon the risks associated with the planned 
operations in the facility being constructed. Tectonic hazards were independently evaluated by the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission prior to granting the license to store the Three Mile Island (TMI) -2 
fuels at INTEC. Capping soil in place has lower associated hazards than does storing TMI-2 fuel.  
The closest mapped faults to INTEC are over 13 miles to the west along the northwest boundary 
of the INL Site. The most recent fault offsets (earthquakes) along these faults occurred greater than 
15,000 years ago. The most recent volcanic activity near INTEC occurred 15 miles south of INL at 
Craters of the Moon approximately 2,000 years ago. The most recent volcanic flows that reached INTEC 
occurred approximately 200,000 years ago (Helm-Clark et al. 2005, pages 4-4 and 4-5). Therefore, the 
claim that tectonic activity could destroy the protections during the required time period (220 years for the 
evapotranspiration cap with capillary biobarrier and 88 years for the low-permeability pavement) is not 
credible. The selected remedy requires monitoring and a review every 5 years until the risk is at 
acceptable levels. In the unlikely event of future tectonic activity, disturbance to the cap would be 
detected through monitoring, and action would be taken to ensure that the remedy is protective.  
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Comment 7: It was pointed out that the Sr-90 plume caused by the injection well is receding. The 
much larger amount of Sr-90 from the tank farm spills has not reached the aquifer in significant amounts 
after 35 years. The modeling results indicating that it will not travel far when it gets there seem 
reasonable. [C21] 
Response: The Agencies agree with the comment. 
Comment 8: Total source term is an enormous amount of contamination that will end up in the 
Snake River Plain Aquifer (SRPA). [EDI, DD, BT, SRA, YNF] 
Response: The statement that all of the source term will end up in the SRPA is incorrect. The two 
reasons for this are radioactive decay and adsorption of contaminants to solids (such as the alluvium and 
interbeds). First, consider radioactive decay. The total source term represents the undecayed inventory 
(at the time of the release to the soil). The two predominant contaminants, strontium-90 (Sr-90) and 
cesium-137 (Cs-137), have half-lives of 29 and 30 years, respectively. Since the largest release occurred 
35 years ago, less than half of the contamination remains. Second, contaminants move through the 
subsurface at different rates because they adsorb differently to solids. Thus, of the total source term, only 
a small fraction of the Sr-90 is predicted to end up in the SRPA because much of it adsorbs to the solids. 
Other contaminants, such as Cs-137, have even greater affinity to the soil, have remained in the soil for 
35 years, and are expected to decay in place and never reach the SRPA. Two of the contaminants that 
leaked into tank farm soil do not adsorb to solids (technetium-99 and nitrate) and have migrated to the 
aquifer. 
Comment 9: Risk modeling of contaminated groundwater and soil movement does not accurately 
determine if the aquifer will be protected and is not acceptable. Nature and weather conditions of today 
may change and current modeling may not be accurate in the future. Capping does not fully protect the 
aquifer and is not the answer to cleanup. [SBT, XW, YNF, CR] 
Response: In order to assess risks in the future, groundwater modeling is necessary. The results of 
groundwater modeling (DOE-NE-ID 2006a, Appendixes A and J, and summarized in Section 8) are used 
to assess risks in the Baseline Risk Assessment (summarized in DOE-NE-ID 2006a, Sections 6, 7, and 8). 
In the Feasibility Study (DOE-ID 2006c, Appendix A), the Agencies examined whether a 
low-permeability pavement would protect the aquifer and determined that a 10-acre low-permeability 
pavement would meet the objective of protecting the aquifer (DOE-ID 2006c, Section A-5). Although the 
Agencies try to minimize modeling uncertainty and improve the predictive ability of the model, the 
Agencies recognize that modeling is only a tool and can be inaccurate or fail to account for unexpected 
changes in conditions. Therefore, monitoring of the perched water and Snake River Plain Aquifer is a 
component of the remedy. Because waste will be left in place, the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) requires that the Agencies conduct 5-year reviews 
to ensure that the remedy is fully protective of the aquifer. If data indicate that the remedy is not 
protective, the CERCLA process mandates that the Agencies modify the remedy to ensure protectiveness.  
Comment 10: One commentor said that they have a strong bias in favor of contaminant removal 
based on the importance of the SRPA and uncertainties underlying all modeled risk assessments. [SRA] 
Response: The selected remedy will protect human health and the environment and will comply 
with all applicable or relevant and appropriate requirements. The selected remedy provides the best 
balance of the seven remaining criteria: long-term effectiveness and permanence; reduction of toxicity, 
mobility, or volume through treatment; short-term effectiveness; implementability; cost; state/support 
agency acceptance; and community acceptance. The OU 3-14 Remedial Investigation/Baseline Risk 
Assessment (Appendix A, Section 10 of DOE-NE-ID 2006a) acknowledges and discusses uncertainties in 
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the modeling process. The vadose zone and groundwater model formulation used reasonably conservative 
estimates of parameters to err on overestimating risk to account for uncertainty. The State of Idaho DEQ, 
EPA Region 10, and DOE understand and accept the uncertainties inherent in modeling and require 
ongoing monitoring of the perched water and aquifer and 5-year reviews to confirm the effectiveness of 
the remedy.  
Comment 11: DOE’s modeling is fundamentally and deliberately flawed. DOE's own report states 
“The modeling results indicated that actions on the Tank Farm Soil alone will not meet Snake River Plain 
Aquifer Remedial Action Objectives.” [EDI] 
Response: The Agencies disagree with the statement that the modeling is fundamentally and 
deliberately flawed. The model and model results used to support the Remedial Investigation/Baseline 
Risk Assessment (summarized in DOE-NE-ID 2006a, Sections 6, 7, and 8, and provided in detail in 
Appendices A and J) and Feasibility Study (DOE-ID 2006c, Appendix A) were reviewed and approved 
by EPA and DEQ as being consistent with the scientific methodologies adopted for these purposes by the 
Agencies. Actions taken on the tank farm soil alone (removing and/or grouting the tank farm soil) will not 
be protective of the Snake River Plain Aquifer (SRPA) because the real risk to the aquifer is not from the 
soil but from the strontium-90 that migrated into the perched water system below the alluvium over 
35 years ago. That is why the Agencies have included infiltration controls in the selected remedy to 
reduce flux of contaminants out of the perched water system to the SRPA, which will protect the aquifer. 
This combination of actions (capping soil to protect workers, reducing infiltration [over a 10-acre area, 
which is larger than just the contaminated soil], and additional infiltration controls) will meet the SRPA 
remedial action objectives. The TETRAD model has been reviewed by an independent third party 
(Martian 2007). This review indicated that TETRAD is comparable to other programs that are used for 
environmental modeling.  
Comment 12: The years for protection and monitoring until the risk is at an acceptable level is 
based on 7 half-lives. This may equate to 220 years before it is down to an acceptable level. [SBT] 
Response: The statement is referring to the radioactive half-life of cesium-137, which is 30 years. 
After every 30 years, half of the cesium-137 has decayed and half remains. After 7 half-lives, less than 
1% of the original cesium-137 remains. If no action was taken, unacceptable levels of risk to workers 
from direct exposure to contaminated soil inside the tank farm boundary would last 220 years. However, 
once the evapotranspiration cap with capillary biobarrier is constructed, the workers will be protected. 
Until that time, workers will be protected using administrative controls similar to those currently in place. 
For groundwater, if no action was taken, unacceptable levels of strontium-90 would remain in the aquifer 
until the year 2129. The selected remedy will reduce the time until the contaminants in the aquifer are at 
acceptable levels on or before 2095. 
Comment 13: Radioactive contamination in groundwater under INTEC is 60,000 times the EPA 
drinking water concentrations [maximum contaminant level or MCL]; at RTC, 176,000 times MCLs. Due 
to close proximity, both of these sources must be considered collectively in making cleanup decisions that 
will impact the aquifer. [EDI] 
Response: The data cited are from over 14 years ago and are from shallow perched water, not the 
Snake River Plain Aquifer (SRPA). Currently, the maximum contaminant concentrations in SRPA 
monitoring wells at INTEC are strontium-90 (about 4 × MCL), technetium-99 (about 3 × MCL), and 
iodine-129 and nitrate (both at concentrations near the MCL). The concentration of chromium in the 
aquifer at the Reactor Technology Complex (RTC) has decreased from about 2.5 × MCL in 1993 to 
1.4 × MCL in 2005 (ICP 2006). This decreasing trend is consistent with the Operable Unit 2-12 (RTC) 
Record of Decision, which predicted that the concentrations of all contaminants in the aquifer at RTC 
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(both radioactive and nonradioactive) would decrease to below the MCLs within 20 years. The INTEC 
and RTC plumes were addressed together under the OU 3-13 Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study 
(RI/FS) (DOE-ID 1997). That study concluded that commingling the RTC and INTEC plumes would not 
result in additional unacceptable cumulative risk beyond the unacceptable risks already identified for 
specific individual contaminants in the aquifer.  
Risk Assessment 
Comment 14: Rationale needed for use of 1 in 10,000 as approved risk level. Preference is for 1 in 
1,000,000. Some commentors stated that they prefer no risk. [SBT] 
Response: The acceptable risk range for site-related exposures under the National Oil and 
Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP) (40 CFR 300) is 10-4 (1 in 10,000 or 1E-04) to 
10-6 (1 in 1,000,000 or 1E-06). The Agencies agree that acceptable risk for OU 3-14 is at the upper end of 
this range (1 × 10-4) based on (1) the conservative nature of the risk assessment, e.g., it is unlikely there 
will be future industrial re-use of the OU 3-14 soil sites and therefore worker exposure is anticipated to be 
much less than 40 hours per week for 25 years; (2) use of the 1 × 10-4 risk-based level in the OU 3-13 
Record of Decision for all Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act soil 
sites at INTEC (which surround OU 3-14); and (3) the isolation of the INL. 
Comment 15: The Record of Decision for the tank farm soil should include, for each contaminant 
of concern [in the risk assessment], what percentage has decayed and what percentage is left. [SRA] 
Response: The Record of Decision, although lengthy, is nevertheless a brief overview of the 
Remedial Investigation/Baseline Risk Assessment, Feasibility Study, and other technical documents and 
is not intended to contain the same level of detail. These technical documents are available in the 
Administrative Record. About half of the cesium-137 in the soil has decayed since the major releases in 
the 1970s. For a future worker in 2095, after 4 half-lives, about 6% of the cesium-137 will be left and it 
will be bound to the soil. For strontium-90, 2095 occurs after 4 half-lives, which means that about 94% of 
the strontium-90 will have decayed away, with about 6% remaining. Most of that 6% will be bound to 
soil, bound to interbeds, or in perched water. The other contaminants of concern either have long 
half-lives (technetium-99 and iodine-129) or no half-life (nitrate). These three contaminants essentially 
travel with groundwater and do not sorb to sediments, so 100% will be dispersed in groundwater. The 
model predicts that these three contaminants will meet the maximum contaminant level by 2095 without 
any remedial action being taken. The modeling does not account for any degradation of nitrate, which 
could further decrease concentrations over time.  
Comment 16: I have known of several people who live in the affected area and have contracted 
brain tumors. Currently my children are unable to give their infant tap water for the damage that it causes 
to her intestines. These may or may not be caused by the leakage of hazardous waste into the aquifer, 
however, wouldn’t it be best to err on the side of safety. [NH] 
Response: The Agencies are sorry to hear about your family member and the other people 
mentioned in your comment. The health problems described in your comment could not have been caused 
by INTEC releases because the portion of the aquifer that is contaminated above drinking water standards 
from INTEC sources does not extend beyond the INL boundary and, therefore, does not extend to any 
residential drinking water wells. The Agencies’ remediation plan errs on the side of safety for current 
workers as well as future residents to ensure contamination does not affect off-Site residents or future 
on-Site residents. 
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Comment 17: The Risk Assessment conducted as a part of the WAG [Waste Area Group] 10 Site 
Investigation several years ago to gain a better understanding of Tribal risk was not utilized in 
determination of what level of cleanup will be done on each Operable Unit. [SBT] 
Response: The Tribes did not specifically mention INTEC, WAG 3, or OU 3-14 in the material 
provided to the WAG 10 risk assessment team (DOE-ID 2001, Appendix A). During the institutional 
control period, institutional controls required at this site and the low-permeability pavement and 
evapotranspiration cap with capillary biobarrier (i.e., capping) will prohibit exposures to any tribal 
members who are hunting and gathering. After the institutional control period, these caps will prevent 
exposures to any tribal members who are hunting and gathering. The selected remedy, which combines 
engineering and institutional controls and prevents unrestricted access to the site and to contaminants of 
concern until the contaminants have decayed to acceptable levels, is protective of scenarios involving less 
frequent exposures (such as hunting and gathering) than the worker exposure scenarios. See Tribal Issues. 
Comment 18: DOE failed to analyze the pathway of airborne risk if/when Pu reaches the aquifer 
and is pumped to the surface for irrigation. This is where the inhalation pathway is REALLY of concern, 
and billions of plutonium particles will be available for public exposure. Avoiding this known and 
documented exposure pathway is how they incorrectly conclude the alternatives are all equally effective 
in the long-term. [PR, YNF] 
Response: The modeling predicted that plutonium concentrations would always be at least several 
orders of magnitude below the maximum contaminant level of 15 pCi/L. Estimation of risk associated 
with inhalation from groundwater pumped to the surface can be assessed using very conservative 
assumptions. EPA (EPA 2007) evaluates inhalation from fugitive dust and from volatile radionuclides 
from groundwater at the site. Because plutonium is not volatile, the only pathway of potential concern 
would be inhalation of fugitive dust. Inhalation of fugitive dust for an irrigation scenario was evaluated in 
the OU 3-13 Remedial Investigation/Baseline Risk Assessment (DOE-ID 1997) using more conservative 
assumptions and determined to not pose an unacceptable risk. However, to address the comment, a 
worst-case risk assessment assuming that (1) groundwater obtained from an area of highest possible 
contamination is used for irrigation and (2) that all the Pu-239 in this irrigation water is aerosolized, was 
performed. It showed that risk levels were more than 100 times below the lower end of the National Oil 
and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP) acceptable risk range of 1 × 10-6 
(Van Horn 2007). 
Remedy Selection 
Comment 19: The Agencies’ determination that the tank farm and 12 surrounding acres will 
remain industrial for the foreseeable future is inconsistent with the limited 100-year institutional control 
period provided to the Tank Farm by the Idaho High-Level Waste and Facilities Disposition Final 
Environmental Impact Statement (DOE 2002a). Sr-90 contamination from INTEC in the aquifer will be 
greater than maximum contaminant levels (MCLs) beyond the 100-yr institutional control period. The 
institutional control period should represent a date where DOE is fully prepared to have the INL cleaned 
up, restored, with natural resources protected. [SBT] 
Response: The Agencies agree that the Snake River Plain Aquifer must be restored to maximum 
contaminant levels (MCLs) within a reasonable time period. The Agencies are committed to cleaning up 
the aquifer in less than 100 years (by 2095 instead of 2107, which is in 88 years). This is reflected in the 
remedial action objectives (see Section 8 of this Record of Decision). The selected remedy is designed to 
achieve MCLs in the aquifer by 2095 and be protective of the environment. This is consistent with the 
Idaho High-Level Waste & Facilities Disposition Final Environmental Impact Statement, which used 
2095 as the assumed end of DOE’s institutional control for the purposes of analysis (DOE 2002a). 
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The Agencies have agreed that future residential use beyond 2095 for a 16-acre portion of 
northern INTEC, which includes grouted facilities and underground tanks (71 FR 68811-68813 and 
71 FR 68813-68814), is not a reasonable future use scenario. See Tribal Issues. 
Comment 20: Institutional monitoring is only for a short duration. [PR, SBT] 
Response: The Department of Energy is legally bound to perform the remedial actions set forth in 
this Record of Decision (ROD), including all required monitoring (see Description of the Selected 
Remedy in Part 1 of this ROD). That obligation continues until the remedy is complete. Monitoring will 
continue for as long as waste remains in place that is above risk-based levels, in accordance with the 
National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP) and this ROD.  
Comment 21: Many commentors request that soil contamination remaining in the CPP-31 alluvial 
soil be removed, or all the contamination be removed. [DD, WP, DP, PR, CR, BT, TK, NH, YNF, SRA, 
EDI] 
Response: Removing the soil doesn’t significantly reduce the risk to the Snake River Plain Aquifer 
(see response to Comment 11). The risk to groundwater is from strontium-90 that is already in the 
perched water system and could migrate, and not from contaminants in the soil, which are immobile. 
Capping the soil protects workers and biota from exposure until the cesium-137 decays and protects the 
aquifer from contaminant migration out of the perched water system until strontium-90 decays. Therefore, 
it would not be prudent to remove soil, with potential for exposing workers during soil removal, to 
achieve such a minimal risk reduction to hypothetical future residents or workers. 
Site closures under CERCLA are risk-based. Given the future industrial land use likely for this area 
and results of the Baseline Risk Assessment (DOE-NE-ID 2006a), complete removal of hot spot 
contamination would not significantly reduce risks to human health and the environment beyond the risk 
reduction achieved by the selected remedy. “Hot spot” soil removal would be hazardous for remediation 
workers, more difficult to implement, and less cost-effective. Containment and institutional controls are a 
cost-effective remedy for this site; they will contain the cesium-137 and prevent exposure until it decays 
to acceptable levels (220 years). Performance monitoring and 5-year reviews will determine whether the 
remedy is effective and allow for future modification of the remedy, if needed. 
The selected remedy will protect human health and the environment and will comply with all 
applicable or relevant and appropriate requirements (ARARs). The selected remedy provides the best 
balance of the seven remaining criteria: long-term effectiveness and permanence; reduction of toxicity, 
mobility, or volume through treatment; short-term effectiveness; implementability; cost; state/support 
agency acceptance; and community acceptance.  
Comment 22: We applaud the amount of cleanup that has been done at the site but the Tribes feel 
that DOE and the contractors have determined the End State for the INL without any type of 
consideration from Tribes or stakeholders. The initial discussion [during a DOE presentation in 2002 on 
the Project Management Plan at a DOE/tribal meeting] gave the Tribes the indication that all of the 
contamination would be cleaned up or removed. Now it looks like the answer is to cap any areas that may 
have some contamination in the sub-surface regardless of the levels of contamination. [SBT] 
Response: INL doesn’t apply a single end-state standard to all contaminated areas. In the case of 
soil in the vicinity of the INTEC tank farm, the Agencies are agreeing in this Record of Decision to 
remediate to an industrial standard. The end state includes low-permeability pavement until 2095 for the 
outer recharge control zone and the evapotranspiration cap with capillary biobarrier on the south and 
central tank farm. The Performance Management Plan (DOE-ID 2002) outlined DOE’s accelerated 
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cleanup strategy. That plan indicated that a majority of cleanup decisions would be made by 2012. 
Cleanup in this context means remediate. Cleanup decisions are based on achieving acceptable risk-based 
levels, not necessarily pristine conditions, and options can include, for example, no action, removal, or 
treatment. Cleanup criteria can be met by containing the waste and monitoring to ensure the remedial 
action objectives are achieved. The public comment process on the Proposed Plan is the Tribes’ and other 
stakeholders’ opportunity to affect the choice of remedial action. See Tribal Issues. 
Comment 23: One commentor believes the chosen alternative, 2b, is adequate for cleanup of the 
tank farm soils. The commentor would not recommend anything more extensive. [C21] 
Response: The Agencies agree that Alternative 2b is adequate for cleanup of tank farm soil.  
Comment 24: After attending and listening to the presentations on the Operable Unit 3-14, on 
the Tank Farms Soils and Groundwater Cleanup, I am fully supportive of the efforts of Idaho DOE to 
continue to clean up the subsurface and surface contamination. Unfortunately, the total lack of 
environmental regulation back in the 1940s–1990s has resulted in expensive cleanup that impacts us all. 
[SBT] 
Response: Thank you for requesting the briefing. It was very helpful for the Agencies in 
understanding your concerns and they appreciate the opportunity to discuss the project and answer your 
questions. 
Comment 25: There is too much contamination (listed on Table 1 in the Proposed Plan) to cap and 
walk away. [DD] 
Response: The contamination listed in Table 1 of the Proposed Plan represents the amount of 
contamination in the waste at the time of release. Radioactive decay has reduced this contamination by 
more than half. The residual contamination in the soil is not mobile, is tightly bound to the soil, and is 
decaying in place.  
The selected remedy will protect human health and the environment and will comply with all 
applicable or relevant and appropriate requirements (ARARs). See response to Comment 21. 
Comment 26: The only real active effort to stop contamination is to cover the contaminated area 
so no further downward migration happens. [SRA] 
Response: Reducing recharge of the perched water over a larger area (10 acres) has the most 
significant benefit in stopping downward migration. Additional infiltration controls will be implemented 
in northern INTEC. Covering the contamination remaining in the alluvial soil is part of the selected 
remedy.  
Comment 27: The Proposed Plan does not take into account the long radioactive lifetimes of 
strontium and cesium. [DD] 
Response: The half-lives of strontium-90 (Sr-90) and cesium-137 (Cs-137) are not considered long 
(29 and 30 years, respectively). These half-lives are taken into account in all aspects of this project, from 
modeling the transport of Sr-90 over long periods of time (until the year 2293), assessing risk to workers 
from direct exposure to Cs-137 (risk is unacceptable for over 220 years if no action is taken), to selecting 
a remedy designed to (1) protect human health and the environment until the Cs-137 has decayed to 
acceptable levels and (2) ensure that Sr-90 concentrations in the aquifer are at safe levels for ingestion by 
future workers and residents. Institutional controls will protect workers and the environment throughout 
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the institutional control period, during which time the Snake River Plain Aquifer will be restored to Idaho 
Ground Water Quality standards (same as maximum contaminant levels). After 2095, the caps will 
contain the Cs-137 until it decays to acceptable levels. 
Comment 28: Wind and wildfire could disperse contaminants and this was not accounted for. 
[DD] 
Response: The Agencies are not sure if the statement is referring to the risk assessment or the 
remedy and are responding to both issues. The OU 3-13 Baseline Risk Assessment (DOE-ID 1997) 
evaluated wind dispersion and these results were incorporated into the OU 3-14 Baseline Risk 
Assessment (DOE-NE-ID 2006a). The soil contamination at OU 3-14 soil sites is not surficial and cannot 
be dispersed by wind or wildfire. OU 3-14 soil sites inside the tank farm boundary are currently covered 
by a liner and up to 6 in. of gravel; three sites (CPP-28, CPP-31, and CPP-79) are also covered by asphalt. 
Most of the leaks and spills occurred below ground. A few minor releases occurred at the surface. Some 
of these surface releases have been cleaned up and all of them are covered by the liner/gravel. The two 
sites outside the tank farm boundary are also covered: CPP-15 is covered by a concrete transformer pad, 
electrical duct banks, and asphalt around the edges and CPP-58 is covered by pavement and asphalt.  
The selected remedy includes covering all soil sites with a low-permeability pavement and then 
covering the central and southern tank farm with an evapotranspiration cap with a capillary biobarrier. 
Because the contamination is not surficial and the remedy prevents it from becoming surficial in the 
future, contaminants of concern will not be available for dispersal through wind or wildfire. 
Comment 29: It would be cheaper to remove all the waste right now and remove the potential for 
mishap than monitor it over time. [WP, CR] 
Response: The risk is associated with the strontium-90 contamination that migrated into the 
perched water system below the soil over 30 years ago and not with the immobile contamination 
remaining in the soil that is decaying in place. Removing the soil would not remove the primary source of 
mobile strontium-90 in the subsurface because it is located primarily below the soil in the perched water 
and interbeds. The perched water system is the source of potential future contamination of the Snake 
River Plain Aquifer, so monitoring would still be required even if the soil was removed. Although cost 
was considered, cost is only one of the nine criteria used for remedy selection. The selected remedy 
provides the best balance of the CERCLA criteria. 
Comment 30: We remain concerned that DOE has once again chosen the cheapest alternative to 
treat some of the deadliest of waste. A remote handled extraction plan could provide $43 million in high 
tech clean-up jobs. [YNF, PR, WP, XW, TL, NH] 
Response: The State of Idaho, EPA Region 10, and DOE have selected a cost-effective remedy 
that also protects human health and the environment, complies with all applicable or relevant and 
appropriate regulations, and best meets balancing criteria. Using the CERCLA balancing criteria, the 
Agencies selected Alternative 2b because it is the most implementable, offers the best short-term 
effectiveness (protects remediation workers), and is the most cost-effective option (see Section 12.1 of the 
Record of Decision). 
Comment 31: At what point does our government agencies that hash and rehash the problem at 
INEEL finally take a stand and do the right thing? At 74 I can say without doubt that every time the 
government does not do the right thing it has to come back and with double the expense. Do it all over 
again...Dig up the waste, remove it, and eliminate the potential of the waste ever invading the aquifer. 
This is a no brainer, spend the money and permanently eliminate the problem. I want it all gone from 
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above my water supply. You would too. Be honest. Covering it up just postpones the cleanup decision. 
Then when it’s removed it will cost $50 million. The DOE has been balking at this for as long as I can 
remember. The bottom line is – this waste must be removed to protect it from leaching into the aquifer. If 
we continue to stall we face contaminated water and an ever increasing price tag to do the right thing! 
[TK, XW, BT] 
Response: The Agencies recognize that they have been studying this problem for a long time (the 
Agencies began investigating some of these sites under CERCLA in 1991, although some sites were 
investigated earlier under other programs). This is due to the complexity of the Operable Unit 3-14 sites 
and the challenges the Agencies face with cleanup of these particular sites, contaminants, and 
contaminated media. However, through the extensive investigations, the Agencies have learned a lot 
about these sites—the nature and extent of contamination, the fate and transport of contaminants, and the 
risk—and conducted a detailed evaluation of remedial alternatives. The Agencies have learned that most 
of the contamination in the soil is immobile (hasn’t moved in 35 years) and is not predicted to cause a 
problem in the groundwater. Digging up the soil does not protect the Snake River Plain Aquifer (SRPA) 
because the potentially mobile contamination is below the soil. Reducing infiltration will protect the 
aquifer by preventing the small mobile fraction of strontium-90 that is already in the perched water 
system (at depths greater than 100 ft below grade) from migrating to the SRPA in concentrations that 
would cause Idaho Ground Water Quality standard (same as maximum contaminant level [MCL]) to be 
exceeded. That is why the Agencies have selected the low-permeability pavement, evapotranspiration cap 
with capillary biobarrier, and monitoring rather than digging up the soil. Protection of the SRPA is 
ensured by monitoring of perched water, which will provide early warning of unexpected contamination, 
and monitoring of the SRPA. The Agencies agree with the commentors that the SRPA must be restored to 
MCLs. Fortunately, the strontium-90 contaminant plume is entirely on INL property and has not migrated 
to any off-Site water supplies. The leading edge of the plume is over 7 miles from the southern INL 
boundary and the plume is shrinking, a trend that the selected remedy is designed to continue until the 
aquifer is restored.  
Comment 32: DOE needs both the infiltration reducing cap [low-permeability pavement] and the 
worker protection cap [evapotranspiration cap with capillary biobarrier]. There was some talk this 
evening about doing only the worker protection cap. At the least, there needs to be redundancy in the line 
of defense between the aquifer and the rain and storm water that drives contaminants into the aquifer. 
[SRA]  
Response: The low-permeability pavement will be installed over the central and south tank farm 
and maintained until the evapotranspiration cap with capillary biobarrier (ET/CB) is installed after 
INTEC closure. The ET/CB will reduce infiltration over the central and south tank farm so that the 
low-permeability pavement will not be required. The selected remedy does not specify what to do with 
the low-permeability pavement. Whether to leave the low-permeability pavement in place or remove it 
prior to installing the ET/CB will be evaluated in remedial design. It would be left in place if it does not 
interfere with construction and performance of the ET/CB.  
Comment 33: The infiltration-reducing cap [low-permeability pavement] requires maintenance. 
How would this maintenance be done and how would problems be identified and fixed if the worker 
protection cap [ET/CB] is on top of the infiltration-reducing cap? [DP] 
Response: Once the evapotranspiration cap with capillary biobarrier (ET/CB) is placed on top of 
the low-permeability pavement, the ET/CB performs the same function as the pavement it replaces. 
Therefore, maintenance of the pavement under the ET/CB is unnecessary.  
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Comment 34: If the waste is not removed from the ground, there needs to be a great deal of 
attention paid to what type of system will require the least amount of maintenance and attention by the 
government. [SRA] 
Response: This evaluation was done in the Feasibility Study (DOE-ID 2006c) and resulted in 
selection of the evapotranspiration cap with capillary biobarrier (ET/CB) for long-term isolation of the 
contamination remaining in the central and south tank farm area. The ET/CB is designed to be 
maintenance-free. However, as part of remedial design, the Agencies plan to determine if the ET/CB 
should be expanded to cover areas where only a low-permeability pavement is required. The 
low-permeability pavement requires maintenance to ensure its effectiveness, and DOE is required to 
ensure its effectiveness until the Snake River Plain Aquifer has been restored to Idaho Ground Water 
Quality standards (same as maximum contaminant levels). 
Comment 35: Take a hard look at long-term maintenance costs for caps. Where have we done this 
before? What has the success been? What is the annual cost? How much maintenance is actually required 
compared to the plan? [SRA] 
Response: This evaluation was done for the Feasibility Study, including the cost estimates (see 
Appendix B of DOE-ID 2006c for details on the costs, including projected annual costs). Currently, INL 
maintains caps on several sites, including the TRA Warm Waste Pond, the Central Facilities Area landfill, 
the BORAX-I burial ground, and the SL-1 burial ground, and there have been no issues with performance 
of these caps. Actual costs for maintaining these caps were assessed for the Feasibility Study cost 
estimates for the selected remedy. It was found that actual maintenance costs have been similar to the 
planned costs.  
Comment 36: Asking a federal agency to commit to maintaining a structure like this of at least 
100 years is questionable. DOE's past and current activities when it comes to newly generated waste leave 
no room for public trust or confidence that they will maintain these caps, which is the only line of defense 
between the waste and the water. [SRA] 
Response: The Record of Decision is a legally binding document that commits DOE to maintain 
the covers as long as is necessary. That obligation continues until the remedy is complete and includes 
maintenance of all components of the remedy, including the final low-permeability pavement and 
evapotranspiration cap with capillary biobarrier. There are many examples of structures that the 
U.S. Government has maintained for over 100 years. The Agencies have selected monitoring of perched 
water as a line of defense to ensure the remedy is protective of the aquifer.  
Comment 37: If we could count on it being remembered 100 years from now that this was a 
nuclear site, nothing would need to be done now. In no reasonable scenario could there be a threat beyond 
INTEC. [C21] 
Response: The Agencies are committed to restoring the Snake River Plain Aquifer during the 
institutional control period, which the Agencies have assumed could end in 2095, regardless of whether 
the site remains a nuclear site for 100 years. The Agencies agree that there is no threat beyond INTEC 
under any reasonable future use scenario.  
Comment 38: Worker protection cap [ET/CB] does seem rather thick. [C21] 
Response: The thickness of the evapotranspiration cap with capillary biobarrier (ET/CB) is a 
function of the minimum thickness needed for protectiveness plus the extra thickness necessary to create 
the gentle slope for drainage. Most of the thickness of the ET/CB at the maximum thickness is grading 
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fill, required to achieve a surface slope of 3 to 5% for drainage. This grading fill adds 3 to 5 ft to the 
ET/CB thickness per 100 ft of horizontal extent.  
Comment 39: Several comments question whether or not the caps will sufficiently limit recharge, 
including from sources outside the capped area. [CAB, DP, SRA, YNF] 
Response: Based on research to date, including field observations on the effects of caps in arid 
environments, the selected remedy will adequately reduce infiltration rates of water and, thereby, the 
driving force for downward contaminant migration from the perched water system. Vadose zone 
modeling inputs included measured surface recharge rates over a model domain much larger than the 
recharge control zone, estimated/measured water from INTEC activities for the duration of activities 
there, and estimated/measured recharge from Big Lost River flows. Modeling predicted that reducing 
infiltration to 1-mm/yr over the 10-acre area alone would be sufficient to meet maximum contaminant 
levels in the Snake River Plain Aquifer by 2095. The Agencies recognize the difficulty of achieving a 
1 mm/yr infiltration rate at an operating facility and are instituting additional recharge controls. 
Monitoring and 5-year reviews will assess the effectiveness of the remedy and corrections will be made, 
if necessary, to ensure continued protectiveness. 
Comment 40: ROD should have a full description of institutional controls (which include public 
information) and their anticipated time span. [SRA] 
Response: In response to this comment, the Agencies provided details on institutional controls in 
this ROD (Section 12.2.4). Institutional controls and their time spans will be further developed during 
remedial design/remedial action (RD/RA) to ensure that the remedial action objectives are met. The 
RD/RA documents and 5-year review documents, which will provide details on the remedy’s 
effectiveness, will be available to the public in the Administrative Record. The Administrative Record can 
be found on the web at http://ar.inel.gov.  
Comment 41: Whenever we hear about cleanup projects, we always hear about what can't be done 
due to risk to workers. [SRA, PR, YNF] 
Response: It could be done, but removing the contaminated soil will not reduce the contamination 
in the perched water and interbeds that threatens groundwater. It would not be prudent to potentially 
expose current workers to contamination during soil removal for such a minimal risk reduction to 
hypothetical future residents or workers. Short-term effectiveness (e.g., worker protection) is one of the 
required CERCLA evaluation criteria. DOE places a high priority on worker protection, short-term 
effectiveness, and all other CERCLA criteria used in selecting the remedy. 
Comment 42: The DOE is incorrectly analyzing the true impacts of the alternatives to avoid 
revealing the health threat of their cheaper choice. [PR] 
Response: Under CERCLA, the baseline health risks are analyzed in the Baseline Risk Assessment 
(DOE-NE-ID 2006a) to assess the risks if no action is taken, in order to determine whether an action is 
necessary. Once it was determined that no action would pose an unacceptable risk, the Agencies 
developed remedial action objectives and remediation goals. The selected alternative must meet these 
objectives and goals, the threshold criteria of protecting human health and the environment, and all 
applicable or relevant and appropriate requirements. No additional risk assessment is required for the 
alternatives as suggested by the comment. Alternative 2b meets these criteria and is protective of human 
health and the environment. Alternatives 3 (includes hot spot removal) and 4 (includes hot spot grouting) 
are not cost-effective because they do not significantly reduce the overall risk to the aquifer over 
Alternative 2b. The baseline risk assessment and the analysis of effectiveness of the alternatives were 
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done according to CERCLA and were extensively reviewed. The State of Idaho, EPA Region 10, and 
DOE agree that these assessments adequately indicate current and future risks to human health and the 
environment. Monitoring and 5-year reviews will assess remedy effectiveness through 2095. 
Comment 43: This INTEC cleanup plan ironically uses the dangers of inhaling plutonium as the 
excuse to avoid removing the plutonium. DOE claims they are experts at cleanup, and have robots for 
waste excavation to avoid worker exposure. Dismissing Alternative 3a for harming workers is incorrect as 
a decision driver. The DOE says that if the waste and soils are exhumed, it would place the workers at a 
great health risk due to exposure. In other DOE clean-up operations there has been success in utilizing 
remote handling techniques and DOE has taken great pride in such efforts. If they could commit to such a 
strategy in this case then the future worries and legacy which extend out into the tens of thousands of 
years (based on half-life of plutonium which is 24,000 years) would be gone. [PR, YNF] 
Response: The risk to groundwater is from strontium-90 that is located in the interbeds and 
perched water, not the residual and immobile strontium-90 that has been in the soil for over 35 years. The 
amount of plutonium does not present an unacceptable risk if left in place, either to workers or to the 
aquifer. The presence of plutonium in the soil complicates the remedy, but doesn’t preclude soil removal. 
One of the reasons that the Agencies are choosing Alternative 2b is because removing the soil would not 
significantly reduce the risk to a hypothetical future worker or the aquifer but increases the chance that a 
current remediation worker could be exposed (gamma radiation and obstructions during excavation are 
the main concerns, but not the only concerns). Removing the soil is not cost-effective because it is a 
significant increase in cost over Alternative 2b without a significant incremental reduction in overall risk 
to the aquifer.  
Comment 44: It should be mentioned that workers have already done a lot of digging in the tank 
farm soil when it was much more radioactive. But it seems reasonable to protect workers in the distant 
future who are unaware of the history. [C21] 
Response: Many of the excavations were done in the 1970s (e.g., CPP-27/33, CPP-28). They had 
planned to excavate in CPP-31 at the same time, but decided to put the line that they were installing in a 
different place rather than dig into CPP-31. CPP-31 is more complicated than the other sites (i.e., the 
combination of the contamination depth, the high radioactivity, and the utilities that would have to be 
excavated through, including the concrete encasement). At CPP-28, they did not dig below the 
encasement, so workers did not dig into the most highly radioactive soils. Much of the CPP-31 
contamination is also below an encasement. The current contractor application of the As Low As 
Reasonably Achievable principle to control and limit worker exposures is more protective than in the 
1970s. Regardless of what transpired in the past with respect to worker exposure, the selected remedy will 
protect workers in the future. Digging into Site CPP-31 would subject today’s workers to unnecessary 
risk with little risk reduction for hypothetical future workers. 
Comment 45: Radioactive contaminants must stay out of the groundwater. This plan puts future 
workers and residents at risk. [CR] 
Response: One of the primary goals of the remedy selected in this Record of Decision is to ensure 
that the portion of the Snake River Plain Aquifer contaminated by INTEC operations will meet drinking 
water standards for future residents and workers. The selected remedy will accomplish this through 
engineered and administrative controls, and monitoring and 5-year reviews to evaluate effectiveness. 
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Comment 46: It does not plan for clean water. It plans for sort-of clean water. It represents a 
compromise based upon percentages and parts per million that have been determined as acceptable levels 
of toxicity for drinking water. [DP] 
Response: The Idaho Ground Water Quality standards are the same numerically as the maximum 
contaminant levels (MCLs), which are drinking water standards set by EPA (40 CFR 141.62(b) and 
40 CFR 141.66). Concentrations of contaminants in drinking water that are less than the MCLs meet 
EPA's drinking water standards. These standards, set by laws and regulations, are considered safe. The 
Agencies are obligated to find solutions that meet these protectiveness standards while using taxpayer 
dollars cost-effectively.  
Comment 47: Alternative 2b maintains continued risk of contaminant migration through perched 
water to the aquifer. [We] were assured that the plutonium that is currently mixed in the soils is no longer 
mobile, nor of “type” that can migrate. Explanations of this, however, have either been incomprehensible 
or based on questionable modeling assumptions. I do not believe a dirt cap on plutonium will prevent 
anything leaking into our only water supply. I cannot believe anybody would expect us to accept that 
premise. To save a bit of money, maybe? [YNF, XW] 
Response: The plutonium in the soil is not migrating and has not migrated in 35 years, and this is 
supported by sampling results for soil, perched water, and the aquifer and a conservative analysis that 
assumed there was a hypothetical mobile fraction. The cap is not being designed, or intended, to stop 
plutonium from migrating out of the soil. The State of Idaho, EPA Region 10, and DOE understand and 
accept the assumptions used in the modeling. However, because models are simply predictive tools, the 
Agencies include ongoing monitoring of the perched water and Snake River Plain Aquifer and 5-year 
reviews to confirm the effectiveness of the remedy. 
Comment 48: I want my children to feel free to experience Idaho and its beauty as I did as a child. 
I want them to grow up and not be concerned about issues with water and having cancer. [TL] 
Response: The Agencies feel the same way about the beauty of Idaho, the health and welfare of 
our children, and the importance of a clean water supply. EPA standards are conservatively set to protect 
human health and the environment. By selecting a remedy that will meet those standards, the Agencies 
are ensuring protection of human health, the aquifer, and biota. Even if the Agencies were to take no 
action, there would not be a health threat to off-Site populations or water supplies. The furthest extent of 
the strontium-90 contaminant plume is on the INL Site, and over 7 miles away from INL’s south 
boundary. However, the Agencies are taking remedial actions to reduce recharge to the perched water in 
order to restore the aquifer beneath the INTEC facility to drinking water standards.  
Comment 49: Think about the long-term effects and the damage that has already been done. [TL] 
Response: The Baseline Risk Assessment (DOE-NE-ID 2006a) examines the long-term effects of 
the contamination that has occurred in the tank farm soil and INTEC groundwater. It looks at the 
increased risk of cancer for workers exposed to the contaminated soil and hypothetical future residents at 
INTEC drinking the water. No off-Site effects have occurred from this contamination, which remains 
on-Site, and no off-Site populations are at risk. The furthest extent of the contaminated plume in the 
aquifer is receding back toward the INTEC facility, not moving downgradient toward the INL boundary. 
Workers are being protected from exposure to the contaminated soil and groundwater (INL drinking 
water wells meet drinking water standards). The Agencies are including monitoring and institutional 
controls in the remedy to ensure the continuing safety of the water supply and control worker exposures.  
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Comment 50: Pump and treat was illegally separated from the rest of the remedies and delayed. 
This strontium has already leaked into the aquifer and the perched area in between, well below the tank 
farm. DOE's excuse (“The Agencies did not consider pump and treat of the perched water because it can 
only be pumped at a few gallons per minute, and the pumping rate cannot be sustained.”) is hardly a 
legitimate reason to refuse to pump it all out and simply CONTAIN it. Pump all perched water out, even 
if it has to be done slowly, to protect our water. [PR] 
Response: The Agencies conducted a thorough analysis of pump and treat for strontium removal 
from the aquifer. The analysis showed that pump and treat of strontium-90 is not efficient or effective—
pump and treat could remove less than 0.1 curie per year of the almost 9,000 curies of strontium-90 in the 
subsurface. Over the next 30 years, radioactive decay alone will destroy about 1,500 times as much 
strontium-90 as pump and treat would. Pumping perched water is ineffective because the perched water 
can only be pumped at a few gallons per minute; the pumping rate cannot be sustained; the area of 
influence of each well would be very small, necessitating many wells; and the perched water is still being 
recharged. Furthermore, pumping perched water to remove strontium-90 would be very ineffective 
because most of the strontium-90 is not in the water; it is sorbed onto the sediments. On the basis of the 
detailed evaluations of the alternatives in the Feasibility Study (DOE-ID 2006c), the Agencies have not 
selected pump and treat. Instead, the Agencies have focused on reducing the volume of perched water 
using infiltration controls to protect the Snake River Plain Aquifer.  
Comment 51: The Tribes would like an assurance that DOE and the current and future M&O 
Contractors will do their best to maintain the integrity of the aquifer. [SBT] 
Response: DOE’s obligation to protect groundwater at the INL Site is inherent in its statutory 
responsibilities under CERCLA Sections 104 (42 USC 9604) and 120 (42 USC 9620) as delegated to 
DOE by the President of the United States of America. See Tribal Issues.  
Comment 52: DOE has illegally separated the treatment of Sr from their dwelling analysis and 
focus on alternative options for the soil at the tank farm transfer leak site. [PR] 
Response: The Feasibility Study investigated in situ treatment technologies (Table 3-1 and 
Section 3.2.2.4 of DOE-ID 2006c) and concluded that the technologies were not developed or 
demonstrated sufficiently to be part of the alternatives that were evaluated in detail. The selected remedy 
does not use experimental strontium treatment technologies. With regard to treatment of Snake River 
Plain Aquifer groundwater using pump and treat, which was evaluated in detail in the Operable Unit 3-14 
Feasibility Study, the pump and treat of perched water was dismissed for the reasons described in the 
response to Comment 50. Because pumping would not remove most of the strontium-90 in the perched 
water system, treatment of extracted perched water would not be effective in meeting remedial action 
objectives.  
Comment 53: DOE's plans to inject acidic polymers (carbopol), which will cover up this strontium 
problem, are not included in the public cleanup plans. DOE thinks they can avoid true cleanup of 
strontium-90 by an experimental temporary injection scheme of an acidic polymer. No one knows what 
will happen as the pH changes over time, but it can't be as safe as simply removing the Sr. These plans 
need to be included for public comment. [PR] 
Response: The research the statement is referring to was not part of the Agencies' Proposed Plan 
for Operable Unit 3-14, and is not part of the selected remedy because the technology is conceptual and 
not proven.  
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Comment 54: Future technology may be developed and we would accept that to be an option for a 
remedy if it may eliminate or further protect the aquifer. If remedy fails, perform a review to determine if 
there is new or other technology available to prevent or stop the spread of contamination [SBT, CAB] 
Response: The Agencies will review the remedy every 5 years to ensure that it is protective of 
human health and the environment and is functioning as designed. Furthermore, the Agencies can 
evaluate whether a remedy change is warranted at any time. If, in the future, the remedy is determined not 
to be protective, the Agencies can amend the Record of Decision to implement a new technology. If a 
new technology is developed that could achieve remediation goals faster, better, and for less cost, a 
process exists under CERCLA to modify the Record of Decision. This flexibility under CERCLA ensures 
that the Record of Decision can be changed when necessary to ensure that the remedy is protective or to 
improve the remedy.  
Design  
Comment 55: Will the caps be able to withstand extreme weather conditions such as extreme rain, 
snow, or flood, such as what happened in 1962 and 1969? [DP] 
Response: The evapotranspiration cap with capillary biobarrier (ET/CB) is intended to function in 
a range of average climatic conditions for the INL Site. The tank farm is mounded and did not flood in 
1962 or 1969. The area of the tank farm that will be covered by the ET/CB is outside the floodplain of the 
Big Lost River (BOR 2005). The final cap design will refine the conceptual design to address 
probabilistic estimates of wind erosion and precipitation based on the required period of performance (the 
duration of unacceptable risk) to meet all functional and operational requirements.  
Comment 56: Native plants in southeastern Idaho have roots that extend below 4 ft. How thick 
will the worker protection cap [ET/CB] be at its thinnest point? Do you anticipate ongoing issues with 
maintenance of the designed grade of the worker protection cap? How will they be addressed? [SRA] 
Response: The evapotranspiration cap with capillary biobarrier (ET/CB) incorporates a biobarrier 
specifically designed to minimize biointrusion by plants, invertebrates, and burrowing animals. Roots will 
not be able to extend down to the depths reached in native soils. The ET/CB will have a minimum 
thickness of about 6.5 ft. The relatively shallow design grade of 3 to 5%, which is intended to minimize 
surface soil erosion, is designed to last for the period of performance, without active maintenance. Cap 
inspections and 5-year reviews will identify any problems with the ET/CB and make corrections as 
needed. 
Comment 57: The risk assessment and feasibility study do not adequately address biotic intruders 
into contaminated tank farm soil. The commentor is concerned about extent to which intruders will affect 
both workers and dispersal of radioactive material and expects DOE to evaluate potential impact of 
intruders (e.g., ants) beyond a general reference. Will contaminated soil generate heat, will heat attract 
insects or animals? How many intruders will contact contaminated soils and how much contaminated soil 
will they bring to the surface? In what form? What will happen to contamination once it reaches the 
surface? What impact will this have on workers and the public? [SRA] 
Response: The ecological risk assessment was presented in the Remedial Investigation/Baseline 
Risk Assessment in Section 7 (DOE-NE-ID 2006a). It analyzes the ecological risk if no action were taken 
and assumes that the tank farm provides good habitat, which it currently does not (no plants growing 
through liner and gravel). The shallow tank farm soil is not thermally warm and is not an attractant to 
invertebrates, including ants. The ecological risk assessment determined that there was an unacceptable 
risk. As a result, the Agencies selected a biobarrier specifically designed to minimize biointrusion by 
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plants, invertebrates, and burrowing animals to protect human health and the environment. The 
conceptual design of the biobarrier was based on research on biointrusion barriers documented in the 
Feasibility Study (DOE-ID 2006c).  
Comment 58: How far will water from infiltration cap be moved? Will it be possible for 
infiltration [near the edge of the cap] to come near enough to the control area to influence movement of 
contaminants [in the soil]? [SRA] 
Response: The contaminants in the soil are not mobile and will decay in place. The remedy will 
reduce infiltration through the 10-acre area to limit transport of strontium-90 from the perched water 
system to the aquifer. The water will be moved 1,000 ft away to the lined evaporation pond, where it will 
evaporate. If water were to infiltrate outside the edge of the low-permeability pavement, it should move 
vertically downward and bypass the contaminated soil. The modeling predicts that infiltrating water 
outside the 10-acre area will not adversely impact the aquifer. If water moves horizontally under the 
low-permeability pavement due to wicking, or condenses under the pavement, this should not influence 
movement of contaminants in the soil because the residual contamination in the soil is immobile and has 
been there for 35 years. As part of remedial design, engineers will determine whether to install a system 
to reduce moisture under the pavement.  
Communications and Process 
Comment 59: Briefing today [8/30/06] with DEQ and DOE was helpful to understand what the 
regulators' and DOE's plan is to deal with this problem. [SRA] 
Response: Thank you for requesting the briefing. It was very helpful for the Agencies in 
understanding your concerns and they appreciate the opportunity to discuss the project and answer your 
questions. 
Comment 60: Two commentors stated that an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) was 
necessary. One commentor formally requests a full EIS under the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA). Only with a rigorous analysis of remediation activities versus future threats under NEPA can we 
have any hope of making a proper decision. Another commentor states that DOE is violating CERCLA 
and NEPA laws. [DD, PR] 
Response: Under DOE’s CERCLA/NEPA Policy, established in 1994, DOE relies on the 
CERCLA process for review of actions to be taken under CERCLA, i.e., no separate NEPA document or 
NEPA process is ordinarily required. Under this policy, DOE also takes steps to ensure early public 
involvement in the CERCLA process and makes CERCLA documents available to the public as early as 
possible.  
The basis for DOE’s CERCLA/NEPA policy is a determination by the Department of Justice that 
there is a statutory conflict between NEPA and CERCLA, and that NEPA, as a matter of law, does not 
apply to CERCLA cleanups. The statutory conflict is that, whereas NEPA allows judicial review (under 
the Administrative Procedure Act) before an agency takes action, CERCLA seeks to achieve expeditious 
cleanups and generally bars such “pre-enforcement” review (see CERCLA Section 113(h) 
(42 USC 9613(h)). A 1995 memorandum from the Assistant Attorney General, Environment and Natural 
Resources Division, Department of Justice, to DOE, EPA, the Department of Defense, and the Council on 
Environmental Quality, memorialized agency consensus on DOE’s CERCLA/NEPA policy.  
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The public comment period and public meetings on the Operable Unit 3-14 Proposed Plan 
provided the public with an opportunity to examine and comment on remediation alternatives (including 
the preferred alternative) and participate in the remedy selection process as required under 
40 CFR 300.430(f)(3). The Proposed Plan describes the remedial alternatives analyzed, identifies the 
preferred alternative, and discusses the rationale for its selection. The Remedial Investigation/Baseline 
Risk Assessment and Feasibility Study were also available during this period.  
Comment 61: One commenter said that the plan was illegal. [PR] 
Response: The OU 3-14 project (including the Remedial Investigation//Baseline Risk Assessment, 
Feasibility Study, the Proposed Plan, and this Record of Decision) has proceeded in compliance with 
CERCLA, the NCP, and the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (DOE-ID 1991) as agreed by 
the three Agencies. 
Comment 62: Commentor requests that DOE provide written response on technical issues raised. 
[SBT] 
Response: This Responsiveness Summary is the written response to all formal comments 
submitted by members of the public. It is available in the Administrative Record. In fulfillment of the 
DOE policy on tribal consultation, DOE is placing in the Administrative Record the comments provided 
by the Tribes and the Agencies’ responses, in addition to participating in meetings directly with tribal 
representatives.  
Comment 63: Several commentors would like to see regular groundwater monitoring, reporting, 
and updates to evaluate the effectiveness of the cap and whether it has affected mobility of contaminants 
in tank farm soil, and minimized or stopped the spread of contamination. For the first 5 years, DOE and 
EPA should do a yearly review, with regular reviews every 5 years afterwards. Other commentors 
requested a yearly update on monitoring results and the status of contaminated plumes. One commentor is 
confident the designs of the two caps are far more effective than older ones but urged DOE to inform 
public regularly of extent (concentration and area) of all contaminants of concern in vadose zone, perched 
water, and the Snake River Plain Aquifer. Findings should be compared to predictions made in the risk 
assessment. Any problems with caps should be discussed publicly. [SRA, SBT, CAB] 
Response: The monitoring and reporting frequency will be specified in the remedial 
design/remedial action work plan or associated monitoring plans and will be no less frequently than every 
5 years. Monitoring reports, which will be available in the Administrative Record, will include 
concentrations of all contaminants of concern measured in perched water and the Snake River Plain 
Aquifer. Findings will be compared to predictions made in the risk assessment. Any problems will be 
included in the reports and the 5-year reviews, which will also be in the Administrative Record. If a 
problem occurs that would require a fundamental change to the remedy, the Agencies would notify the 
public and accept public comments as part of a new Proposed Plan.  
Comment 64: I feel obligated to express my feeling involving the cover up. [TL] 
Response: The Agencies welcome comments from the public. The CERCLA process has been 
transparent and all documents that support the Agencies’ decision are available in the Administrative 
Record at http://ar.inel.gov. The CERCLA process was followed with involvement of all three Agencies 
in accordance with regulations and EPA guidance, including public involvement requirements. 
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Comment 65: Two commentors stated that DOE mailings describing the project showed a lack of 
basic information a person would need to make an informed and responsible decision. [YNF, EDI] 
Response: The Proposed Plan and Record of Decision are brief overviews of the Remedial 
Investigation/Baseline Risk Assessment and Feasibility Study and other technical documents and are not 
intended to contain the same level of detail, because the technical documents are available in the 
Administrative Record for anyone interested in that level of detail. The Agencies condensed thousands of 
pages of technical information in the Administrative Record down to 24 pages for the general public. The 
Agencies attempted to summarize the most important information. The Agencies also mailed a color fact 
sheet to try to explain the different types of contaminant sources, the contamination that exists today, and 
where it is in the subsurface. The Remedial Investigation/Baseline Risk Assessment and the Feasibility 
Study are referenced throughout the Proposed Plan for anyone who would like more technical 
information. The Agencies appreciate how difficult it is for the general public to read technical documents 
and, therefore, project people were available at public meetings and provided briefings and conference 
calls as requested to explain the project and answer questions.  
Comment 66: Two commentors stated that waste characterization was downplayed in the 
Proposed Plan. This persistent & deliberate trivialization of waste characterization leads the public to 
believe that there is no major problem. The process was deficient in full disclosure. [YNF, EDI] 
Response: Waste characterization data was just one element the Agencies used as a basis in 
selecting the remedy outlined in this Record of Decision. In the Proposed Plan, the Agencies tried to 
strike a balance between too much technical detail and too little. The Agencies put critical information on 
the first page to ensure that the public would realize that (1) the contaminated soil posed an unacceptable 
risk to unprotected workers, (2) INTEC groundwater would exceed drinking water standards for more 
than 100 years if no action is taken, and (3) remedial action is required to protect future workers and the 
Snake River Plain Aquifer. The Proposed Plan also discussed that 12 billion gallons of wastewater had 
been injected directly into the aquifer down the former INTEC injection well and that the strontium-90 
contaminant plume from INTEC is 1-1/2 miles long. The Proposed Plan clearly references the OU 3-14 
Remedial Investigation/Baseline Risk Assessment (DOE-NE-ID 2006a) and Feasibility Study 
(DOE-ID 2006c), both of which provide full disclosure of the nature and extent of contamination, as well 
as the waste characteristics. Both documents are available to the public in the Administrative Record 
found at http://ar.inel.gov.  
Comment 67: Two commentors provided examples where waste characterization is downplayed. 
For example, the Proposed Plan states that “strontium-90 exceeds the Idaho Ground Water Quality 
standard” but fails to say by how much. DOE fails to offer groundwater contaminant levels and 
corresponding MCLs [maximum contaminant levels]. This data is crucial for the public to fully 
understand the severity of the problem and draw their own conclusions on appropriate cleanup. This point 
was brought up in a meeting with the DOE, and the concern was noted but there was no follow-up. 
[YNF, EDI] 
Response: This comment has been addressed in the Record of Decision, Section 5.6 (Table 5-4), 
which gives current contaminant concentrations that exceed Idaho Ground Water Quality standards (same 
as MCLs) with the corresponding standard, to facilitate comparison between the two. The Proposed Plan 
stated that the Snake River Plain Aquifer currently exceeds drinking water standards because that is the 
threshold dividing what is considered safe and unsafe. Although the Proposed Plan does not state current 
contaminant concentrations, it gives the maximum predicted concentration for the risk assessment and the 
corresponding Idaho Ground Water Quality standard. The Proposed Plan also referenced documents that 
provided more detail, including specific concentrations. The Proposed Plan and Record of Decision are 
brief overviews of the Remedial Investigation/Baseline Risk Assessment and Feasibility Study and other 
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technical documents, which discuss in detail strontium-90 concentration data in comparison to the MCL. 
All these documents are available in the Administrative Record at http://ar.inel.gov. 
Comment 68: One commentor stated that DOE’s deficiencies of full disclosure are rampant in 
public mailings and DEQ and EPA are complicit in this misinformation. The commentor’s review of the 
Administrative Record identified 37,324.56 curies were released from more than 22,990 gallons of leaks, 
specific information on the maximum soil concentrations and depths, and the estimated 120 gallon release 
at CPP-15 contained contaminated soils at 778,000 pCi/g. [EDI] 
Response: The Agencies did not fail to disclose information. The Remedial Investigation /Baseline 
Risk Assessment (RI/BRA) (DOE-NE-ID 2006a) contains hundreds of pages of waste characterization 
information. The Proposed Plan and Record of Decision are brief overviews of the RI/BRA and 
Feasibility Study and other technical documents and are not intended to contain the same level of detail; 
the technical documents are available in the Administrative Record for anyone interested in that level of 
detail. Because only a brief summary can be included in a 24-page Proposed Plan, the Agencies presented 
information on the contaminant sources for the biggest releases and referenced where specific information 
can be found. Table 1 in the Proposed Plan compares selected contaminant sources. It shows over 
37,000 curies released. The Proposed Plan also mentions the volumes for the most concentrated releases 
(19,770 gallons mentioned) that included sodium-bearing waste, first-cycle waste, Waste Calcining 
Facility scrub solution, and process equipment waste. The other releases that were not specifically 
discussed in the Proposed Plan, but are presented in detail in the RI/BRA, contain much less than 1% of 
the radioactivity and contaminant mass released. This includes CPP-15, which contained less than 0.24% 
of the total I-129 released and less than 0.005% of all other radionuclides released at the tank farm. The 
data cited in the comment was for gross beta, which is not as accurate as the isotope-specific data that 
were presented in the same table in the RI/BRA, and was at a depth of 10.5 ft. Because the contaminated 
soil is below the depth of exposure for workers, it is the potential mobility of the contamination rather 
than the concentration that determines risk. The Proposed Plan focused on the mobility and the risk to 
groundwater under the facility.  
Tribal Issues 
Comment 69: The INL lands are within the aboriginal land area of the Shoshone-Bannock Tribes. 
The Tribes have used the land and waters within and surrounding the INL for fishing, hunting, plant 
gathering, medicinal, religious, ceremonial, and other cultural uses since time immemorial. These lands 
and natural resources provided the Tribes their home and way of life. When the Tribes signed the Treaty 
of Fort Bridger in 1868 with the United States, the Tribes protected their rights to subsistence and 
traditional activities on the unoccupied lands of the federal government, which includes the INL Site. 
[SBT] 
Response: In addition to responding to Tribal Comment 69, this response addresses common 
issues raised by the Tribe for the OU 3-14 Proposed Plan and will be referred to as necessary in the 
responses to Tribal comments. 
DOE recognizes that the Shoshone-Bannock Tribes (the Tribes) are concerned that INL is within 
the aboriginal land area of the Tribes and that historically the land and waters within and surrounding INL 
were used for fishing, hunting, plant gathering, medicinal, religious, ceremonial, and other cultural uses 
before the Shoshone-Bannock Reservation (the Reservation) was established. DOE also recognizes there 
is a distinctive obligation of trust incumbent upon the government in its dealings with the Tribes. The 
scope of the trust is defined by the specific duties and obligations contained in treaties, agreements, 
executive orders, or statutes. However, DOE cannot afford the Tribes more rights than the DOE has under 
the law and implementing regulations. Unless there is a specific duty that has been placed on DOE with 
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respect to the Tribes, DOE’s trust obligations are discharged by its compliance with general regulations 
and statutes not specifically aimed at protecting the Tribes. As a mutually agreeable vehicle to discharge 
our statutory responsibilities and implement applicable federal policies, DOE has entered into the 
Agreement-in-Principle Between the Shoshone-Bannock Tribes and the United States Department of 
Energy (DOE 2002b) with the Tribes to define their working relationship and recognize DOE’s trust 
responsibility. For example, in preparing the Operable Unit 3-14 Proposed Plan, DOE’s compliance with 
CERCLA regulations and requirements (e.g., public notice, meetings, and remedy selection) is sufficient 
to fulfill DOE’s trust obligation to the Tribes. At the same time, DOE and its contractors have worked, 
and will continue to work, with the Tribes to provide input to INL planning and access to INL as 
necessary or required by the National Historic Preservation Act, the Archaeological Resources Protection 
Act, the National Environmental Policy Act, the Native American Graves Protections and Repatriation 
Act, the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, and any other applicable laws and agreements.  
CERCLA Section 126 (42 USC § 9626) authorizes the federal government to recognize Indian 
tribes and afford them substantially the same treatment as states with regard to most CERCLA provisions 
at locations where tribes have jurisdiction, such as a reservation. This participation includes, but is not 
limited to, notification to the Tribes of releases, consultation on remedial actions, access to information, 
and roles and responsibilities under the National Contingency Plan. Since INL is not on the reservation 
and the Tribes do not otherwise have jurisdiction over INL, this provision does not apply. At federal 
facilities such as INL, the public participates in the CERCLA process through, among other things, public 
comment on documents such as the Operable Unit 3-14 Proposed Plan, community interviews, and 
participation on various advisory boards. Because the Tribes do not have jurisdiction over INL, their 
rights are on par with those of the public.  
The DOE, the State of Idaho, and EPA entered into the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent 
Order (FFA/CO) to remediate the INL Site. Although the FFA/CO uses the CERCLA process, it 
integrates the requirements of CERCLA and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (including the 
State counterpart, the Hazardous Waste Management Act). Since the State has jurisdiction to regulate 
hazardous waste in Idaho, and INL is located in Idaho, the FFA/CO resolved these jurisdictional issues by 
selecting the CERCLA process as outlined in the National Contingency Plan, and also providing a role in 
the remediation for Idaho as a regulatory agency. Since INL is outside of the Reservation, the Tribes have 
no regulatory authority at INL and are not similarly situated with the State. Therefore, there is no legal 
basis to provide the Tribes with a regulatory role under the FFA/CO.  
Article 4 of the Fort Bridger Treaty of 1868 (the Treaty) gives the Tribes a right to hunt on the 
“unoccupied lands of the United States so long as game may be found thereon.” At the same time, in 
Article 2 of the Treaty, the Tribes agreed to relinquish all title, claims, or rights to aboriginal lands outside 
the Reservation, including INL. This relinquishment was confirmed in a stipulated judgment before the 
Indian Claims Commission in Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, Ft. Hall, Idaho et al. v. United States, 19 Ind. 
Cl. Comm. 3 (1968). Any claims based on such rights would be barred by the stipulated judgment. 
For the Tribes to exercise their Treaty hunting right on the INL Site, the land must remain 
unoccupied and there must be game on the land. While DOE recognizes that the Tribes retained the right 
under the Treaty to hunt on unoccupied lands on the INL Site, the property encompassing this project is 
not expected to ever become “unoccupied” such that hunting would arise consistent with the use of the 
property. As long as the property is fenced and has other indications of occupancy, it will remain 
occupied.  
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Comment 70: Since the creation of the INL activities have damaged the land and natural resources 
both on- and off-Site. DOE's decisions regarding waste management, remediation, storage, long-term 
stewardship, and transportation activities must provide for the protection of the Tribes' natural and 
cultural resources. [SBT] 
Response: The DOE has for many years maintained a significant program for protection of cultural 
resources, including compliance with the Archeological Resources Protection Act, the Native American 
Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, the National Historic Preservation Act, the American Indian 
Religious Freedom Act, and other statutes. Pursuant to those statutes, DOE has appropriately involved the 
Tribes in consultation and other communications on these cultural resource protection efforts. 
Compliance with these statutes is integrated with all DOE programs, including remedial actions under 
CERCLA. 
DOE-ID has gone well beyond strict compliance with federal cultural resource laws in efforts to 
avoid impacts to cultural resources located on INL land. The INL Cultural Resource Management Office 
has developed, for DOE-ID, the INL Cultural Resource Management Plan (CRMP) (DOE-ID 2005) to 
guide these efforts and tailor the process of cultural resource protection at the INL to comply with federal 
cultural resource laws, DOE orders, Executive Orders, etc. The CRMP outlines strategies for the 
protection of all types of cultural resources on the INL Site and was developed over several years with the 
assistance of the then-Shoshone-Bannock anthropologist and others in her office, now called the Heritage 
Tribal Office (HeTO). As presented in the CRMP, the 2002 Agreement-in-Principle Between the 
Shoshone-Bannock Tribes and the United States Department of Energy (AIP) provides a framework for 
ensuring that the Tribes are involved in INL activities at various levels. A high level of involvement and 
collaboration is achieved through the INL Cultural Resource Management Office activities, including but 
not limited to, monthly Cultural Resource Working Group meetings, Quarterly Activity Reports, 
programmatic archaeological surveys, and yearly archaeological resource monitoring. Through these 
established communication lines, tribal representatives from HeTO are informed of INL cultural resource 
compliance activities and provided with opportunities to participate in fieldwork and development of 
measures that will protect resources of concern to them, particularly during ground-disturbing INL 
projects. Other CRMP/AIP-driven activities, such as special informational briefings by Idaho Cleanup 
Project and INL projects and direct delivery of environmental documentation, also provide the Tribes 
with opportunities to participate in decision-making. 
The specific natural resources of interest to the Tribes, related to their treaty right to hunt and fish 
on “unoccupied lands”, have been affected to a very limited extent, primarily by construction of 
buildings, roads, and utilities. Such construction predated releases of hazardous substances, so there were 
few surface natural resources at those locations that could be damaged by the subsequent releases. 
Outside the relatively small areas of land where roads and buildings have been constructed, many within 
fenced enclosures, approximately 99% of the 890 square miles of the INL Site is undeveloped and 
uncontaminated land with some of the most extensive tracts of contiguous natural habitat in Idaho, 
including both native plants and animals. This preservation has been formalized by establishment of the 
Sagebrush Steppe Reserve in cooperation with the Bureau of Land Management and the U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service. If, at some future date, portions of the INL Site are returned to the Public Domain, the 
biological resources that support hunting and food gathering will have been preserved much more than 
on Public Domain lands that have been open for unrestricted entry by the general public. 
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Comment 71: The Tribes are an affected tribe with respect to DOE EM/Clean-up plans and 
activities, and have a role in EPA and DOE’s planning and implementation process for environmental 
restoration and waste. DOE should work closely with the Tribes on a government-to-government basis, 
as outlined in the President’s Memorandum of April 24, 1994, on Government-to-Government Relations 
With Native American Tribal Governments (Fed. Reg. Vol. 59, No. 85, May 4, 1994). Part of the 
responsibility cited in the document is the requirement: 
“In carrying out this relationship with the Tribes, the DOE will assess the impact of DOE’s plans, 
projects, programs, activities on tribal trust resources and assure that tribal government rights and 
concerns are considered during the development of such plans, projects, programs, and activities.” [SBT] 
Response: DOE-ID, pursuant to the “DOE American Indian and Alaska Natives Tribal 
Government Policy,” dated January 20, 2006 (Bodman 2006), which implements all applicable 
Presidential guidance, solicited the Tribes’ comments on the Operable Unit 3-14 Proposed Plan. In 
addition to the Proposed Plan, the Tribes received fact sheets on this project. DOE held three briefings 
with the Tribes on this project and made formal presentations to the INL Citizens Advisory Board (CAB). 
The Tribes have a DOE tribal liaison who is also a member of the CAB, chair the CAB’s INTEC 
subcommittee, and were in attendance at all CAB briefings and subcommittee conference calls. See 
Response 70 for a further discussion of DOE’s efforts to fulfill its trust responsibility to the Tribes and its 
government-to-government relations with the Tribes.  
Comment 72: DOE, in this project, did not adequately assess the impact to the Tribes, nor did they 
provide trust responsibility to them, as provided by Fort Bridger Treaty and the above-referenced 
Presidential Memorandum. Unless the plans are changed to incorporate protection of these Treaty rights 
the DOE will finalize inadequate Remedial Action Objectives, will fail to provide alternatives that 
incorporate treaty rights, and then fail to provide adequate weight to the Tribal-based impacts when 
arriving at the preferred alternative at the Tank Farm (OU 3-14). A section should be added, in the final 
Plan for OU 3-14 that reflects DOE’s consideration of the Tribal Treaty Rights, one that specifically 
addresses clean-up alternatives at the INL that protect the natural resources consistent with these treaty 
rights. [SBT] 
Response: The remedial action objectives have been developed to incorporate Tribal rights as 
those rights are or may be applied to INL, as required by law and applicable guidance. As discussed in 
Response 69, DOE’s general trust obligation is discharged by its compliance with general regulations and 
statutes not specifically aimed at protecting the Tribes. DOE’s compliance with CERCLA regulations and 
requirements (e.g., public notice, meetings, remedy selection) is sufficient to fulfill DOE’s trust obligation 
to the Tribes. The response to Comment 69 also provides information regarding the extent of Tribal 
hunting and aboriginal rights on INL consistent with Treaty rights.  
Comment 73: By adhering to these clean-up policies DOE is, essentially, permanently removing 
the availability and accessibility of these lands to the Tribes. The archeological record is very clear that 
the lands at the INL were used historically by the Tribes and consequently they should be restored in the 
foreseeable future and returned to BLM whereupon the Tribes may exercise their hunting, fishing rights 
and to travel freely through this land, as they did before DOE took interim possession of the INL. Placing 
long-term institutional and physical barriers in these lands directly prohibit the future use by the Tribes. In 
this sense, the DOE has not carried out their trust responsibility to the Tribes, and have not selected 
alternatives that reflect consideration of restoring the INL lands back to a point where it would be safe 
and accessible to Tribal members to hunt, fish, and otherwise enjoy the use of their aboriginal territory 
protected by Treaty Rights. Recommendation: A new section should be added the CERCLA clean-up that 
changes the RAO’s to include one that “addresses Tribal impacts”. The Text Chart in the Plan that shows 
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Remedial Action Objectives should be changed to reflect the DOE’s trust responsibility to the Tribes. 
[SBT] 
Response: As discussed in the response to Comment 69, DOE is required to carry out its trust 
responsibility consistent with applicable law. In preparing the Operable Unit 3-14 Proposed Plan, DOE’s 
compliance with CERCLA regulations and requirements (e.g., public notice, meetings, and remedy 
selection) is sufficient to fulfill DOE’s trust obligation to the Tribes. As discussed in the response to 
Comment 69, while DOE recognizes that the Tribes retained the right under the Treaty to hunt on 
unoccupied lands, the property encompassing this project is not expected to ever become “unoccupied” 
such that hunting would arise consistent with the use of the property. See the responses to Comments 70 
and 71 for additional discussion in regard to DOE’s efforts to carry out its trust responsibility to the 
Tribes.  
Comment 74: Tribes preference for approved risk may be with the 1 in 1,000,000 especially since 
this area is considered as a Tribal resource and some elders may want to re-use these areas. Tribes have 
the right to gather, hunt and collect on aboriginal territory such as this one. [SBT]  
Response: The tank farm, which is the subject of this Proposed Plan, has occupied this specific 
location for decades. It has long since become unsuitable for hunting activities. The conservative nature 
of the Operable Unit 3-14 risk assessment bounds the range of activities that would result in Tribal 
members being exposed to contamination, such as hunting, gathering, and collecting, if this location were 
unoccupied lands. The selected remedy would be fully protective for these activities, and certainly the 
risk to Tribal members doing these activities would be significantly less than the risk to workers in 
conducting excavation or similar activities. See the response to Comment 69 for a discussion of Tribal 
hunting and aboriginal rights on the INL Site.  
Comment 75: Who is considered the regulators? Why aren't the Tribes a part of this bargaining 
team? Need Tribal involvement. [SBT] 
Response: Under the INL Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFA/CO), selection of 
the final cleanup decision for the buried waste is the joint responsibility of DOE, EPA, and the State of 
Idaho. The controlling statute is CERCLA § 120 (42 USC § 9620), which gives oversight of federal 
facility remedial actions to EPA, with additional involvement by the appropriate state and the appropriate 
federal agency. Mechanisms for Tribal involvement are discussed in the responses to Comments 69 
and 70.  
Comment 76: There has also been a question and a concern regarding the Tribes as being one of 
the regulators along with the State of Idaho and EPA with important issues at the INL. The INL is located 
on aboriginal and treaty rights areas of the Shoshone-Bannock Tribes. Radioactive waste shipments 
routinely travel through the reservation on I-15 Interstate and on the rail to and from the INL. [SBT] 
Response: The INL Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFA/CO) does not envision 
the Tribes as being one of the regulators along with the State of Idaho and the EPA for CERCLA 
decisions at INL. However, although the Tribes are not a signatory to the FFA/CO, under the CERCLA 
process the Tribes’ input is solicited through public notice, meetings, and the opportunity to comment on 
remedy selection. All final cleanup decisions are reached only after evaluating, through public notice and 
comment, including Tribal comments, the feasibility and safety of a full range of alternatives. Under the 
FFA/CO, selection of final cleanup remedies for Operable Unit 3-14 and other CERCLA sites is the joint 
responsibility of DOE, EPA, and the State of Idaho. As discussed in the responses to Comments 69 and 
70, DOE has entered into an Agreement-in-Principle with the Tribes that defines their working 
relationship and recognizes DOE’s trust responsibility. Further, EPA as a federal agency also has a trust 
  16-27 
relationship with the Tribes. The CERCLA process has provided for full participation of the Tribes; DOE 
and EPA, as federal agencies are charged with recognizing and implementing their trust responsibilities to 
the Tribes for the INL CERCLA cleanup. See the response to Comment 69 for the discussion regarding 
aboriginal and treaty rights areas of the Tribes. Lastly, the transport of materials, including radioactive 
and other wastes, on I-15 Interstate and on rail through the Reservation is regulated by the federal 
government by statutes implemented by the U.S. Department of Transportation. 
Comment 77: The protection of the land base and the people is of the highest priority for both the 
Tribes and DOE. [SBT] 
Response: We agree. 
Comment 78: It is quite evident that DOE only goes through the “motions” when offering their 
consultation with the Tribes. It is necessary to demand that a Federal Facilities Agreement be prepared in 
order to give the Tribes the necessary “clout” in dealing with this Federal Agency; otherwise we will be in 
the same boat forever, with “token lipservice” offered by DOE. [SBT] 
Response: The INL Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFA/CO) entered into by 
DOE, EPA, and the State of Idaho governs actions such as the Operable Unit 3-14 Record of Decision. 
The FFA/CO establishes a formal, three-party process for deciding how to remediate Operable Unit 3-14 
and similar sites, pursuant to CERCLA § 120 (42 USC § 9620). All final cleanup decisions are reached 
only after evaluating, through public notice and comment, the feasibility and safety of a full range of 
alternatives. Under the FFA/CO, selection of the final cleanup decision for the buried waste is the joint 
responsibility of DOE, EPA, and the State of Idaho. As discussed in the responses to Comments 69 and 
70, DOE has entered into an Agreement-in-Principle with the Tribes that defines their working 
relationship and recognizes DOE’s trust responsibility. The CERCLA process has provided for full 
participation of the Tribes; DOE and EPA, as federal agencies, are charged with recognizing and 
implementing their trust responsibilities to the Tribes for the INL CERCLA cleanup. As discussed in the 
response to Comment 71, DOE has conducted significant consultation and briefings to the Tribes and 
Tribe members. 
Other Issues  
Comment 79: There is significant groundwater intrusion from sumps (36,633 gal/yr) that collect 
leaks or other groundwater contributions to waste accumulation outside the original containment area. 
This data (not disclosed by DOE or IDEQ) indicates serious leaks or equally serious surface/groundwater 
contributor to INTEC contaminant dispersion into the underlying Snake River Plain Aquifer. [EDI] 
Response: The water that is collected in the referenced sumps is rainfall and snowmelt, not 
groundwater or waste from the tanks. The sump water described in the comment enters the tank vault 
through unsealed joints in the tank vault ceiling, between the roof beams and panels. The water is pumped 
out and treated using the Process Equipment Waste evaporator and does not leak into groundwater. The 
existence of the rainfall and snowmelt, and its effect on contaminant migration, is included in the model. 
The references where the data can be found were cited in the comment letter and are publicly available. 
The comment letter provides data from INTEC perched water in 1995 and 2002. Perched water 
concentrations have decreased over time. More recent data (from 2005) are included in Section 5.6 of this 
Record of Decision.  
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Comment 80: One commentor emphasized that the DOE must learn lessons to avoid future 
problems like Operable Unit 3-14. [SRA] 
Response: Current environmental requirements of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
(RCRA) that apply to the Tank Farm Facility are designed to prevent these types of releases. All waste 
transfer lines in the Tank Farm Facility have been upgraded to meet RCRA standards, such as double 
containment. The Operable Unit 3-14 sites are from old spills and leaks—the last known leak to the 
environment in the tank farm was in 1986. When design problems were found at the tank farm, DOE 
performed upgrade projects to correct problems and prevent their recurrence. In addition, DOE also 
reviewed the entire system configuration at the time of leak discovery and repaired or replaced piping 
that had similar inferior configuration.  
Comment 81: One commentor stated that DOE fails to disclose how much of the INTEC 
high-level waste tank sediments will be left in tanks, and what specific contaminant concentrations are in 
the sediments. [EDI] 
Response: The performance assessment, where this information was considered in the CERCLA 
process, was discussed in Section 1.3.12 of the Feasibility Study (DOE-ID 2006c). The requested 
information on the volume and curies of tank residuals, as well as the estimated radiological contaminant 
concentrations in the closed tanks, can be found in Basis for 3116 Determination for the Idaho Nuclear 
Technology and Engineering Center Tank Farm Facility at the Idaho National Laboratory 
(DOE-NE-ID 2006b), issued November 19, 2006, which can be found at http://apps.em.doe.gov/idwd. 
There was extensive public review and disclosure related to the Waste Determination and the High-Level 
Waste and Facilities Disposition Environmental Impact Statement and related Amended Record of 
Decision (see “Determination under Section 3116 of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 for the Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center Tank 
Farm Facility at the Idaho National Laboratory, Notice of Availability” (71 FR 68813-68814) and the 
“Amended Record of Decision: Idaho High-Level Waste and Facilities Disposition Final Environmental 
Impact Statement” (71 FR 68811-68813)). Although not required by Section 3116, DOE also made 
available the draft 3116 Determination for a 30-day public review and comment period in 
September 2005 (70 FR 54374-54375). No public comments were received during the comment period; 
however, comments were subsequently received after the comment period from the State of Idaho and the 
INL Site Environmental Management Citizens Advisory Board (Hardesty 2006; Kipping 2005; 
Trever 2006). These comments were considered in preparing the 3116 Basis Document 
(Provencher 2005; Van Camp 2006a, b). DOE also consulted with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC) regarding the Waste Determination Pursuant to Section 3116(a) of the National Defense 
Authorization Act. The DOE also provided other additional information, as requested by the NRC 
(NRC 2006a); DOE and NRC held public consultation meetings as well as several consultation telephone 
calls. On October 20, 2006, the NRC issued its “Technical Evaluation Report for the U.S. Department of 
Energy Idaho National Laboratory Site Draft Section 3116 Waste Determination for Idaho Nuclear 
Technology and Engineering Center Tank Farm Facility” (NRC 2006b). It is available on the NRC 
electronic reading room at http://www.nrc.gov with an ADAMS accession number of ML062490108. 
Comment 82: Wastes with sodium should not be pumped through piping near contaminated soil, 
as sodium could remobilize Sr-90, transporting it to groundwater extremely quickly. There needs to be a 
hard look at piping, joints, boxes, containment - what underground TF piping will be retired, remediated, 
and what will stay in service and used through the industrial use of the site. What types of liquids are 
being pumped through those pipes? [SRA] 
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Response: The Agencies share your concerns about sodium and its potential to remobilize waste. 
Idaho Cleanup Project has discontinued use, and initiated closure, of the brine pit near the tank farm. The 
suggested action—taking a “hard look” at the piping system—is a good idea and has been done. The 
results of the evaluation dictated which waste transfer lines are being removed from service and which 
will remain in service. Those that will remain in service have been upgraded to meet Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) requirements (double-contained with leak detection/monitoring 
systems). The waste transfer lines will not handle high-level waste, as that waste no longer exists (it has 
been calcined). Sodium-bearing waste that is currently stored in the tank farm will be transferred through 
RCRA-compliant lines in the tank farm to be treated prior to permanent disposal. This piping travels 
through some of the Operable Unit 3-14 sites, but does not travel through the largest release site, CPP-31. 
Additional current and future waste will typically be acidic and have much lower concentrations of 
radionuclides than historical high-level waste. Typical wastes will include decontamination solutions and 
similar low-level wastes. The lines that will remain in service within the Operable Unit 3-14 boundaries 
also include utility lines (primarily steam). However, the evaluation of the active piping systems and 
current liquid characterization is outside the scope of Operable Unit 3-14.  
Comment 83: Commentors requested that underground piping in areas near the contaminated soil 
not be used. One commentor stated that past leaks in valve boxes and transfer pipes could happen again. 
If there was a failure -- similar to past -- and liquid leaked into already contaminated areas, what is 
potential for remobilizing strontium and drive waste down into the aquifer? [SRA, YNF] 
Response: The current liquid waste system and hypothetical future spills are outside the scope of 
CERCLA and Operable Unit 3-14. However, the number of lines that will remain in service near the 
contaminated soil has been evaluated and minimized. The lines that will remain in service, particularly 
the waste transfer lines, do not have the same configuration as the lines that leaked in the past. The types 
of piping configurations that leaked in the past (tile encasements, two-piece screwed-together, etc.) have 
been removed from service and no longer exist. All waste transfer lines that will remain in service are 
made of stainless steel. All such lines have stainless-steel secondary encasements that have been upgraded 
to meet current Resource Conservation and Recovery Act requirements. Waste monitoring systems and 
leak detection systems are improved over historical systems. Due to these system upgrades, the Agencies 
are confident that another accident, similar to the historical incidents, will not occur.  
Comment 84: Continued operation of INTEC facilities poses a risk of further contamination. 
Leaving INTEC open will lead to prolonged inaction, and only partial cleanup due to operational 
constraints. INTEC infrastructure should be decommissioned as soon as possible to make way for 
thorough cleaning of the site. [DP]  
Response: The mission of INTEC operations is to ensure that legacy waste is managed and 
dispositioned properly to protect human health and the environment. Remediation of contaminated areas 
within INTEC, including cleaning and closing the Tank Farm Facility, tank farm system, and other 
INTEC facilities; treatment and removal of remaining Tank Farm Facility waste; and retrieval and 
removal of calcined waste require the continued operation of INTEC and its support facilities and 
infrastructure (see Section 4 of this Record of Decision). Sudden and abrupt abandonment of INTEC 
would leave wastes in place that would pose a threat to the environment. Risks of further contamination 
will be minimized by using processes that meet current environmental regulations and using improved 
technologies. A planned, sequential cleanup and shutdown of INTEC is the prudent way to proceed to 
minimize risks to personnel and the environment.  
DOE, the State of Idaho, and EPA are committed to the cleanup of Operable Unit 3-14 and the rest 
of INTEC. There is a regulatory agreement in place between DOE and the State of Idaho that includes 
cleanup milestones for INTEC. Because it will take time to clean up INTEC, even under DOE’s 
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accelerated plans, the Agencies are selecting a low-permeability pavement to be installed first. This 
component of the remedy provides equivalent aquifer protection as the evapotranspiration cap with 
capillary biobarrier. Comments relating to other cleanups at INTEC are outside of Operable Unit 3-14, 
but the Agencies have selected a plan that is integrated with these non-CERCLA constraints.  
Comment 85: Commentor stated that DOE is obligated by the State of Idaho to remove the 
plutonium and other contaminated waste. [YNF]  
Response: The Agencies are not aware of any requirements as described by the commentor that are 
applicable to the contamination covered by this Record of Decision. The agreed-to requirements 
applicable to this remediation are as set forth in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order among 
DOE, the State of Idaho, and EPA.  
Comment 86: Commentors addressed subject matter discussed or presented in documents prepared 
outside the scope of CERCLA or outside this Operable Unit such as End States and the containment, 
corrosion rates, seismic standards, potential flooding, waste classification, waste characterization, 
washing, sampling other media, and grouting or removal related to Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act tanks and piping. [EDI, YNF, SRA, SBT]  
Response: Comments not specific to the Operable Unit 3-14 project should be addressed to the 
appropriate program and will not be addressed here. The Agencies carefully evaluated each submitted 
comment to identify which comments are specific to Operable Unit 3-14 and have responded to those 
accordingly. 
Comment 87: Commentors rendered opinions on other DOE and/or INL programs (Nuclear 
Energy, Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, continued INTEC operations, other tanks, reprocessing, State 
of Idaho INL Oversight) unrelated to alternatives discussed in the Proposed Plan, such as the safety for 
workers in other programs. [SRA, DP, EDI, PR] 
Response: The safety and operation of DOE programs other than Operable Unit 3-14 and other 
comments not directly related to the Operable Unit 3-14 project are beyond the scope of this project. DOE 
continues to emphasize safety in all aspects of its operations (both nuclear and otherwise).  
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